Charlie Kurth

Email: charles.kurth [at] wmich [dot] edu

Office Hours: Wednesdays, 3:00-4:00 pm, and by appointment

Office Location: Moore 3010

Course Overview

In this seminar, we will explore recent work on moral realism (and normative realism more generally). Moral realism is the view that takes moral properties and facts to be mind-independent -- independent in the sense of not being the product of our thoughts, attitudes, conventions, or institutions. As we will see, moral realism comes in a variety forms. Naturalistic versions, for instance, maintain that moral properties are no different than ordinary natural properties (e.g., the basic properties of science). Non-naturalists, by contrast, take the moral domain to be importantly distinct from the natural properties and facts--they're sui generis entities.

In the last several years, there has been increased interest in realist metaethical accounts -- especially non-naturalistic versions. One of our principle projects will be to look at some of this recent research and assess its prospects and problems. To do this, we will explore a range of traditional metaethical issues concerning moral metaphysics, moral epistemology, and moral psychology. Moreover, though our focus will be on moral realism, our critical investigation will introduce us to competing metaethical views: expressivism, error theory, and constructivist proposals.

Texts

T. M. Scanlon, Being Realistic About Reasons

Alex Miller, Contemporary Metaethics [Recommended]

Selected readings available on the course web site

Assignments and Grading

This course will have three graded components.

1) Class participation (15%). This course is structured as a seminar. So you will be expected to come to class prepared to discuss the readings. To give you some guidance, I will provide weekly reading questions. While you are not required to write up answers to these questions, you should come to class prepared to talk about them.

2) Reading responses (40%). Throughout the course, you will write four brief critical response essays. More specifically, you need to write one response for each of Parts 1-3 of the course, your fourth response paper can be for anything in Parts 1-4 (the readings for Jan 10 are not eligible for reading responses). Those constraints aside, you are free to choose which reading you write about and you can use the reading questions as guide for your response papers. These essays should be approximately 500-600 words long (standard formatting).

In your response paper, you should focus on just one of that week's assigned readings. Having picked a reading, you should then do two things. First, you should summarize one argument from the reading you selected (not the entire paper) by putting it into standard form. That is, explicitly lay out your understanding of the argument's premises and conclusions. Second, you should raise an objection to the argument you've presented. As a rough guide, presenting the standard form version of the argument should 30-40% of your discussion with the balance left for your objection.

The essays are to be emailed to me by noon on the Wednesday before the relevant Thursday class meeting.

3) Long paper (45%). The longer paper assignment invites you to explore one of the topics that we will be discussing in the course. Your paper should be approximately 15 pages long (double spaced, standard formatting). Though you are free to choose the topic for your long paper, you must get it approved by me before you start working on your draft. I strongly recommend that you begin thinking about you paper topic early; you should aim to have a proposal signed off on by the end of March.

You will need to turn in a draft of your paper by noon on Sunday, April 21. I will provide you with feedback by Thursday, April 25 (hopefully earlier). The final version of the paper will be due at noon on Saturday, April 27. You should email both your draft and your final papers to me.

While your draft needn't be a highly polished piece, the more developed it is, the better the comments I will be able to give you. Turning in a cursory draft may result in a grade penalty.

Grading: Final grades will be calculated based on the percentages noted above (using the average for the four reading responses). Here is a tentative guide for the grading scale: A=100-92, BA=91-88, B=87-83....

Policies

In order to help ensure a successful class, please heed the following rules and policies:

• Due Dates. Baring unusual circumstances, the due dates on the syllabus are non-negotiable. If you think you have reason to miss an assignment, it is best to inform me well in advance.
• Classroom Environment. Please arrive to class on time. All cell phones must be turned off during class. Texting, web surfing and the like is not permitted. Abuse of these courtesies may lead to penalties.
• Academic Honesty. As a student at WMU, you are responsible for making yourself aware of the University policies and procedures that pertain to Academic Honesty. These policies include cheating, fabrication, falsification and forgery, multiple submission, plagiarism, complicity, and computer misuse. In this class, you will be expected to abide by these obligations. This means that all work presented as original must, in fact, be original; the ideas and contributions of others (be they quotes, summaries, or paraphrases) must be appropriately acknowledged. More information about the WMU Academic Honesty rules as well as the rights of accused students can be found here.

