Core Theory
Antecedents in Scientific Literature on Character
Trait Structure
Defense Mechanisms
Etiological and Further Psychodynamic Remarks
Existential Psychodynamics
“We may consider wrath in three ways,” says Saint Thomas in Questiones Disputatae: “Firstly, a wrath which resides in the heart (Ira Cordis); also, inasmuch as it flows into words (Ira Locutionis), and thirdly, in that it becomes actions (Ira Actiones).” The survey scarcely brings to mind the characteristics of the perfectionistic type as we will be portraying it here. Yes, there is anger in the heart, mostly in the form of resentment, yet not so prominently as anger may be experienced by the lusty, the envious, or the cowardly. As for verbal behavior, it is most characteristic of the anger type to be controlled in the expression of anger, in any of its explicit forms: we are in the presence of a well-behaved, civilized type, not a spontaneous one. In regard to action, ennea-type I individuals do express anger, yet mostly unconsciously, not only to themselves but to others, for they do so in a way that is typically rationalized; in fact, much of this personality may be understood as a reaction formation against anger; a denial of destructiveness through a deliberate, well-intentioned attitude.
Oscar Ichazo’s definition of anger as a “standing against reality” has the merit of addressing a more basic issue than the feeling or expression of emotion. Still, it may be useful to point out at the outset that the label “anger type” is scarcely evocative of the typical psychological characteristics of the personality style in question—which is critical and demanding rather than consciously hateful or rude. Ichazo called the ennea-type “ego-resent,” which seems a psychologically more exact portrayal of the emotional disposition involved: one of protest and assertive claims rather than mere irritability. In my own teaching experience, I started out calling the character’s fixation “intentional goodness”; later I shifted to labeling it “perfectionism.” This seems appropriate to designate a rejection of what is in terms of what is felt and believed should be.
Christian writers who shared an awareness of anger as a capital sin, that is to say, as one of the basic psychological obstacles to true virtue, mostly seem to have failed to realize that it is precisely under the guise of virtue that unconscious anger finds its most characteristic form of expression. An exception is St. John of the Cross, who in his Dark Night of the Soul writes with characterological exactitude as he describes the sin of wrath in spiritual beginners:
“There are other of these spiritual persons, again, who fall into another kind of spiritual wrath: this happens when they become irritated at the sins of others, and keep watch on those others with a sort of uneasy zeal. At times the impulse comes to them to reprove them angrily, and occasionally they go so far as to indulge it and set themselves up as masters of virtue. All this is contrary to spiritual meekness.” And he adds: “There are others who are vexed with themselves when they observe their own imperfection, and display an impatience that is not humility; so impatient are they about this that they would fain be saints in a day. Many of these persons purport to accomplish a great deal and make grand resolutions; yet, as they are not humble and have no misgivings about themselves, the more resolutions they make, the greater is the fall and the greater their annoyance, since they have not the patience to wait for that which God will give them when it pleases Him.”
On the whole, this is a well-intentioned and overly virtuous character arisen as a defense against anger and destructiveness. It would be a mistake, however, to conceive of it as a violent character—for it is on the contrary, an over-controlled and over-civilized interpersonal style. Striking in this style is also an oppositional quality, both in regard to others and to experience in general. While every form of character may be regarded as an interference with instinct, the anti-instinctive orientation of this “puritanical” style is the most striking. A good name for the character (and one applicable beyond the explicitly sick region of the mental health spectrum) is perfectionism—for in spite of the fact that people in some other characterological styles may appropriately refer to themselves as “perfectionistic,” this is definitely the orientation in which perfectionism is most prominent. This involves an obsession with improving things that result in making their lives and those of others worse and a narrow-minded concept of perfection in terms of a matching of experience or events with a pre-established code of values, standards, ideas, tastes, rules, and so on. Perfectionism not only illustrates the fact that the better is the enemy of the best (and the search for the best is the enemy of the better) but may be said to involve a cognitive bias, an imbalance between the allegiances to duty and to pleasure; to gravity and to levity; to work and to play, mature deliberateness and child-like spontaneity.
As a sequel to the word perfectionist—more colloquially—I have caricatured the character as one of “angry virtue,” a label that has the advantage of including both the emotional (anger) and the cognitive (perfectionistic) aspects.
Though I personally appreciate Erikson’s re-statement of anality as an issue of autonomy that arises at the time of learning sphincter control and walking, I think Abraham and Freud deserve the homage of having for the first time drawn attention to the connection between the prohibition of soiling oneself and obsessive cleanliness.
