Wednesday Series Download Telegram

President Isaac Herzog's Telegram account was hacked on Wednesday in an incident suspected of having a criminal background, the President's Residence announced on Thursday.The Shin Bet is handling the situation. There is no concern about information being leaked. The hack has been handled and the account is back under the president's control.Dr. Gilad Leibovitch, academic director for a wide array of cybersecurity-related study tracks at Haifa's Technion, addressed the event, saying: console.log("BODY2. CatId is:"+catID);if(catID==120){console.log("BODY. YES for anyclip script");var script = document.createElement('script'); script.src = ' -widget/lre-widget/prod/v1/src/lre.js'; script.setAttribute('pubname','jpostcom'); script.setAttribute('widgetname','0011r00001lcD1i_12258'); document.getElementsByClassName('divAnyClip')[0].appendChild(script);}else{console.log("BODY. YES for vidazoo script"); var script = document.createElement('script'); script.src = ' '; script.setAttribute('data-widget-id','60fd6becf6393400049e6535'); document.getElementsByClassName('divVidazoo')[0].appendChild(script); } "In cases like this, it must be assumed that the attack was designed to obtain high-level intelligence information...the most common technique used by hackers is 'phishing.' They present themselves as a trustworthy person or corporate entity, sometimes impersonating the official communications of an app such as Telegram, and trick the recipient into revealing sensitive information."Leibovitch added that two-step verification on apps like Telegram is an effective way to avoid such a situation.Previous hacking attempts targeting IsraelIn late September, Slovak ESET cybersecurity company reported that an Iranian hacker group called OilRig hijacked a series of legitimate websites in order to target Israeli organizations throughout 2021 and 2022. Telegram app (credit: FLICKR)OilRig carried out two separate campaigns, which collected browsing history, cookies, usernames, and passwords on targeted devices. Targeted organizations included a healthcare institution, a job portal website, and a human resources site. AdvertisementIn April of 2023, a group of hackers who called themselves "Anonymous Sudan" took down websites belonging to one of Israel's largest cyber security companies, Check Point. Earlier in the day, the websites of multiple major universities in Israel were also attacked by the same group, and were down for several hours.Among the websites unavailable for browsing were the sites of Tel Aviv University, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Haifa University, Weizmann Institute of Science, Open University of Israel and Reichman University.Tzvi Joffre contributed to this report.

Related TagsIrancyber security israelcyber securityTelegramAnonymous SudanCheck Point

In September of 1959, as he began to assemble a cast and crew for the first James Bond movie, Ian Fleming sent the following telegram to fellow novelist Eric Ambler, and asked him to find out whether his friend, Alfred Hitchcock, would like to direct. Hitchcock, who had recently wowed audiences with his action-packed thriller,

Download 🔥 https://tiurll.com/2y3i7s 🔥

At 07:58am on December 7th, 1941, Commander Logan C. Ramsey ordered the following telegram to be sent to all ships in the Hawaiian area after watching a low-flying plane drop a bomb on Ford Island. Ramsey had in fact just witnessed the very beginning of a coordinated attack on Pearl Harbor in which the Japanese, over the

Two years into World War I, on January 16th of 1917, the following coded telegram was sent by German Foreign Secretary Arthur Zimmermann (via the German Ambassador in Washington) to the German Ambassador in Mexico, Heinrich von Eckardt. In it, Zimmermann told Eckardt to approach the President of Mexico with a view to forming a

During that period, the second most watched series on Netflix was Dead to Me, which racked up 1.464 billion minutes. Wednesday, which has direction in several episodes and is overseen and produced by Tim Burton, has thus become the most watched at present.

While Netflix has not officially said anything yet about a second season of the series starring Jenna Ortega, it is a matter of days before it is confirmed that there will be more seasons.

While it is true that Netflix usually cancels successful series after one or two installments, the success of 'Wednesday' seems destined that the adventures of this character out of The Addams Family will continue for several more years.

/2/In Current Intelligence Memorandum OCI No. 1541/63, May 2, the Office of Current Intelligence concluded that complaints by Kong Le and Meo Commander Vang Pao that they were receiving insufficient support, which were cited in a CIA morning report of May 1, reflected typical impatience of field commanders with those supporting them rather than a problem of inadequate supply. The spirits of Kong Le's and Vang Pao's forces were good and had improved since the desperate days of early April 1963. The memorandum went on to explain the methods of supplying Kong Le and the Meo, similar to the information presented to the President below. (Ibid.)