Resources

• Accommodations for Disabilities. I am happy to make accommodations to assist students with documented disabilities (e.g., physical, learning, psychiatric, vision, hearing, etc.). Those wishing to arrange reasonable accommodations must contact Disability Services for Students. A disability determination must be made by this office before any accommodations are provided by the instructor. More information can be found here.
• Mental Health. WMU’s Mental Health Services’ professional staff members work with students to resolve personal and interpersonal difficulties, many of which can affect the academic experience. These include conflicts with or worry about friends or family, concerns about eating or drinking patterns, and feelings of anxiety and depression.

Tentative Schedule of Readings and Assignments

Course Introduction & Overview

(readings with an * should be given priority)

Jan 10: Open Questions and Moral Skepticism

• Read syllabus
• *GE Moore, "The Subject Matter of Ethics” (sections 5-15)
• *JL Mackie, "The Subjectivity of Values" (section 6 is optional)
• Philippa Foot, "Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives"
• Alex Miller, Contemporary Metaethics, Chap 2, 6 [recommended]
  • Qs: In seeking to answer the question ‘what is good?’ what does Moore take himself to be doing? Moore maintains that ‘good’ cannot be defined and that it is “a simple notion”. What does this amount to? What considerations lead Moore to this conclusion about ‘good’? In particular, how does the argument of Section 13 work (this is the famous “open question argument”)? What is the ‘naturalistic fallacy’ and why does Moore think it’s significant (see Sec 12)? In what ways do Mackie and Foot turn a skeptical eye toward our moral discourse: what do their critiques have in common and how do they differ?

Part 1: Naturalistic & Non-Naturalistic Moral Realism

Jan 17: Cornell-style Moral Realism

• *David Brink, "Moral Realism and the Sceptical Arguments from Disagreement & Queerness"
  • Qs: In sections 2 & 4, Brink presents his understanding of Mackie’s picture of what moral realism is. What is Brink’s take? Do you think it’s an accurate reflection of what we find in Mackie? What is internalism (as Brink attributes it to Mackie) and why does Brink think it is implausible? Do agree? Why (not)? Brink says he’s offering a “functionalist theory of moral value” (p 115). What does this mean (see, eg, p 121-2)? Brink thinks realists should claim that moral properties supervene on (but are not identical with) natural properties (pp 118-9). What does this mean? How does Brink address Mackie’s concern that an appeal to supervenience is not enough disarm the metaphysical queerness worry? Do you find this convincing?
• *Peter Railton, "Moral Realism"
  • Qs: What is the “generic stratagem of naturalistic realism” (p 171-2)? What are “subjective interests,” “objectified subjective interests,” and their respective “reduction bases” (173ff)? How does the Lonnie case illustrate the relationship between these things—for instance, what is the truth-maker of the claim that Lonnie has an objective interest in drinking clear liquids? In what way does the notion of non-moral goodness Railton develops have “explanatory uses” (178f)? Why does this matter? What about the “wants/interests mechanism”: what is it and why is it significant? What are criterial explanations and why are they significant (185-6)? Railton equates the moral point of view with rationality from a social point of view (189f)—what’s this amount to? Why does he think it is plausible—that is, how does he use this account of moral rightness to make a case for moral realism (191ff)? Railton discusses the implication that his account does not yield categorical moral imperatives (201). Why doesn’t it? How does he address this concern? At the end of the paper (204), Railton explains that he has been giving a “reforming definition” of moral rightness and that this allows him to avoid Moore’s open question argument. Why is this?
• Charlie Kurth, "What Do Our Critical Practices Say about the Nature of Morality?"
• Miller, Contemporary Metaethics, Chap 9.1-9.6 [recommended]