The position of the anger type in the enneagram is neither at the schizoid nor at the hysteroid corners, but in the group of the upper three characters pervaded by “psychological laziness.” It is my experience that, contrary to the fact that many obsessives declare themselves extroverts, this very statement reveals their lack of psychological mindedness, for they are, rather, sensory-motor extroverts with an introverted self-ideal that is part of their refinement and intellectual values. The position of ennea-type I between ennea-types IX and II in the enneagram invites a consideration of how perfectionistic character is not only “anti-intraceptive” but also proud. Indeed the word pride is sometimes used specifically to describe the aristocratic and haughty attitude of the perfectionist rather than the attitude of the type here designated as “proud,” whose priding is not so much to be respectable and admirable but to be needed, loved and exalted as very special.
From a survey of many thousands of entries in the literature since 1960, I find that the obsessive-compulsive personality style is the most frequently written about. I imagine that this may be due to its being the most clear cut and recognizable, and yet I also think that a confusion has slipped into the use of the term “anankastic,” by which the obsessive-compulsive is frequently designated in Europe. Also, in regard to the “anal personality” syndrome of psychoanalysis I think that sometimes the term has been applied to the obsessive-compulsive proper and at other times to the more controlled and obsessive-like schizoid individuals. In my experience it is the schizoid personality which is more frequently found as the background of ego-dystonic obsessions and compulsions, and not the obsessive, in which cleanliness and order are ego-syntonic.
I learned from Kurt Schneider’s Psychopathic Personalities that it was J. Donath who introduced the concept of anankastic personalities in 1897. Writing in the early twenties Schneider reports that literature on “obsessive state is almost impossible to encompass,” yet he doesn’t draw a clear distinction between what until recently was called an obsessive neurosis and obsessive personality. Though there is no doubt that he was acquainted with our “perfectionist” and the picture of this character was in his mind as he wrote part of his chapter on the “insecure” the very fact that he did regard the anankastic along with the “sensitive” as varieties of the insecure disposition suggests to me that he fell for the same confusion that became later apparent in the concept of anal personality—a confusion between our perfectionist and the schizoid, which have some common characteristics and yet contrast sharply in other respects.
Reading Von Gebsattel on anankastic personality I have the distinct impression that it is a schizoid form of obsessiveness that he has in mind, which inclines me to think that up to this day the confusion survives. Since the ICD-IX, which still has not been superseded by DSM-III in some countries, includes Kurt Schneider’s system of classification in regard to personality, it is pertinent to point out that there is no place in this classification for our perfectionist except possibly as a variety of the “insecure.” Although theoretically it is admissible that an excessive formality may be a reaction to a deeper insecurity, the terminology leads to a further confusion since it obscures the clear contrast between the
“On the expressive psychology of the anankastic it must be said that, externally they often strike us by their exaggerated meticulousness, pedantry, correctness, and scrupulousness.” In the realm of psychological literature it may be said that the type of person we are discussing was the first of all personality patterns to be observed, when Freud wrote his famous essay on anal character. Karl Abraham picked up and elaborated the idea in the anal character which he begins with a concise summary of Freud’s observations: “Freud has said that certain neurotics present three particularly pronounced character traits, namely, a love for orderliness which often develops into pedantry, a parsimony which easily turns to miserliness, and an obstinacy which may become an angry defiance.” Among his original observations is that persons with a pronounced anal character are usually convinced that they can do everything better than other people: “they must do everything themselves.” The next important contribution to the understanding of the ennea-type I syndrome was that of Reich, who writes of it:
“Even if the neurotic compulsive sense of order is not present, a pedantic sense of order is typical of the compulsive character.” “In both big and small things, he lives his life according to a preconceived, irrevocable pattern …”
In addition, Reich points out the presence of circumstantial, ruminative thinking, indecision, doubt and distrust hidden by an appearance of strong reserve and self-possession. He agrees with Freud’s observation of parsimony, especially the form of frugality and also shares the interpretation of the character as deriving from anal eroticism. More importantly, however, he underscores what might be viewed as the other side of self-possession: emotional blockage. “He is just as ill disposed towards affects as he is acutely inaccessible to them. He is usually even-tempered, lukewarm in his displays of both love and hate. In some cases this can develop into a complete affect-block.”
It is not surprising that Freud and others have been more aware of thriftiness than of anger in “anal character,” for parsimony and austerity are behavioral traits, while anger is mostly an unconscious motive in the personality under discussion. Yet, true as it may be that the tendency to economize and to amass wealth can be present in ennea-type I, I believe that Freud, Abraham, and Reich were inadvertently considering together two different syndromes when they discussed anal character: two syndromes (our anger and avarice ennea-types) mapped at the antipodes of the enneagram, and which yet share the quality of being superego driven, rigid and controlled.