We are aiding the Kong Le Neutralists and the Meo through five channels.

(1) Under Article 6 of the Geneva Accords,/3/ military supplies and equipment are permitted to be introduced into Laos at the request of the RLG. Souvanna Phouma has made such a request, but we have not surfaced it because it was not a cabinet decision. U.S. supplies are being delivered to him from Thailand. Souvanna is using his Soviet and American aircraft and crews to airlift these military supplies directly to Kong Le in the Plaine des Jarres.

/3/Article 6 of the Protocol to the Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos, July 23, reads: "The introduction into Laos of armaments, munitions and war material generally, except such quantities of conventional armaments as the Royal Government of Laos may consider necessary for the national defense of Laos, is prohibited." Full text is in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 1078-1083.

(2) Phoumi, with our encouragement, has been delivering arms and ammunition out of FAR stocks to Souvanna, who airlifts them to the Plaine des Jarres as described above. We replace the depleted FAR stocks.

(3) Phoumi is also delivering arms and ammunition directly to Kong Le's isolated units, using his own air force.

(4) Air America has augmented its regular airlift of food, clothing, etc., to the Meo tribesmen, who turn some of it over to isolated Kong Le troops.

[2 paragraphs (7 lines of source text) not declassified]

There are occasional reports of arms and ammunition shortages, both from the KL and the Meo. In some cases this is a problem of transport. It is easy to supply the Plaine des Jarres airfield, harder to get the materiel overland through the jungle to isolated units.

The Meo have not been given large reserves of ammunition, because they are extremely difficult to control. Nevertheless, we have so far been able to keep them adequately supplied on a current basis.

Over the last four days the situation in the Plaine des Jarres appears to have been militarily quiet./4/ Either this is due to a change in Communist tactic from military aggression to political and propaganda attacks, or is simply the build up before the next Pathet Lao assault on Kong Le. One risk we run is that Kong Le may well make the next attack in an effort to regain the positions in the Plaine des Jarres which he has lost. Thus our Ambassador in Vientiane is trying to walk a tricky tightrope between insuring Kong Le adequate military assistance, on the one hand, and avoiding the escalation of the fighting on the other.

/4/According to OCI No. 1541/63, 4,500 Meo guerrillas were involved in limited support of Kong Le. In a memorandum to Taylor, May 2, Bagley concluded: "The Meos continue to be a major deterrent to unlimited PL aggression in central Laos. There are some indications that Souvanna may have traded off a halt to recent Meo actions against the PL to get the cease fire now existing in Laos." (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Laos #2, 7, T-265-69)

469. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Harriman) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/

Washington, May 7, 1963.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 5/1/63-5/20/63. Secret. A note on the source text indicates the memorandum was part of the President's weekend reading for May 11.

SUBJECT

Actions Taken with the Poles re ICC Laos

The following summarizes, in response to your telephoned request, the actions which we have taken or are contemplating with respect to the Poles in light of their obstructive action on the Laos ICC:

1. When the cease-fire was first seriously breached in the Plaine des Jarres, Secretary Rusk called in the representatives of the three members of the ICC and asked that they cooperate to restore the cease-fire and to prevent further aggressive action by the Pathet Lao./2/ The Polish Ambassador, after seeking instructions from Warsaw, returned to inform the Secretary that his Government's representative on the ICC was being fully cooperative and that the cause of the current difficulties in Laos rested with right-wing elements rather than with the Pathet Lao./3/

/2/An account of Rusk's conversation, April 20, with Polish Ambassador Drozniak is in circular telegram 1815, April 20. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 Laos)

/3/The discussion of April 29 was reported in circular telegram 1861, April 29. (Ibid.)

2. During my recent trip to Moscow I stressed to Gromyko, as Soviet Co-Chairman, his responsibility for obtaining Polish cooperation in making the ICC effective./4/ I said that the Pole seemed to be guided more by the specific interests of the Pathet Lao than he did by his conscience or his own objective observations. Gromyko did not give me an effective response beyond assuring me of the Soviet desire to see the ICC function effectively. Khrushchev reiterated this desire when I talked with him.

/4/See footnote 1, Document 466.