Jan 24: Moral Twin Earth

• *Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons, "New Wave Moral Realism Meets Moral Twin Earth"
  • Qs: What is distinctive of “New Wave” moral realism (e.g., how does it contrast with strong reductionist and non-naturalistic alternatives)? According to psychofunctionalism and New Wave Moral Realism (NWMR), how do terms like ‘belief’ or ‘good’ refer (see p 452-3, 454-5)? What is the basic set up of the Moral Twin Earth (MTE) example? Why does MTE purport to be a problem for NWMR? Do you agree? The Dowell and Dunaway & McPherson pieces offer two very different replies to the MTE challenge. How do these views differ? Which do you find more compelling and why?
• Janice Dowell, "The Metaethical Insignificance of Moral Twin Earth"
• Billy Dunaway & Tristram McPherson, "Reference Magnetism as a Solution to the Moral Twin Earth Problem"

Jan 31: No Class

Feb 7: Reductive Realism

• *Mark Schroeder, "Realism and Reduction"
  • Qs: What is “The Project” and why is it philosophically interesting in light of the debates about moral/normative realism that we’ve been discussing? Why does Schroeder think theological reductions are unlikely to succeed? What space does his diagnosis open up for reductions in other domains? Schroeder suggests we should understand reduction, not as property identity, but rather property analysis (sec 3.3). What does this mean? For instance, how does the geometry example on pg 11 work? How does Schroeder propose that reductivist about the normative might make progress on Nagel and Plantinga’s Challenges? Do you find it compelling? Explain.
• *Neil Sinhabahu, "Ethical Reductionism"
  • Qs: What does a naturalistic, reductive account of moral properties amount to (e.g., how is it different than the analytic naturalism that Moore challenged)? How does Sinhabahu's proposal differ from Schroeder's? According to Sinhabahu, why do nonreductive realist think reductivism fails? How does Sinhababu respond to this objection? Do you find it convincing (e.g., are you happy with his appeal to disjunctive properties)? Why does Sinhababu think nonreductive accounts are implausible? Do you agree?

Feb 14: Robust Non-natural Realism

• *Derek Parfit, On What Matters, excerpts
  • Qs: Parfit is most concerned to critically assess the non-analytic naturalism (NAN) of the sort we saw in Railton and Brink. He seems to be raising two basic arguments. The first is the "normativity objection" from pp324-7. The second objection is a more extended critique of the NAN's account of the relationship between normative concepts and the natural properties they refer to. This objection is complicated; the reading questions will hopefully provide some guidance. Around p 308, Parfit distinguishes various ways we talk about the normative? What are these--in particular, how does normativity in the "rule-implying" sense differ from normativity in the "reason-implying" sense? What is the "normativity objection" (324-7)? Do you find it convincing? As Parfit sees it, NAN deny that normative concepts can be reduced to natural concepts. But he maintains that they're committed to being able to reduce normative properties to natural properties. Explain what all this means. In several places (eg, 299), Parfit distinguishes between the property that makes something right and the property of being right. Explain this difference. Explain how the heat example illustrates the difference between properties of objects and properties of properties (p. 329ff). How does this difference apply to the moral domain (330-1)? Why does Parfit think this difference causes a problem for NANs (this is hard, but look at 331, and 334-6)?
• *William FitzPatrick, "Skepticism about Naturalizing Normativity"
  • Qs: FitzP is only skeptical about naturalizing certain kinds of normativity and allows that some kinds of normativity might be plausibly naturalized. Explain the distinction FitzP is drawing here and why he thinks we should be unsatisfied with the kinds of normativity that might be naturalizable? What is the "common misunderstanding of non-naturalism"? Do you find his assessment plausible? Explain What is the "structural error" (equivalently, the "conflation") that FitzP notes in Sec 3? What is the "standard-based model" for naturalizing the normative (Sec 5)? For instance, how's it like the example of the good computer that FitzP discusses earlier? What are conditions (i)-(iii) on pp 13-4 and how do they relate to this model? What is FitzP's complaint against Michael Smith's functionalist proposal (sec 6)? Do you think a similar worry applied to functionalists like Brink (or Railton)? Explain. What further concerns are leveled against Cornell Realists in Sec 7 (p 18f)? What's Schroeder's view about how we should naturalize reasons (in terms of desires)? Why might it seem plausible? What is FitzP's concern?
• David Copp, "Just Too Different: Normative Properties and Natural Properties"

