Published papers:
Selling order in a sequential auction. (with H. Gunay and X. Meng) Economic theory bulletin 14, 10 (2026)
Working papers:
Single crossing in multidimensional screening: Implementability and optimality. (with Aloisio Araujo)
Abstract: We study screening problems where the principal's allocation is one dimensional and the agent's private information is multidimensional. We provide conditions on the utility of the agent that simplify the problem in the same way the single crossing assumption does in onedimensional models: local incentive compatibility implies global incentive compatibility and the type space can be endogenously ordered according to marginal valuation. We present a new and more general characterization of implementable allocations which can be read as the requirement that the allocation is nondecreasing across the order of marginal utility that it induces on the type space. We also provide a simple algorithm that allows us to find optimal contracts in screening models for the specific case of a bidimensional model. This algorithm admits a simplification when the model has a one-dimensional index or utility is linear in types as is commonly assumed. We provide several examples to illustrate this algorithm.
Multidimensional Bayesian monopoly regulation. (with Aloisio Araujo)
Abstract: We study the optimal regulatory policy for a bayesian regulator who faces a monopolist with private information in cost and demand. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we find no genericity of exclusion: if demand is sufficiently high, the regulator allows all firm types to operate. We show that the optimal regulated price follows a straightforward generalization of Baron and Myerson (1982)'s adjusted marginal cost formula. Two novel and robust phenomena appear in this multidimensional environment. First, the regulator typically caps the firm's price at the maximum possible marginal cost inducing a ``bunching at the bottom" which arises independently of the distribution. Second, for some firms it'll be optimal to set the regulated price below marginal cost. Both of this phenomena arise from the fact that incentive compatibility in this bidimensional environment induces a strong conflict between social and private incentives for pricing. We perform comparative statics showing how the shape of the optimal regulatory policy responds to changes in the regulator's preference over efficiency and redistribution as well as changes on the relative size of uncertainty in cost and demand. We show that the bidimensional solution converges to Baron and Myerson (1982)'s solution as uncertainty in demand vanishes and to Lewis and Sappington (1988)'s solution as uncertainty in cost vanishes. We also make comparisons between the bayesian and the robust approaches to monopoly regulation.