3. On April 30 the Department of State instructed our Embassy in London to ask the British, in their capacity as Co-Chairman, to raise with the Soviets the violation of the Geneva Agreements inherent in the Polish ICC's Commissioner's failure to provide a member for the team which the majority of the ICC members agreed should be established in the Plaine des Jarres./5/ On May 3rd the British Foreign Office instructed its Embassy in Moscow to raise this issue with the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs. We do not yet have a report of the results.

/5/In telegram 5747 to London, April 30. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 Laos)

4. On May 6th Assistant Secretary Tyler called in Polish Ambassador Drozniak to express our concern over the Polish Commissioner's violation of the Geneva Agreements./6/ Additionally, Mr. Tyler complained of the continuing failure of the Polish Commissioner to cooperate in the Commission and of his recent irresponsible behavior after the ICC helicopters had been attacked by Pathet Lao artillery and automatic weapons fire. It was specifically decided that Mr. Tyler should make this demarche because it is with him and his office that the Poles have been dealing on such matters as PL-480 and other economic and trade problems. Although no connection was explicitly drawn between these matters and the Polish behavior in Laos, it is hoped that there will be some connection made in the Polish mind.

/6/An account of the Tyler-Drozniak conversation of May 6 is in telegram 1358 to Warsaw, May 6. (Ibid.)

5. If Drozniak's response to this demarche, after he receives his instructions from Warsaw, is unsatisfactory, I contemplate bringing him in to make more definitive demands for Polish cooperation and also calling in Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin./7/

/7/Drozniak's response to this demarche was reported in telegram 1428 to Warsaw, May 14. The Polish Government reiterated that sending the ICC to the Plaine des Jarres was illegal because the move did not have the unanimous consent of the three Lao factions. (Ibid.) In a letter from Rusk to Polish Foreign Minister Rapacki, May 16, Rusk expressed disappointment at the Polish attitude on the ICC, asked Poland to live up to its obligations under the Geneva Accords, hinted that the Geneva Accords had significance extending far beyond Laos or Southeast Asia, and stated that "it would be difficult to predict the serious consequences" if the obligations of the agreement were not fulfilled. (Ibid.)

WAH

470. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos/1/

Washington, May 16, 1963, 6 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 Laos. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Cross and Sullivan; cleared by Hilsman, Koren, Johannes V. Imhof of WE, Alf E. Bergesen of BNA, and in draft by Forrestal; and approved by Harriman. Repeated to Paris, London, Bangkok, and CINCPAC.

1104. Kong Le preoccupation with need improve his military and prestige position in Plaine des Jarres well and sympathetically understood here. As stated previous messages, our concern is that he should take appropriate action designed assure his continuing ability maintain integrity his military forces. While realizing such assurance not attainable in absolute terms, his dispositions, his logistics and his forces morale should be such that, in order destroy his forces or drive him from PDJ communists will be required launch such overt and flagrant attacks that they might be above threshold political risk and opprobrium which even Viet Minh would be willing to bear.

We do not have full confidence in Kong Le's military and political judgment such matters, and particularly have doubts if such judgment exercised in collaboration General Phoumi. Most disastrous occurrence, in our view, would be repetition Nam Tha fiasco, but we recognize there are circumstances under which military action by Kong Le might be necessary.

It is impossible, from Washington vantage point, develop adequate information or criteria enable us give guidance or even useful reactions re specific military moves. Our kibitzing must perforce be concerned primarily with evaluating, in advance, rpt in advance, predictable international political repercussions to contemplated military moves.

Therefore, it becomes incumbent upon those at closer range to develop systematic guidance and judgment re Kong Le military intentions. We recognize friendly elements in Laos have only limited means undertake such functions and that major available instrument must be French Military Mission. However, we consider it essential that you and other friendly representatives Vientiane immediately establish mechanisms which will obtain maximum value from resources we have at hand.

For Vientiane: You should approach your British, French and Australian colleagues with view establishing informal group charged with responsibility determining best means meeting problem outlined first two paragraphs this message. (Realize you are already regularly consulting with British and French.) This should not become group which will assume responsibility for Kong Le military decisions or undertake specific command guidance. However, it should be able develop model situation which would constitute optimum positions Kong Le could reasonably be expected attain without resorting to reckless or foolish provocation. This model could then serve as benchmark against which friendly reps in Vientiane could judge either requests for material or advisory assistance.

It would also serve as a clearing house for intelligence information concerning any proposed military actions by Kong Le and Phoumi which might, in group's judgment, prove ill-considered.