Part 2: Anti-Realist Critiques and Alternatives

Feb 21: Korsgaard's Kantian Constructivism

• *Christine Korsgaard, Sources of Normativity, Chap. 3, Chap. 4
  • Qs: What is the problem of the normative that Korsgaard discusses in 3.2.1? Why does she think it is so significant? What are practical identities and what role do they play in Korsgaard's account? At p 103-4 Korsgaard says "The reflective structure of human consciousness requires that you identify yourself with some law or principle which will govern your choices. ..." What does this mean? More generally, what does the Kantian idea of "willing something to be a law" amount to? In 3.4.7 (and elsewhere), Korsgaard maintains that to value a particular practical identity, you must value must value your identity as a human being. What does this mean and what is the argument for it? What does Korsgaard mean by 'human' or 'human being'? What does normativity amount to on Korsgaard's account? In what ways does her account of normativity differ from what we've seen from Realists? What is the private language argument of 4.2.3 supposed to show? How does it work? How does the shared reasons argument of 4.2.8-9 work?

Feb 28: Humean Constructivism and Debunking Realism

• *Sharon Street, "A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value"
  • Qs: How does Street understand the difference between realism and anti-realism? What are ‘evaluative attitudes’ on her account? Street’s first premise is that evolutionary forces have had a tremendous influence on our evaluative judgments. What does this mean? Is it plausible? What does Street mean in saying that evolution is “a purely distorting influence” and how does the Bermuda example illustrate what she is getting at (121)? Why is this claim significant for the first horn of her dilemma? What is Street’s reply to the realist counter that rational reflection can act as a suitable corrective (123f)? Do you find it convincing? What is the “tracking account” and why might one think it can help the realist (125ff)? How does the tracking account differ from the adaptive link account? Why does this matter? Street maintains the adaptive link account is better, in part, because it is “clearer” (129f). What does she mean by this? Street maintains that realists like Brink who take the identification of “natural-normative identities” to be a matter of substantive normative theorizing to fall victim to the Darwinian Dilemma (139ff). Why does she think this? Do you agree? What is the “pain” reply on behalf of the realist and how does Street response to it—the “pain dilemma” work (Sec 9)? How are anti-realists able to avoid the dilemma (Sec 10)?
• Erik Weilenberg, "On the Evolutionary Debunking of Morality"
  • Qs: What’s the difference between metaphysical and epistemological debunking arguments? Starting from the assumption that we have rights, Wielenberg argues that we can have knowledge of this right. How does the argument for this work (Sev IV, esp. 449-450)? On p 453, Wielenberg presents the basic debunking argument and his reply to it. He rejects the second premise of the argument. How does his reasoning here work? In Section VII, Wielenberg takes on Street’s debunking argument. How does he think a realist can avoid her dilemma? Do you find his argument compelling?
• Katia Vavova, "Debunking Evolutionary Debunking"