While “anal character” is a rather ambiguous concept, we also find in Wilhelm Reich the description of a personality that corresponds more purely to our perfectionist: his case of “aristocratic character,” discussed in Character Analysis in support of some general ideas on the function of character. He describes his patient as having “a reserved countenance,” and being serious and somewhat arrogant; “his measured, noble stride caught one’s attention … it was evident he avoided—or concealed—any hate or excitement … his speech was well phrased and balanced, soft and eloquent …” “As he lay on the couch, there was little if any change in his composure and refinement”…”Perhaps it was merely an insignificant … that one day ‘aristocratic’ occurred to me for his behavior,” Reich comments, “I told him he was playing the role of an English lord” he proceeds, and goes on to discuss in this patient, who has never masturbated during puberty, being aristocratic served as a defense against sexual excitation: “A noble man doesn’t do such things.
The syndrome we have been discussing is today identified in the American DSM III 13 as compulsive personality disorder. The following cues are offered by this manual for the diagnosis of this personality:
Restrained affectivity (e.g., appears unrelaxed, tense, joyless and grim; emotional expression is kept under tight control).
Conscientious self-image (e.g., sees self as industrious, dependable and efficient; values self-discipline, prudence and loyalty).
Interpersonal respectfulness (e.g., exhibits unusual adherence to social conventions and properties; prefers polite, formal and correct personal relationships).
Cognitive constriction (e.g., constructs world in terms of rules, regulations, hierarchies; is unimaginative, indecisive and upset by unfamiliar or novel ideas or customs).
Behavioral rigidity (e.g., keeps a well-structured, highly regulated and repetitive life pattern; reports preference for organized, methodical and meticulous work).
Here follows the picture of the behavioral features of compulsive personality in the words of Theodore Millon: “The grim and cheerless demeanor of compulsives is often quite striking. This is not to say that they are invariably glum or downcast but rather to convey their characteristic air of austerity and serious-mindedness. Posture and movement reflect their underlying tightness, a tense control of emotions that are kept well in check… The social behavior of compulsives may be characterized as polite and formal. They relate to others in terms of rank or status; that is, they tend to be authoritarian rather than equalitarian in their outlook.”
This is reflected in their contrasting behavior with ‘superiors’ as opposed to ‘inferiors.’ Compulsive personalities are deferential, ingratiating, and even obsequious with their superiors, going out of their way to impress them with their efficiency and serious-mindedness. Many seek the reassurance and approval of their position. These behaviors contrast markedly with their attitudes toward subordinates. Here the compulsive is quite autocratic and condemnatory, often appearing pompous and self-righteous. This haughty and deprecatory manner is usually cloaked behind regulations and legalities. Not untypically, compulsives will justify their aggressive intentions by recourse to rules or authorities higher than themselves.”
In the final elaboration that Karen Horney left us of her clinical experience, Neurosis and Human Growth, she groups together three character types under a general label of “the expansive solutions.” These are approaches to life through mastery, in which the individual embraces early in life as a solution to conflicts, a strategy of “moving against” others (in contrast to the orientations of those who move seductively “toward” and fearfully “away from” others). One of these three forms of the “solution of mastery” (or “moving against”) she calls “perfectionistic” and though she describes it without reference to the earlier “anal” and “compulsive” types in the literature, she contributes substantially to the psychodynamic understanding of the syndrome in question. I quote her:
basis looks down onto others. His arrogant contempt for others, though is hidden from himself as well—behind polished friendliness, because his very standards prohibit such ‘irregular feelings.’ His way of blaming the issue of unfulfilled shoulds are twofold. In contrast to the narcissistic type, he does make strenuous efforts to measure up to his shoulds by fulfilling duties and obligations, by polite and orderly manners, by not telling obvious lies, etc. When speaking of perfectionist people, we often think merely of those who keep meticulous order, are overly punctilious and punctual, have to find just the right word, or must wear just the right necktie or hat. But these are only superficial aspects of their need to attain the highest degree of excellence. What really matters is not those petty details but the flawless excellence of the whole conduct in life. But since all he can achieve is behavioristic perfection, another device is necessary. This is to equate in his mind standards and actualities—knowing about moral values and being a good person… . The self-deception involved is all the more hidden from him since, in reference to others, he may insist upon their actually living up to his standards of perfection and despise them for failing to do so. His own self-condemning is thus externalized.
“As confirmation of his opinion of himself, he needs respect from others rather than glowing admiration (which he bends to scorn). Accordingly his claims are based less on a ‘naive’ belief in his greatness than on a ‘deal’ he had secretly made with life. Because he is fair, just, dutiful, he is entitled to fair treatment by others and by life in general. This conviction of an infallible justice operating in life gives him a feeling of mastery. His own perfection therefore is not only a means to superiority but also one to control life. The idea of undeserved fortune, whether good or bad, is alien to him. His own success, prosperity or good health is therefore, less something to be enjoyed than a proof of his virtue.”
