(1) Please show ALL of your work!!!!
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1) Interdependent Security (IDS) Games: Create your own instance of IDS games with 3 players.
(a) Formulate this instance as an IDS game. (10 points)
(b) Apply the algorithm presented in class to compute a (pure-strategy) Nash equilibria in your instance. (10 points)
(c) Summarize the experimental section of IDS game paper. (10 points)
2) Stackelberg games: For the following 2-player utility matrix (see below)
(a) Identify all pure-strategy Nash equilibria and mixed-strategy Nash equilibria viewing this as a normal-form game. (10 points)
(b) Identify an optimal pure strategy to commit to (Stackelberg pure equilibrium) assuming player 1 is the leader. (10 points)
(c) Identify an optimal mixed strategy to commit to (Stackelberg mixed equilibrium) assuming player 1 is the leader. You only need to show the LPs. (10 points)