Mar 7: Spring Break

Mar 14: Expressivism

• *Blackburn, Spreading the Word, excerpts
  • Qs: What is the economy motivation and why does it tell against realism and for expressivism (p 182)? What is the conceptual supervenience that Blackburn takes as characteristic of the moral domain (183)? What are “mixed worlds” and what does it mean to say that supervenience entails a “ban on mixed worlds” (184)? Why does the ban on mixed worlds present a problem for realists and why don’t projectivists/expressivists have that problem (185-6)?
• *Gibbard, "The Reasons of a Living Being"
  • Qs: What’s the “what’s at issue?” argument (49-50)? What is Gibbard’s proposal for how we’re to explain the meaning of a (normative) term? What does he think Moore (and other non-naturalists) get right (51)? Explain the difference Ayer (and other expressivists) see between expressing an attitude and saying one has that attitude (52)? What is “hypothetical contingency planning” and how does it provide an answer to the “what’s at issue?” question? Why do we engage in such planning (52f)? A central puzzle about Gibbard’s account of contingency planning is that it raises the question of why we should see different plans about what to do if in Jack’s situation as a disagreement rather than just a difference in tastes or biographies (53). Why is showing that these aren’t merely different plans, but ones that conflict or disagree so central to Gibbard’s project? What’s his answer (this is hard: much of Gibbard’s answer comes out in the last quarter or so of the paper)? In what sense are normative terms like ‘ought’ constituted by natural properties on Gibbard’s account (54f)? In what way is Gibbard’s proposal expressivistic, non-naturalistic, and naturalistic all at once? Is this a good thing? Why?
• Caroline Arruda, "Why Moral Status Matters for Metaethics" [recommended]
• Blackburn, "Supervenience Revisited" [recommended]
• Miller, Contemporary Metaethics, Chap 4-5 [recommended]

Part 3: Quietist Non-Naturalistic Realism

Mar 21: Scanlon's Quietism

• *TM Scanlon, Being Realistic, Chap 1
  • Qs: Scanlon raises several worries about desire based theories of reason. On p 5, he presents what he takes to be the most significant one concerning the (illusory) explanatory power of desire accounts. How does that objection work? On p 9, Scanlon presents Korsgaard’s “Normative Question” challenge. Why does this question pose a potential threat to Scanlon’s account of reasons and how does he suggest it can be answered? What is the distinction between “external reasoning” and “internal reasoning” (12-13) and how does Scanlon use it to address the concern that his proposal is problematic because it doesn’t ground a person’s reasons in some feature of their psychology or agency?
• *Tristram McPherson, "Against Quietist Normative Realism"
  • Qs: What does McP take the two defining features of quietist realism to be? How does this picture contrast with the other forms of realism we have looked at (Moore, Railton, Brink, FitzPatrick)? How does it challenge the standard view about the relationship between normative theory and metanormative theory? As McP sees it, Scanlon’s argument for his quietism lies in showing that a realism of this sort doesn’t face the explanatory burdens that Mackie and others take it to have. McP sees Scanlon’s defense of this as having two steps. First, there’s a claim about what reasons are—namely, a certain kind of proposition. Second, there’s a move to show that what are often taken to be metaphysical concerns about realism are really normative concerns. Focusing on p 228ff, explain in greater detail how these two moves are supposed to work (eg, what’s the difference between Norm and Norm* on Scanlon’s account? How does the math analogy shed light on Scanlon’s core idea?). Starting on 230, McP suggests that Scanlon’s move to “normativize” metaphysical questions is subject to a kind of vicious circularity. What makes Scanlon’s proposal seem circular and why is the resulting circularity vicious? Here it might be helpful to consider the analogy McP makes with semantic holism (231). What is the distinction between being formally normative and being robustly normative? Why does McP think Scanlon has trouble making sense of this distinction? E.g., what are the three conditions McP thinks an adequate defense of robust normativity must satisfy and why does he think Scanlon’s proposal fails to meet them?