We may discern the personality under consideration in Jung’s extraverted thinking type: is a pure type—is to make all his activities dependent on intellectual conclusions, which in the last resort are always oriented by objective data, whether these be external facts or generally accepted ideas. This type of man elevates objective reality, or an objectively oriented intellectual formula, into the ruling principle not only for himself but for his whole environment. By this formula good and evil are measured, and beauty and ugliness determined. Everything that agrees with this formula is right, everything that contradicts it is wrong, and anything that passes by it indifferently is merely incidental. Because this formula seems to embody the entire meaning of life, it is made into a universal law which must be put into effect everywhere all the time, both individual and collectively. Just as the extraverted thinking type subordinates himself to his formula, so, for their own good, everybody around him must obey it too, for whoever refuses to obey it is wrong—he is resisting the universal law, and is therefore unreasonable, immoral, and without a conscience. His moral code forbids him to tolerate exceptions; his ideal must under all circumstances be realized, for in his eyes it is the purest conceivable formulation of objective reality, and therefore must also be a universally valid truth, quite indispensable for the salvation of mankind. This is not from any great love for his neighbor, but from the higher standpoint of justice and truth. Anything in his own nature that appears to invalidate this formula is a mere imperfection, an accidental failure, something to be eliminated on the next occasion, or, in the event of further failure, clearly pathological. If tolerance for the sick, the suffering, or the abnormal should chance to be an ingredient of the formula, special provisions will be made for human societies, hospitals, prisons, missions, and so on, or at least extensive plans will be drawn up. Generally the motive of justice and truth is not sufficient to ensure the actual execution of such projects; for this, real Christian charity is needed, and this has more to do with feelings than with any intellectual formula. ‘Oughts’ and ‘musts’ bulk large in this program. If the formula is broad enough, this type may play a very useful role in social life as a reformer or public prosecutor or purifier of conscience, or as the propagator of important innovations. But the more rigid the formula, the more he develops into a martinet, a quibbler, and a prig, who would like to force himself and others into one world. Here we have the two extremes between which the majority of these types move.”
In the domain of testing applications of Jungian typology the best fit is to be found in the “ESTJ” (extraverted, with predominance of sensation over intuition, thinking over feeling, judgment over perception). David Keirsey and Marilyn Bates say of these scorers that the best adjective to describe them would be “responsible.”
In the domain of homeopathic medicine the personality picture similar to ennea-type I has been described in connection with individuals who are specifically helped by the use of Arsenicum. Thus, in Portraits of Homoeopathic Medicines Catherine R. Coulter writes of Arsenicum personality as “the perfectionist par excellence.” She describes in detail the Arsenicum child’s conscientious and thorough nature.
Corollaries of perfection are to be found in the adult proper compulsively reworking things, never satisfied with results, as in the case of the professor who endlessly rewrites his lectures, and a concomitant anxiety of feeling unprepared, which makes the Arsenicum disposition the very antithesis of relaxation. Another corollary is ordinationness, and still another self-criticism. She also describes a strong competitiveness that goes hand-in-hand with the ambition to be the best.
Another word Coulter introduces in the description of Arsenicum is fastidiousness —applied to compulsive orderliness, thus: “… In all spheres he is ultra-’picky,’ and, in his intolerance of everything slipshod, irritated at any clumsiness—dropping a dish, overturning a glass, spilling food—his own as well as another’s.” Still another aspect of perfection mentioned in the case of Arsenicum is meticulousness—” ‘conscientious about tri)es’: Kent.” Says Coulter: “his work manifests that particular ‘finishing touch’—that final polish—that reveals a meticulous attention to detail.”
Very characteristic of ennea-type I is the anxiety described in connection with Arsenicum Album—an anxiety that has to do with the anticipation of troubles and with fussy meticulousness that contributes in making the patient a driven and driving person. Frequent object of concern to Arsenicum,according to Coulter, is money. “Whether or not he has any, he thinks and talks about it a great deal, frequently lamenting his poverty or the high cost of living. His liking for money is stronger than that of most constitutional types, and he can even be ‘avaricious’ (Hering)… .”
Also congruent with ennea-type I is the description of Arsenicum as a domineering type: “He takes the lead in personal relations, determining their scope and tone, and leaving others no choice but to comply … The domineering Arsenicum cannot abide others being in charge and insists on making all decisions himself… .”
Further remarks in Coulter’s description of the Arsenicum type are the overintellectualizing tendency, a concern with “the meaning of every symptom,” and a medical “one-upmanship” that “makes him distrustful even of those from whom he is seeking help.” She reports that, while “Many constitutional types dislike any dietary restrictions … Arsenicum loves being placed on a diet and will religiously follow the most Spartan regime. He not only delights in nutritional fads, but the necessity of a special diet certifies the seriousness of his condition… .