We would expect that nucleus group would be responsible officers French Military Mission assisted by US, British and Australian Military Attaches. We would assume such group would have no formal organizational status and would be particularly sensitive to French nervousness re possible compromises to their special status. Therefore, we leave entirely to your judgment manner in which you attempt create this grouping or form which it will take.

We would naturally assume that French, through their military mission status, could have direct access to and influence on Kong Le and his commanders. However, it is imperative that Souvanna be fully informed on US, UK and Australian advice or comment on military matters affecting Plaine des Jarres and fully aware of political consequences resulting from any military moves so that he would not repudiate any Kong Le actions.

For London, Paris: In order not compromise Unger's efforts this matter, Embassies London and Paris should take no initiatives this juncture, but should be prepared support Unger's moves or respond to his requests for support in capitals.

Rusk

471. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Thompson) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/

Washington, May 20, 1963.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 Laos. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Thompson.

SUBJECT

Conversation aboard the Patrick J on Saturday, May 18, 1963

During the boat trip which the Secretary arranged for Ambassador Dobrynin, the Soviet Embassy Counselor, Alexander Zinchuk, made two interesting statements about Laos. The first one was that the Soviets had little means of influencing developments there. The second was that one difficulty in Laos was that both the Right and Left Wings were strong, whereas the center was weak.

Information received today to the effect that the Soviets are apparently pulling out personnel that have remained with Laotian neutralist forces could have two explanations. The first is that the Soviets are now going to back the Pathet Lao, and probably work for partition. The second is that they may be wanting to disengage in order to put full responsibility for what happens upon the Viet-Minh and Chinese Communists. To the extent that the latter might be true, a strong United States reaction to any Pathet Lao resumption of hostilities, or attempt to partition the country, would appear to be called for. I would suggest that we should have a contingency plan for consideration if it should develop that the Soviets in their quarrel with the ChiComs would like to demonstrate that the Chinese high-risk policy is too dangerous. One such action might be something along the following lines:

After the Pathet Lao had made some clear aggressive move, we could inform the Soviet Union that the Pathet Lao, backed or possibly instigated by the Viet-Minh and ChiComs seem determined to destroy the Geneva Accords. We would say that we had decided that the only way to re-establish the neutral Laos that we have agreed upon is to teach the Pathet Lao and the Viet-Minh a lesson, and that we have determined to do this. We would point out that our sole purpose is to restore the Geneva Accords and that while, as a precautionary measure, we are moving some forces into Thailand, we plan only a one-shot operation to demonstrate that the Geneva Accords must be upheld. This operation, which would take place simultaneously with the notification to the Soviets, would be a heavy bombing raid by United States planes, concentrated chiefly upon areas where Viet-Minh forces are believed to be, but the bombers would also attack bridges and other communication targets leading from North Viet-Nam into Laos.

There are, of course, a good many obvious disadvantages to such a course of action. Among others, it would be difficult for the American public to understand the use of American forces in Laos when we are unwilling to use them in Cuba. Unless the Pathet Lao aggressive action was flagrant, our action would hurt our standing in world opinion. It might have the opposite effect of that intended, and might bring about overt Soviet or ChiCom aid to the Pathet Lao, perhaps by a similar bombing raid on Phoumi strongpoints. Moreover, even if successful it might be impossible to reconstitute a neutralist government.

Finally, if the psychological effect were great enough, General Phoumi might get out of hand and refuse to be called off from attacks which he might undertake to exploit our action. On the other side of the coin, it is possible that such action would have a salutary effect not only in Laos and probably in South Viet-Nam, but might also be preferable to having American ground forces drawn into Laos in a situation in which it would be very difficult for them to be withdrawn. Moreover, it could very easily be a deciding factor in the Sino-Soviet dispute. I should think it would at least merit examination as a contingency plan.

472. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos/1/

Washington, May 24, 1963, 6:23 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 Laos. Top Secret. Drafted by Cross, cleared in draft with Heinz and with Koren, and approved by Hilsman. Repeated to London, Bangkok, Paris, and CINCPAC.

1136. Ref: Embtel 1719./2/ Role of US and/or SEATO in case Lao situation should deteriorate further is again being studied in Washington along with general updating of contingency plans./3/ However, as you point out, reftel raises several questions which are unanswerable at this time. Therefore, this message can only provide general guidance on our policy objectives in respect to non-communist Lao military forces.