Mar 28: Scanlon's Quietism (con't)

• *TM Scanlon, Being Realistic, Chap 2
  • Qs: What does Scanlon take the core of Mackie’s metaphysical queerness objection to be? To address Mackie’s worry Scanlon thinks we should think about what’s true within particular domains (19ff). What does this amount to (here it might be helpful to recall McPherson’s discussion of “normativizing” the metaphysical)? Relatedly: what is the distinction between pure and mixed statements and why does it matter? What does it mean for moral reasons, numbers, or electrons to exist on Scanlon’s account (23-5)? Do you find this plausible? Why does Scanlon think that we should take the normative as its own domain (26f)? Scanlon distinguishes things that are reasons from the counting in favor of relation (or, equivalently, relation R or the ‘is a reason for’ relation). Explain this distinction (30ff). What is the difference between pure and mixed normative statements? How does Scanlon use this distinction to explain the supervenience of the normative on the non-normative (see 37-41; the Schroeder may also be helpful here)? ) Scanlon argues against Schroeder’s reductive account of reasons. At its core, Schroeder’s proposal is that for the fact the there will be dancing at the party to be a reason for Ronnie to go, it must be the case that (i) Ronnie has a desire that will be satisfied by going to the party (i.e., his desire to dance) and (ii) the fact that there will be dancing is part of what explains why Ronnie’s going to the party would satisfy his desire to dance. Why is Scanlon unhappy with this proposal (46-8)? Do you find his concerns convincing?
• *Mark Schroeder, "The Price of Supervenience"
  • Qs: What is the explanatory argument from supervenience—both versions (126)? Why might looking to mathematics seem promising for someone like Scanlon who wants an answer to the explanatory argument from supervience? In particular, why are certain mathematical supervience claims trivial and how does this combine with the pure/bastard distinction to provide the possible makings of an account of moral supervience (128-30)? Schroeder notes two problems with Scanlon’s attempt to employ the Pricean Strategy to make sense of moral supervience (134-5). Explain these problems.

Apr 4: Scanlon's Quietism (con't)

• *TM Scanlon, Being Realistic, Chap 3
  • Qs: What are the two ways Scanlon thinks we can understand the claim that judgments or desires motivate? Why does this distinction matter? What is Scanlon’s account of how normative beliefs explain action? What role does the idea of a rational agent play in this (54-6)? Do you find it plausible? In Sec 2, Scanlon compares his proposal to those of Hare and Gibbard. In what ways are these three proposals similar? How do they differ and why does Scanlon think that difference is likely to make his proposal seem less plausible? In Sec 3, Scanlon raises a complaint about expressivists’ account of interpersonal normative discussions where one person gives another person advice about what to do. What is Scanlon’s concern? Do you find it plausible (here you might find it useful to look back at Gibbard’s account of disagreement)? Why does Scanlon think his proposal does better? Also in Sec 3, Scanlon raises a worry about expressivists’ accounts of normative error—specifically, how they account for the thought that I might be mistaken in judging myself to have a reason to X. How does this objection work? Do you find it plausible? Again, why does Scanlon think his account does better on this front? ) In Sec 4, Scanlon takes up the concern (suggested by Blackburn and Korsgaard) that a proposal like his cannot account for the authority of reasons. His move here seems to be that expressivists themselves seem unable to account for this authority. How does this argument work? In Sec 5, Scanlon notes that his account of normative beliefs entails that they are importantly different from non-normative beliefs in being rationally connected to intentions and actions. Why might one see this as problematic (ie, what’s the direction of fit issue that Scanlon discusses)? How does Scanlon account for it?
• *Jamie Dreier, "Can Reasons Fundamentalism Answer the Normative Question?"
  • Qs: In Sec 1-2, Dreier goes through various ways others have tried to formulate the “normative objection” to non-natural realism? In your own words, explain both what you take the explanatory demand of the normative question to be, and why Dreier, Korsgaard, Gibbard and others think non-naturalists like Parfit and Scanlon cannot meet it. Dreier (and the others) think non-naturalism allows us to ask why it is rational to conform to the reasons we take ourselves to have (178). What does this amount to and why is it supposed to be a problem for the non-natural realist? In sec 4, Dreier explores several ways in which a non-naturalist might attempt to account for why, on their account, there is no substantive answer to the normative question. Do you think this discussion does justice to the non-naturalist? Put another way, what might Scanlon say in response (here it might be helpful to look again at what Scanlon says on 54-5)?
• Charlie Kurth, "Being Realistic about Moral Motivation"