The correspondence of the Arsenicum personality of homeopathy to our ennea-type I is made even more explicit by Coulter’s mention of a literacy example-Dickens’ Miss Betsey in David Copperfield “whose snippy, persnickety, and at times fearsome exterior conceals a highly developed moral delicacy and integrity.”
I see the reflection of ennea-type I not only in Arsenicum, but also in Carcinosin (a remedy “made from the scirrhous cancer of the breast”), inasmuch, as Coulter points out, it is related to a “patient where there is a strong history of excessive parental control and pressure … or an excessive sense of duty (Foubister).” Since Carcinosin also fits the treatment of an over-responsible, “preoccupied” (Templeton) individual, it particularly seems to relate to a subtype within ennea-type I characterized precisely by an over-responsible perfectionistic anxiety.
In what follows, I have undertaken to show something of the structure of the perfectionistic character in terms of the underlying traits that may be discerned through a conceptual analysis of some hundred and seventy descriptors.
Anger
More than a trait among others, “anger” may be regarded a generalized emotional background and original root of this character structure. The more specific manifestation of the emotional experience of anger is resentment, and this is most commonly felt in connection with a sense of injustice in face of the responsibilities and efforts the individual undertakes in larger measure than others. It is inseparable from the criticism of others (or significant others) for displaying less zeal, and sometimes it involves the adoption of a martyr role. The most visible expression of anger occurs when it is perceived as justified, and can in such cases take the form of vehement “righteous indignation.”
In addition, anger is present in the form of irritation, reproach and hatefulness that remain largely unexpressed, since perceived destructiveness conflicts with the virtuous self-image characteristic of the type. Beyond the perception of anger at an emotional level, however, we may say that the passion of anger permeates the whole of ennea-type I character and is the dynamic root of drives or attitudes such as we discuss in connection with the remaining clusters: criticality, demandingness, dominance and assertiveness, perfectionism, over-control, self-criticism and discipline.
Criticality
If conscious and manifest anger is not always one of the most striking characteristics of this personality, the more common traits in the type may be understood as derivatives of anger, expressions of unconscious anger or anger equivalents.
One of these is criticality, which is not only manifest in explicit fault finding, but sometimes creates a subtle atmosphere that causes others to feel awkward or guilty. Criticality may be described as intellectual anger more or less unconscious of its motive. I say this because, even though it is possible that criticism occurs in the context of felt anger, the most salient quality of this criticality is a sense of constructive intent, a desire to make others or oneself better. Through intellectual criticism, thus, anger is not only expressed but justified and rationalized and, through this, denied.
Moral reproaches are another form of perfectionistic disapproval and not just expressions of anger, but a form of manipulation in the service of unacknowledged demandingness—whereby “I want” is transformed into “You should.” Accusation thus entails the hope of affecting somebody’s behaviors in the direction of one’s wishes.
A specific form of criticality in ennea-type I is that bound to ethnocentrism and other forms of prejudice, in which case there is vilification, invalidation and the wish to “reform” inquisitorially those who constitute an outgroup to one’s race, nation, class, church, “Crusader,” and so on. [Displaying the mechanism of “authoritarian aggression” (described by Adorno, Sanford, et al.,) anger towards the ingroup’s authority is repressed, inhibited, and displaced onto those below in the hierarchical ladder and especially those in the outgroup—who then become scapegoats.]
Demandingness
Demandingness also can be understood as an expression of anger: a vindictive overassertiveness in regard to one’s wishes in response to early frustration. Along with demandingness proper we may group together characteristics such as those which make these individuals the most disciplinarian both in the sense of inhibiting spontaneity and the pursuit of pleasure in others as well as exacting hard work and excellent performance. They tend to sermonize, preach and teach without regard for the appropriateness of such a role, even though this compulsive characteristic of theirs may find its niche in activities such as those of school teacher and preacher.
Together with this corrective orientation is that of being controlling, and this not only in relation to people but to environments or personal appearance: an obsessive is likely to prefer a highly “manicured” garden, for instance, where plants are in clear order and trees pruned into artificial shape, over one that conveys a “Taoistic” organic complexity.
Dominance
Though already implicit in intellectual criticism, which would be without force if not in a context of moral or intellectual authority, and implicit also in the controlling-demanding disciplinarian characteristic (for how would that be effective without authority), it seems appropriate to regard dominance as a relatively independent trait, comprising such descriptors as an autocratic style, a self-confident and dignified assertiveness, an aristocratic self-concept and a superior, haughty, disdainful and perhaps condescending and patronizing demeanor. Dominance, too, may be regarded as an implicit expression or a transformation of anger, yet this orientation towards a position of power entails subordinate strategies as the above and also a sense of entitlement on the basis of high standards, diligence, cultural and family background, intelligence, and so on.