/2/In telegram 1719, May 18, Unger asked a number of questions about U.S. military goals for Laos: should the United States build up conservative-neutralist forces so that they could hold their own against the Pathet Lao--supported by North Vietnamese cadres--or so they support the anti-Communist Laos forces to serve primarily as a trip-wire or plate glass window holding the Pathet Lao long enough for the West to make a decision how to react. Unger felt that the best the conservative and neutralists troops could do was act as a trip-wire. Unger also suggested that Washington policymakers consider the "old question" of working through the French in keeping with the Geneva Accords or seeking a more direct and effective relationship. (Ibid.)

/3/In a memorandum to Bundy, May 23, Legere provided background on the contingency planning for Laos. Legere informed Bundy that Forrestal, Harriman, and Hilsman wanted the JCS to come up with alternative contingency actions for Laos. The planning would examine, with pros and cons and an order of preference, U.S. support to Kong Le's forces and, with the same format, the question of introduction of U.S. forces into Laos. Legere discovered that there might be some reluctance to undertake this task because "everyone who has been mixed up in this Laos in-fighting" was "nursing a lot of grudges and scar tissue." Nevertheless, the JCS was prepared to initiate the contingency planning. (Memoranda from Legere to Bundy, May 21, 22, 23, and 23; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 5/21/63-5/30/63)

1. Objectives. Our efforts with non-communist forces should be directed at (a) maintaining non-communist forces at level of morale and equipment which can hold long enough against attack to focus international attention on situation and crystallize the elements out of which we must make decision as to what actions to take. It obvious whatever we choose to do would be immeasurably harder to achieve if non-communist Lao simply folded completely and at once. (b) Producing strongly enough motivated non-communist forces to resist communist nibbling tactics where non-communists and communists are in direct contact. (c) Supporting forces which could eliminate PL elements from areas generally dominated by FAR, particularly in South and vicinity of Vientiane. (d) Supporting forces which could attempt to extend FAR into areas which PL has not yet firmly occupied or where it is weak.

2. Support. We agree with reftel that neutralists and FAR could not resist for long strong VM supported PL attacks. Further, we doubt whether merely by increasing materiel support to non-communist forces we could overcome powerful psychological boost PL get from presence their North Vietnamese comrades. For these reasons it does not appear advisable for us to attempt build-up of non-communist forces either in numbers or in new equipment (aside from replacements worn-out items).

3. Morale. As we have implied chances of obtaining all or indeed any our objectives boils down to motivation of non-communist forces. Basic question which we again face is how can we improve morale of FAR and neutralists without openly committing US in advance to their immediate and direct support (i.e. by US forces) in case of showdown. Regrettably, we have nothing new to offer on this perennial sixty-four dollar question. However, would appreciate your thinking over this problem once again and forwarding your comments and recommendations as to any steps we might take now under present overall guidance to meet it, such as directly paying FAR and KL or increased airlift for Phoumi. Would also appreciate your considering possible removal some restraints now imposed, such as use of bombs by T-6's or re-introducing US advisers particularly to regional commanders.

4. Kong Le. Our most immediate concern in military field is in connection present threat to Kong Le on PDJ and in trying to strengthen him to point where it will be necessary for PL/VM to mount major attack to wipe him out or drive him from PDJ. Believe exchanges of messages between us over past few weeks have established general guidelines this aspect our policy. For the moment support to Kong Le can be regarded as separate from problem of what to do with non-communist forces as a whole and over long run.

5. Meo. Our objectives with Meo is to maintain them much as they are now and to support their present type of operations. How we would use Meo assets in various contingencies which could face us cannot be determined at this stage. It is possible that they can somehow be used as bargaining lever to force communists to accept less satisfactory, to them, partition line if and when partition became subject of negotiation. In meantime, Meo prevent consolidation of communist control over much of PL held areas and they are of direct support to Kong Le.

6. French. We must continue try to engage French to extent they would actually contribute to above objectives. However, we fully realize that their motives and leverage quite different from ours. Moreover, in no other field concerning Laos have our (and Lao) relations with French been more difficult than that of military assistance. Would appreciate your latest thinking on French role in light objectives set forth above.

Rusk

473. Memorandum From Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy/1/

Washington, May 29, 1963.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 5/21/63-5/30/63. Secret. Drafted by Forrestal.