Apr 11: Scanlon's Quietism (con't)

• *TM Scanlon, Being Realistic, Chap 4
  • Qs: Scanlon specifies a two-part strategy for responding to Mackie-style epistemic queerness objections. On p. 70, he details the “negative” component and on pp 70-1 sketches his take on what he thinks a successful “positive” argument would need to do. Explain these two elements. On p 72, Scanlon states “The problem is not how we could ‘be in touch with’ the abstract structures that mathematics is about, but how we can characterize these structures in a way that makes clear which principles and modes of reasoning about them are valid.” What does this amount to (e.g., is it just conceptual analysis or something more?) and why is it significant for Scanlon’s reply to Mackie? Here it might be good to think through some of the specific examples Scanlon discusses (eg, arithmetic, set theory). Related to the last question, what is the “conceptual/intuitive dilemma” and how does Scanlon think we might be able to solve it for set theory (73ff)? In Sec 3, Scanlon explains reflective equilibrium. How does RE work as an epistemological tool? In particular, what are considered judgments and general principles? How does one reach “equilibrium”? Does equilibrium itself provide justification—explain? Is there a unique equilibrium state? If not, what implications does that have for our understanding of the domain we’re seeking to secure RE in? Again, thinking through Scanlon’s discussion of RE for set theory might be helpful. Given your understanding of RE, how does it differ from conceptual analysis or intuitionism (at least as Scanlon characterizes those epistemological views)? In Sec 4, Scanlon seeks to apply his account of RE in set theory to the normative domain. Though he sees significant differences between these two, he nonetheless thinks they are analogous in ways that are important for helping us understand normative epistemology. In what ways do these domains differ? How are they similar and what epistemic implications does this have for the normative domain? In Sec 5, Scanlon turns to investigate whether constructivist proposals can provide a unifying rationale of the normative domain. He looks at Rawls’s proposal as well as his own. Why is this discussion significant? Also in Sec 5, Scanlon introduces three ways of thinking about how a domain might be “independent” or “objective” (starting at 93). What are these three? In what ways is set theory likely to be objective? What about the normative domain?
• *Thomas Kelly & Sarah McGrath, "Is Reflective Equilibrium Enough?"
  • Qs: On p 326, K &McG say “it is not a good objection to the method of reflective equilibrium that there are circumstances in which employing it could lead us into error, even radical error.” Explain. What do they take the right worry about RE in the vicinity of this one to be? On p 332, K & McG distinguish between coherentist and foundationalist accounts of justification. What is the distinctive claim of each? Where does RE fit? K & McG think a coherentist/RE theorist faces challenge of explaining why mere coherence could justify belief (or lead to knowledge) of mind-independent subject matters. Why is this—what is particularly puzzling about the combination or mind-independence and coherentism? What is the difference between wide and narrow RE (334f)? What work is this distinction supposed to do with regards to bolstering RE’s credentials as an epistemological proposal? Similarly, what are considered judgments and what epistemic work are they supposed to do? Why do K & McG think convergence is important for Rawls’s account and what worries do they have about this (e.g., the analogy with Baysians)? According to Scanlon, how does astrology differ from morality (342-3) and why does this difference matter? How does the example of transcendental metaphysics complicate this? K & McG object that Scanlon does not have a good response to the possibility that two individuals might end up in different states of reflective equilibrium. What is their worry (see Sec 5)?

Part 4: Better Alternatives?

Apr 18: Deflationary Realism and Moral Relativism

• *Andrew Sepielli, "Moral Realism without Moral Metaphysics"
• *David Wong, "Constructing Normative Objectivity in Ethics"

Apr 21: Drafts Due at Noon

Apr 27: Final Papers Due at Noon