Perfectionism
Most characteristically, however, the pursuit of mastery in the anger type implies the endorsement of the moral system or human hierarchy in which authority is vested. It may be said that the perfectionist is more obedient to the abstract authority of norms or office than the concrete authority of persons. Also, as Millon remarks, “people with obsessive personality not only do adhere to societal rules and customs, but vigorously espouse and defend them.” Such vehement interest in principles, morals and ideals is not only an expression of submission to the demands of a strong superego, but, interpersonally, an instrument of manipulation and dominance, for these enthusiastically endorsed norms are imposed on others and, as was commented above, serve as a cover for personal wishes and demands. Yet ennea-type I individuals are not only oriented to “Law and Order,” and themselves obedient to norms, they also subordinate themselves to people in the position of unquestionable authority.
The emphatic endorsement of norms and sanctioned authority usually implies a conservative orientation or, to adopt David Riesman’s language, the tendency to be “tradition directed,” (a trait shared with ennea-type IX). It is hard to separate, except conceptually, two aspects of perfectionism: the cathexis of ideal standards, i.e., the vehement endorsement of norms and the “perfectionistic intention,” i.e., a striving to be better. Both kinds of “good intention” support a sense of personal goodness, kindness, and disinterestedness, and distract the individual from the preconscious perception of self as angry, evil, and selfish. (Among the descriptors grouped in the cluster are included “good boy/girl,” “goody-goody,” “honest,” “fair,” “formal,” “moral,” and so on.)
Not only is compulsive virtue a derivative of anger through the operation of reaction formation, it is also the expression of anger turned inwards, for it amounts to becoming one’s own harsh critic, policeman, and disciplinarian. Also, we may conceive a group of traits, ranging from orderliness and cleanliness to a puritanical disposition, as a means to evoke affection through merit and a response to an early emotional frustration.
Particularly important for the therapeutic process, is the understanding of how perfectionism serves anger by preventing its acknowledgment. More specifically, it serves (by supporting felt entitlement), the unconscious expression of anger as dominance, criticality, and demandingness. The image of the crusader may serve as a paradigm for this situation: one who is entitled to break skulls in virtue of the excellence of his cause and his noble aspirations. When the strategy maneuver is visible enough, we find it appropriate to speak not only of “compulsive” virtue but of “hypocritical” virtue—for even though (as Horney points out) a certain level of honesty is characteristic of the perfectionist, his obsessive preoccupation with right and wrong, or good and bad, entails an unconscious dishonesty in its intent.
From the preceding analysis it is clear that the psychodynamic relation between anger and perfectionism is reciprocal: just as we may surmise that the strategy of striving to do better has been preceded by anger in the course of early development and continues to be fueled by unconscious anger, it is easy to understand how anger itself continually arises from self frustration and from interpersonal consequences of the irritating activity and rigidity of the perfectionist.
While I have grouped together under the single label of “perfectionism” those traits ranging from “love of order,” “law abidingness,” and “an orientation to rules,” to “do-goodism” and “dutiful nurturance,” such as make people adopt fathering or mothering roles toward others, I have grouped the three traits of “over-control,” “self-criticism,” and “discipline” separately below. These traits stand in the same relationship to perfectionism as “criticality,” “demandingness,” and “dominance” stand in relation to perfectionistic anger directed toward others. Just as criticality, demandingness, and dominance are hard to separate, over-control, self-criticism, and discipline—three attitudes toward oneself that constitute, we may say, the underside of perfectionism—are closely related as facets of a single underlying disposition. Perfectionism may be singled out, along with anger, as a pervasive dynamic factor in the character and as its root strategy.
Over-Control
What dominance—a transformation of anger—is to others, self-control is to perfectionism. Excessive control over one’s behaviors goes hand-in-hand with a characteristic rigidity, a sense of awkwardness, a lack of spontaneity with the consequent diffIculty to function in non-structured situations and whenever improvisation is required. To others the over-control may result in boringness. Excessive control over one’s self extends, beyond outer behaviors to psychological functioning in general, so that thinking becomes excessively rule bound, i.e. logical and methodical, with loss of creativity and leaps of intuition. Control over feeling, on the other hand, leads not only to the blocking of emotional expression but even to alienation from emotional experience.
Self-Criticism
What the criticism of others is to anger, self-criticism is to perfectionism. Though self-disparagement may not be apparent to the outside observer and tends to be hidden behind a disparagement may not be apparent to the outside observer and tends to be hidden behind a virtuous and self-dignified image, the inability to accept oneself and the process of selfvilification not only are the source of chronic emotional frustration (and unconscious anger) but an ever present psychodynamic background for the perfectionistic need to try harder in the pursuit of worthiness.
