This paper examines how historically rooted informal institutions shape the allocation of state-controlled resources. Using 2011–2020 land transaction records, firm registration data, and a nationwide genealogy dataset, we identify firms affiliated with Chinese clans, which are local kinship-based institutions, and spatially match their land purchases to those of nearby non-clan-affiliated firms. We find that firms affiliated with local clans obtain land price discounts of 1.8%-3.7%. We investigate whether these discounts reflect social network ties or clans’ role in local governance. Clan-affiliated preferential allocation is also associated with weaker local development outcomes.
How do pre-existing informal institutions shape responses to expanded access to formal justice? We study China's 2015 case-registration reform, which sharply lowered barriers to court entry. Combining historical genealogical records with the near-universe of first-instance civil judgments from 2014 to 2016, we find that court adjudication increased significantly less in cities with stronger clan institutions. A one-standard-deviation increase in clan strength is associated with approximately 5 percent lower growth in per-capita civil judgments. The mechanism evidence is most consistent with complementary mediation. People's mediation became more prevalent relative to formal adjudication in clan-strong cities. The clan effect is also more pronounced in disputes not explicitly prioritized for court mediation, disputes between strangers, and cities without pre-existing registered mediation organizations. Alternative explanations based on differential pent-up demand, within-clan relational costs, and weaker downstream enforcement receive limited support. Our findings suggest that expanding formal legal access can increase the relative role of existing informal dispute-resolution institutions rather than simply displacing them.
"The Rise and Fall of Shanxi Banks in Historical China: A Political Economy Explanation" (with Jinyan Hu and Chicheng Ma) , Quantitative History of China, 2026
This chapter studies how political connections shaped the rise and fall of the Shanxi banks (piaohao), a type of Chinese financial institution operated by natives of Shanxi province that dominated inter-regional remittances in the nineteenth century. We find that Shanxi banks opened more branches in provinces where the provincial governors came from Shanxi. However, Shanxi banks declined after political connections were broken due to the collapse of the Qing dynasty in 1911, and the decline was faster in provinces that had been governed by more Shanxi officials than in the other regions.