“The Effect of Complexity in an Electorate: Experimental Evidence” (job market paper) [Updated 3/1/2022, Appendix]
Abstract: This study investigates the effects of complexity in various voting systems on individual behavior in small group electoral competitions. Using a laboratory experiment, I observe individual behavior within one of three voting systems -- plurality, instant runoff voting (IRV), and score then automatic runoff (STAR). I then estimate subjects' behavior in two different models of bounded rationality. The estimated models are a model of Level-K thinking and the Cognitive Hierarchy (CH) model. I consistently find that more complex voting systems induce lower levels of strategic thinking. These findings show that policy makers desiring more sincere voting behavior could potentially achieve this through voting systems with more complex strategy sets. Of the tested models, Level-K consistently fits observed data the best, implying subjects make decisions that combine steps of thinking with random, utility maximizing, errors.
“The Effect of Leader Selection on Honesty and Group Performance: An Experimental Study” (With Brian Roberson and Raquel Asencio) [Updated 8/28/2022]
Abstract: This paper investigates how the mechanism for promotion into leadership roles in a team affects the subsequent ethical behavior of leaders. We conduct a controlled laboratory experiment that allows for promotion into leadership to take three possible forms: random selection, a formal competition, and an election. After a leader is selected, the group performs a task, and then, the leader has the option to honestly or dishonestly report the group's performance. In the context of our laboratory experiment, we find that promotion via election results in higher levels of ethical behavior by leaders, with the differences in ethical behavior between the random and competition selection treatments being negligible.