Discipline
What angry demandingness is to anger, an implicitly hateful and exploitative demanding from oneself is to perfectionism. Beyond do-goodism proper, i.e., an orientation toward correction and moral ideas, self-demanding involves a willingness to strive at the expense of pleasure, which makes ennea-type I individuals hard-working and disciplined as well as overserious. And just as a vindictive element may be discerned in interpersonal demands, a masochistic element may be discerned in the postponement of pleasure and natural impulses, for beyond a mere subordination of pleasure to duty the individual develops, to a greater or lesser extent, a “puritanical” disposition of being opposed to pleasure and the play of instinct.
There is widespread agreement as to the close association between the mechanisms of reaction formation, reparation and undoing with obsessiveness. These three constitute variations of a single pattern of doing something good to overcompensate for something felt to be bad, and I will concentrate on reaction formation, for reparation and undoing are more specifically connected to the symptoms of obsessive-compulsive neurosis, while reaction formation may be regarded as the more universal of the three and the most intimately connected with obsessive personality or perfectionistic character.
The notion of reaction formation was proposed by Freud as early as 1905 in his three essays on A Sexual Theory, where he observed that “opposing psychic forces” arise in the service of suppressing uncomfortable sensations through the mobilization of “disgust, modesty, and morality.” As is well known, his interpretation posits that a drive toward soiling during the child’s anal sadistic stage of development is defended against through disgust and will result in an excessive concern with cleanliness. I think a consideration of obsessive personality suggests that reaction formation is not only a matter of covering up something through the opposite, but a distracting oneself from the awareness of certain impulses through opposite activities. Even when it is not exactly the case that morally approved action serves to distract the person from the awareness of sexuality and angry rebellion, we can say that it is intention—i.e., a disposition to action that serves the function of remaining unconscious of emotions.
We may say that reaction formation underlies and is also the mental operation through which the psychological energy of anger is transformed into that of obsessive “drivenness.” Moreover reaction formation may be regarded as the process indicating the transformation of gluttony into anger. For the self-indulgence of gluttony constitutes a most avoided attitude of the perfectionist—whose character is the least self-indulgent of all, the most highly endowed with a “virtuous austerity.”
It is not only the case of a repression of oral passive needs in view of the active and self reliant attitude of anger, but a transformation: for we may consider anger as an alternative way of getting a self same underlying love-need satisfied—not through a hedonistic regression, but through an anhedonic progression to a premature self-control and increased tolerance of frustration. Rather than being a mere issue of relinquishing oral expectations, as it might superficially seem, the case of anger is one in which expectations are assertively endorsed, yet at the same time rationalized as legitimate demands. According to this analysis, then, reaction formation both generates anger and constitutes a defense against its recognition, in addition to constituting the underlying mechanism for perfectionism, moralism, conscious benevolence, “well-intended” criticality, anhedonic ethic of hard work, and so on.
I find that generally speaking ennea-type I individuals are pyknics and most commonly ectopenic mesoendomorphs. There are exceptions, however, mostly among those of the social subtype who tend to be athletic but slender and wiry. It is possible to think that the aggressiveness of ennea-type I is supported by somatotonia in their inborn temperament.
Freud, who was the first to observe the character disposition that we are here labeling as ennea-type I, was also the first to formulate a theory concerning its etiology: the toilet training theory, according to which an excessive concern with cleanliness and orderliness, as well as the retentiveness in individuals with an “anal personality” is explained as a result of premature or exaggerated demands of cleanliness at the toilet training period, and also understood in terms of the attempt to deny through overcompensation an angry desire to soil and let go of control. Later psychoanalytic observation also recognized that the “retentive” individual harbors an (“oral aggressive”) desire to soil and let go of control and defends against the forbidden wish with an over-compensatory, over-formal goody-goodness.
Since Freud’s time this theory has been mostly revised by Erikson, who proposes that it is not only the issue of sphincter-control that we should see as being the focus of parental overcontrol and rebellion, but that of locomotion, mastered during the same stage. Underlying both, Erikson claims, is the issue of an autonomy that asserts or over-asserts itself. I think that we can even go further and say with Fromm that this, like every other personality orientation, is a way of coping with life in general; that has arisen in response to a broader situation than sphincter control—a generalized situation of excessive demands and frustration in regard to recognition. I quote from a group reporting on the origin of their shared character:
“Almost all of us agreed that we all took responsibility early. It wasn’t given to us, but we took it. From the age of three all the way up, you know people remembered early in childhood up to the age of nine and then of course continued it through our adolescent and adult life. Often it was around, being, taking care of the children, I mean being that person that saw that the kids got fed and clothed and sent where they were supposed to be sent. Kind of assuming almost in a sense the mother’s role a little bit and a lot of, and then wanting to be recognized almost all of us felt that no matter how hard we tried what we did and tried harder and harder to be good and to do those things because we wanted to get some kind of recognition or acknowledgment from our parents, and we never felt it.”
