Working Papers

Price Recommendations and the Value of Data.  (JMP) (link) 

Abstract: This paper presents a novel methodology to regulate data collection for e-commerce platforms based on the marginal value of information. I consider a platform that discloses buyer information to sellers, via price recommendations, to influence their prices. I determine the gain in profit from acquiring datasets with marginally more buyers under two business models. First, when a platform charges buyers and sellers, it discloses information efficiently, but undervalues data. In this case, a subsidy scheme restores efficiency. Second, when a platform provides free access to buyers, it discloses information and ranks datasets inefficiently. I develop a classification of datasets depending on if they increase welfare or consumer surplus.

Short video presentation (8min30) : Link 

Additional note on the robustness of the trade mechanisms. 

The Production of Information to Price Discriminate. (CRC 190 discussion paper: link)

Abstract: We study price discrimination by a monopolistic seller that endogenously produces a market segmentation at a cost, and question the efficiency of the production of market segmentations led by private incentives.  We show that the efficient market segmentation gives all the gains in total surplus to the buyer, and the seller profit stays at the uniform profit level. Our result suggests that the private production of information by sellers to price discriminate is significantly inefficient. 

Short AI generated podcast presenting the paper (17min54): (link)

Surplus Squeeze and Informational Hold-up. (with Peter Achim, CRC 190 discussion paper: link)

Abstract:  We study a static bilateral trade setting with moral hazard, where a seller privately chooses quality and a buyer may pay to verify it. We show that buyer-side information acquisition can lead to informational hold-up through a mechanism we call surplus squeezing: precise verification enables the seller to extract all buyer surplus, deterring inspection and causing trade to unravel. When verification is noisy, uncertainty preserves buyer surplus and sustains trade. Our framework highlights how strategic responses to learning can distort investment incentives, offering a new perspective on the limits of information precision in mitigating moral hazard.

Collusion under incomplete information on the discount factor.  (link) 

Abstract:  The  gradual  increase  in  prices  at  the  start  of  collusion  is  a  recurrent  pattern  that  has been observed in many discovered cartels.  When firms have private information regarding their respective discount factors, I show that optimal collusive schemes feature a transition phase during which prices increase gradually.  Impatient firms, for which sustainable collusive prices are low, are willing to mimic patient firms to undercut them at a high market price.  To elicit firms’ true discount factors,  optimal collusive strategies take advantage of the differences in time preferences across types.  Patient firms delay the period during which the highest collusive prices are set to force impatient firms to undercut early and reveal their type.  In addition, patient firms find it optimal to reach the highest collusive prices by employing a gradual price path.  I characterize the Pareto payoff frontier and compute the optimal speed of price increases during the transition phase.