Publications

Abstract: This paper presents a simple and tractable equilibrium model, where collateralized credit emerges under limited commitment. We show that even if there is no time variation in fundamentals, credit trade can fluctuate endogenously over time. In our theory, credit fragilities are associated with endogenous fluctuations in trade probabilities, collateral values, and lending volumes.

Working Papers

Abstract: We study a uniform price auction where k identical objects are allocated among n bidders with unit demands. The common valuation of the object is jointly determined by the state of the world and an action that is chosen after winning the object. State of the world is unobservable to bidders. Instead, each bidder receives a signal that provides bounded information about the state of the world. When the valuation is increasing in state given "plausible" actions, a unique equilibrium exists in the class of symmetric equilibria with monotone bidding strategy. In large auctions, monotonicity of the valuation function is also a sufficient condition for full information aggregation in a symmetric and monotone equilibrium. We also provide an example illustrating that full information aggregation is plausible even when the object valuation is non-monotone with respect state.

Work in Progress