Information Quality in Sequential Persuasion, 2025, Economics Letters, Volume 254, 112452. Link
The previous version was titled 'Does Inviting New Senders Improve the Quality of Information?: A Robust Approach'.
On the Possibility of Strategic Ignorance in Sequential Persuasion, with Satoshi Nakada, 2025. Link
The previous version was titled 'A Little Knowledge is a Dangerous Thing: Intentional Disregard under Sequential Persuasion'. Link
Consumer Privacy Protection: Service Personalization and Data Disclosure, 2025. Link
A model of robust Bayesian persuasion, with Shohei Yanagita.
September 2025: Japanese Economic Association Autumn Meeting (Hirosaki University)
August 2025: Summer Camp (Waseda University)
June 2025: Oligo Workshop (University of Cambridge)
July 2024: European Meeting on Game Theory (University of Franche-Comté)
May 2024: Japanese Economic Association Spring Meeting (Tokyo Keizai University)
September 2023: Summer Workshop on Game Theory and Experimental Economics (Institute of Science Tokyo)
June 2023: Oligo Workshop (University of Padova)
December 2022: Communication and Persuasion Workshop (Waseda University)
October 2022: DC Conference (University of Tokyo)
September 2022: Summer Workshop on Game Theory and Experimental Economics (Keio University)
July 2022: European Meeting on Game Theory (University of Padova, Online)