My research interest lies in microeconomic theory, with a focus on mechanism design and organizational economics.
I am on the 2026-2027 job market!
Working Papers
In this paper, I analyze a model where a profit-maximizing monopolist competes against a free, capacity-constrained public option. My main finding is that when increasing capacity is not possible, improving quality can backfire, making every consumer worse off. The reason is that improving the quality of a public option holding its capacity fixed can have an anti-competitive effect. Rather than competing with a high quality and free public option, the monopolist finds it optimal to exploit the residual demand, namely the consumers who are rationed out of the public option. I show that this anti-competitive effect can be reversed by increasing capacity. Finally, I study how the public option changes the monopolist’s menu, and the composition of her consumer base.
How Markets Disrupt Mediated Trade (Revise & Resubmit, AEJ Micro)
The Art of Waiting (with Ece Teoman) (conditionally accepted, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization)
Work in Progress
I consider a model of costly screening in the presence of adverse selection and moral hazard. A Principal faces a heterogeneous pool of candidates, and must decide whether to accept of reject them. She would like to accept only high types, but screening is costly. Prior to screening, agents can exert effort to improve their type. Since screening is costly, Principal might not want to evaluate all candidates., and may want to filter some of them using a first stage test. However, such first stage screening tests are often manipulable. Examples include initial screening using resumes (that people can lie on) in recruitment prior to conducting an interview. The question that I ask is: In this setting of costly screening and investment, what is the Principal-optimal first stage test, in the class of all manipulable tests? The somewhat surprising answer is that the best first stage test may be the one that's always manipulated in equilibrium, and filters out no one. The reason for this is that in equilibrium, there is a trade off between screening and investment. The test that appears to be useless because it screens out no one, actually incentivizes the maximum investment by the agents to improve their types, leading to the best ex ante pool of agents, and under some conditions, is the optimal test.