Working Papers:
Extensive games with randomly disturbed payoffs: A new rationale for equilibrium refinements (with Max Stinchcombe), June 2024.
Robust information design (coming soon).
Marriage market equilibrium with matching on latent ability: Identification using a compulsory schooling expansion (with Dan Anderberg, Jesper Bagger and Tanya Wilson), Aug 2022.
Older papers: not currently active or partially incorporated in published work.
A foundation for Markov Equilibria in infinite horizon perfect information games (with George Mailath and Stephen Morris), 2009.
The robustness of repeated game equilibria to incomplete payoff information, 2000.
Recent publications
Strategic parental investments in a competitive marriage market (with Wenchao Li and Junjian Yi, forthcoming European Economic Review.
Robust relational contracts with subjective performance evaluation (with Wojciech Olszewski and Tom Wiseman), Theoretical Economics, July 2024.
The Ratchet Effects: A Learning Perspective (with Nikita Roketskiy), Jounal of Economic Theory, October 2023.
Multidimensional pre-marital investments with imperfect commitment (with Wenchao Li and Junjian Yi), Journal of Political Economy, October 2023.
Consumer privacy and serial monopoly (with Nikita Roketskiy), Rand Journal of Economics, 2021.
Community Enforcement of Trust with bounded memory (with Caroline Thomas), Review of Economic Studies, 2019.
The culture of overconfidence (with Caroline Thomas), American Econ. Review Insights, 2019.
The curse of long horizons (with George Mailath), Journal of Mathematical Economcs, 2019.
The economic functioning of online drugs markets (with Robin Linacre and Steve Machin), Journal of Econ. Behavior and Organization, 2019.
The impact of monitoring in infinitely repeated games: perfect, public and private (with Masaki Aoyagi and Guillaume Frechette), AEJ: Micro, 2019.
The demographic transition and the position of women: A marriage market perspective, Economic Journal, 2019. Print Appendix. Online Appendix.
Marriage as rat-race: Noisy pre-marital investments with assortative matching (with Ed Hopkins), Journal of Political Economy 2016.
A Foundation for Markov Equilibria in sequential games with finite social memory (with George Mailath and Stephen Morris), Review of Economic Studies 2013.