Early attempts in the 1930’s to grant Native Americans new institutions of governance by the federal government eventually informed the final draft Indian Reorganization Act. The idea of Indian-controlled corporations was first seriously brought before federal legislators by Native Americans of the Klamath Reservation in southern Oregon in 1928. As a result of being economically successful from timber sales, the Klamath Reservation was able to fund a delegation to Washington D.C. in 1928 to propose the creation of a Klamath Indian Corporation, which was supported by a majority of the adult tribal members of the Klamath Reservation. Ultimately calling for the transfer of all lands from the Department of the Interior to the proposed Corporation while also asking for the termination of oversight by the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the proposed bill sent to the BIA was not pushed forwards because of the lack of trust in Native American “competence,” alongside the fracturing of support for the bill by residents of the Klamath Reservation over time.
The Klamath bill demonstrated a clear interest by some Native Americans to participate in the legislative process and marked a significant contribution in the future Indian Reorganization Act. Despite this, however, Native Americans themselves were rarely directly involved in the legislation that was actually passed, though their influence in making the tribal alternative and the concept of Indian-corporations more widely known cannot be understated. It wasn’t until the election of Franklin Delano Roosevelt to the presidency in 1932 that these policies began to replace the forced assimilation alternative at the federal level. Roosevelt’s election also heralded the end of the more complacent Rhoads-Scattergood Bureau of Indian Affairs administration, which led the BIA for the duration of Herbert Hoover’s presidency. In its place was newly appointed commissioner Collier, who was appointed at the recommendation of newly minted Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes.
Copy of the first page of the passed Indian Reorganization Act, accessed from Library of Congress.
After a period of slowly acclimating to the new position, Collier began preparing for the bill-crafting process by bringing on Felix Cohen as legal architect and assessing the position of Native American societies across the United States by asking the opinions of prominent anthropologists. It is important to note that throughout this process of gathering information, Collier and his administration did not initially seek out the input of Native Americans until his administration had already developed the rough draft of the Indian Reorganization Act. The decision to pass the bill as one, overarching omnibus rather than as a number of separate bills that could be individually accounted for reflects a sense of urgency that Collier’s administration felt. Rushing to put the bill out as soon as possible, Collier pushed Cohen and the other individuals working on the bill to quickly finish it up by the beginning of 1934, which in turn contributed to it being overly complex and difficult to understand by both Congress and Native Americans. Alongside this, most members of the House and Senate committees which received copies of the rough draft in early 1934 were still staunchly assimilationist, leading to a conflict over the provisions put forth by the bill.
In order to drum up support for the bill as it was processed by the House and Senate, Collier's administration called for a series of congresses with Native Americans throughout the United States as a way to explain the proposed bill and gather support from Native American populations. Many of the participants in these meetings were conflicted over the nature of the Indian Reorganization Act and expressed concern over whether or not it was necessary, with many preferring the older system of treaties that enabled them to have an active say in their relationship with the United States. Another major issue for many present was securing effective land and water rights that they could build upon and develop to increase economic prosperity. Many of these issues were taken as suggestions and used in crafting the final Indian Reorganization Act, though they were gathered very late in the legislation-making process and as a result did not help to adequately represent Native American beliefs. Perhaps the most important effect of these congresses was that they helped to convince Washington legislators of Native American support for the bill, shifting the meetings towards being public-relations events rather than effective dialogues.
Perhaps the most visible opponent to the bill’s passage was ironically enough one of the individuals whom the bill is named after: Senator Burton Wheeler of Montana. Personal hostilities between Collier and Wheeler combined with Wheeler’s assimilationist beliefs made Wheeler a key block against the bill in the early months of its introduction to Congress, and his mark on the final product is evident when examining the passed legislation. A proposed separate court system to handle Native American affairs was removed entirely, while the self-government, advanced education opportunities, and the ending of allotment policies remained, albeit changed and pared down. The end result was a bill that afforded Native Americans to decide, on a reservation-by-reservation basis, if they would want to conform to the incorporated charter or constitution system the bill allowed. Alongside this, allotment as a policy was ended, though many Native Americans who had already been allotted land prior to the passage of the IRA retained their holdings and were allowed to consolidate them within chartered companies if they desired. The bill was finally passed into law on June 18, 1934.