Using responses obtained through the Nielsen Homescan panel survey, we explore the differences between managers’ and non-managers’ expectations and perceptions of inflation and unemployment. By and large, managers and non-managers exhibit similar average inflation and unemployment expectations as well as similar levels of disagreement and sensitivity to information provided in a randomized control trial. Responses to hypothetical questions suggest that inflation expectations of managers frequently affect their economic decisions. Finally, the inflation expectations of managers deviate systematically from the predictions of "anchored" expectations.

This paper examines the division of household work in several post-socialist countries during their democratic transition period and compares them to advanced economies between 1994 and 2012. While female time allocation became more similar to that in advanced economies over time, some differences persist. Conventional determinants of time allocation to unpaid work at home are relevant in post-socialist countries; however, female time availability matters significantly less than in advanced economies. The Kitagawa–Blinder–Oaxaca decomposition suggests that differences between the regimes exist largely due to unobservable factors rather than determinants controlled for in this study.

How do agents form their macroeconomic expectations and how do they incorporate them into their economic decisions? Do they think about each variable independently or do they revise expectations jointly? Using experimental evidence from the U.S. online labor market, we show that when people receive one relevant piece of information, they simultaneously update their expectations about multiple macroeconomic variables. For example, when people receive information about the price inflation rate, they revise not only their price inflation expectations but also their aggregate wage growth and unemployment expectations. Exploiting exogenous variation in expectations arising from randomized information provision, we document that such simultaneous revision of expectations has important implications for the likelihood of wage-price spirals. Specifically, we show that, after controlling for wage growth and unemployment rate expectations, higher price inflation expectations result in a downward revision of reservation wages, implying that households perceive inflation as a bad signal about the economy. These results suggest that the risk of wage-price spirals was limited in the U.S. in 2022, despite the high inflation rates.

I assemble a novel dataset to examine the long-term consequences of blacklisting, a Soviet policy used to deter market-oriented behavior through collective punishment of Ukrainian villages in 1932-33. Under blacklisting, all village residents could be banned from trade and provision of crucial goods, prohibited from moving, and imposed harsh in-kind fines. Formally, the policy was meant to punish the communities underperforming in terms of state food procurement (similar to in-kind taxation) because local procurement shortfalls supposedly were a consequence of intentional, profit-seeking behavior. Using a weather-based instrument for the locality’s blacklisting status, I document that blacklisting significantly reduced the present-day nightlight intensity (a proxy measure for economic development). Additional evidence points to entrepreneurship and trust as channels for this effect. My results support the notion that policies that suppress economic freedoms and disrupt social structure can have persistent negative effects on economic performance.