My research develops a unified attitude-based approach to issues in the philosophy of mind, perception, and epistemology, combining historical and contemporary discussions. In my dissertation, Perceiving and Thinking, I argued against content-based approaches to the perception/cognition divide, defending the view that the attitude-component of mental states has phenomenal and epistemic properties irreducible to those of the content. Since attitude-based strategies of this kind have their roots in the Brentano school, I turned early on to the history of philosophy of mind in early analytic philosophy. With the MIND project, I focus on the reception of the Brentanian theory of mental acts by early British analytic philosophers, particularly G.F. Stout, G.E. Moore, and G.D. Hicks. In my future research, I plan a historical exploration of the discussion about the transparency of experience, in the hope of showing that it rests on a metaphysically mistaken view of mental phenomena.
Other topics I am interested in: non-propositional content, accuracy, perceptual justification, cognitive phenomenology, Husserl, and uncovering neglected figures in the history of analytic philosophy.
(Forth.). Dewalque A., Leclercq B., Martinis V., Pallagrosi J., Seron D. (eds.). The Cambridge Family: British Philosophy of Mind at the Turn of the Twentieth Century. Routledge.
(forth.) The origins of transparency and the debate on mental acts in early analytic philosophy. To appear in Niemeck, M. (ed.), The philosophical significance of intentional modes, Routledge. | Contact me for the penultimate draft
(2026) The problem of evaluability for objectual content. Ergo. | Open-access
(2026) Moore on awareness, transparency, and Erlebnis. Synthese. 207, 40 (2026). | Read-only version
(2024) Perceptual justification and objectual attitudes. Synthese, 203(5), 165, 1-24. | Read-only version
(2024) Defending (perceptual) attitudes. European Journal of Philosophy, 32(2), 560-576. |Read-only version
All my papers are also available on PhilPapers and ResearchGate.
On the history of analytic philosophy:
Beatrice Edgell's argument against the transparency of mental acts.
On cognitive phenomenology:
Horizons, emptiness, and cognitive phenomenology.
On non-propositional representation:
Does accuracy come in degrees?
Against the Content Constraint. Non-propositional perception and perceptual justification.