Even so, we may continue to speak of the toilet training situation as paradigmatic and symbolic of the personality disposition, for the perfectionist has not only developed under stringent demands of striving harder for some desired behavior and exerting utmost control over his own organism, but is one who inwardly rebels angrily in face of both external and internalized control, and who has learned to alienate from his awareness and inhibit the manifestations of this anger through the mechanism of reaction formation.
It is easy to trace back the motivation to strive hard in the perfectionist to an early experience of affective dissatisfaction so that seeking to be a better person represents a hope of gaining more approval or closeness from one of the parents. Later in life, however, such striving also takes on a competitive implication, as if saying to father or mother: “I will be better than you and rise beyond your capacity to evaluate me: I will show you!”: a vindictive turn in which there is not only in success a hope but also a claim and a vindictive denigration.
I find ennea-type I somewhat more frequent among women. And among them I find that the parent for whose love the little girl has striven and who has been perceived as cold is more often the father. Besides an atmosphere of love scarcity, however, there is also in perfectionistic striving an element of modeling, a taking on by the subject of the hard-working, perfectionistic personality of one or another parent. Frequently there is a perfectionistic father or mother in the family of the perfectionist, and when not, there is commonly an ennea-type VI father of an over-dutiful disposition (which has much in common with the demanding perfectionist).
The overall situation is one of excessive demands coupled with scant acknowledgment, so the child has felt the need to push on and on in an atmosphere of sustained frustration.
It is my impression that an over-accommodating mother (ennea-types IX or VI) may contribute to the unmitigated power of an over-demanding and distant father. It would seem that in these cases an excessively symbiotic or an excessively timid mother betrays the child out of a comparatively greater need to accommodate her excessively demanding mate
The individual’s response to the situation thus far described involves not only an attitude of “See how good I am, will you now love me”, but also one of claiming a recognition or affection through an appeal to moral justice, a protest: “See how good I am—you owe me respect and recognition.” Towards earning this recognition and respect that are felt to be missing (at first from parents, later in people in general) the child learns to become a little attorney for himself or herself, as well as a moralist who specializes in making others play by the rules.
As an outcome of this process, the search for love that kindled perfectionistic development becomes the search for right and respectability—which characterizes this hard and distant personality style and interferes with the satisfaction of a still latent—though repressed—need for tenderness.
Before considering the existential psychodynamics of ennea-type I, it may be well to reiterate the postulate that is to be articulated through the contemplation of the nine characters in the book: that passions arise out of a background of ontic obscuration; that the loss of a sense of I-am-ness sustains a craving-for-being that is manifested in the differentiated form of the ego’s nine basic emotions.
In the case of ennea-type I, the proximity of the character to that of psychospiritual laziness (indeed the fact of being a hybrid between it and pride) makes the issue of ontic obscuration something that lies near the foreground of their psychological style. This is to say that there is in the life-attitude of ennea-type I a loss of the sense of being which, as is the case in the three characters at the upper region of the enneagram, manifests as an “unconsciousness of unconsciousness” that gives them a particular self-satisfaction, opposite to felt deficiency or to “poverty in spirit” of those at the bottom of the enneagram. Unconscious dissatisfaction, however, is converted into the hottest of the passions, which, however ignored by active unconsciousness, underlies the quality of interpersonal relationships.
While ontic obscuration involves a sort of psychological coarsening in the case of type VIII and type IX psychology as will be seen, in type I it is covered up by an excessive refinement; it could be said that reactive formation also takes place at the ontic level: perceived ontic deficiency becomes stimulus for compensation through activities purporting to sustain false abundance. The main activity that promises abundance to the ennea-type I mind is the enactment of perfection. We might say that precisely in virtue of this obscuration, the search for being can turn into a search for the substitute being of the good life, in which behavior fits an extrinsic criterion of value. The wrathful are in special need, however, of understanding Lao-Tse’s statement:
“Virtue (Te) does not seek to be virtuous; precisely because of this it is virtue.”
In other words: Virtue, by not being “virtuous,” is virtue.
It would be too narrow, however, to say that the substitute for being in type I is virtue, for sometimes the quality of life is not so much a moralistic one but one with the quality of “correction,” a goodness of fit between behavior and a world of principles; or a goodness of fit between ongoing life and some implicit or explicit code.
On the whole, it may be said that the preconscious perception of being-scarcity and the imagination of destructiveness and evil in ennea-type I is compensated for with an impulse to being a “person of character”: one endowed with a certain over-stability, a certain strength to resist temptations and stand by what is right. Also, loss of being and value supports activity designed to sustain the impression of somebody worthy which, as we have seen, is sought through a sort of worship of goodness and worthiness.
In the Nasruddin corpus of jokes, ennea-type I may be recognized in the grammarian whom Nasruddin, as boatman, carries to “the other shore.” After Nasruddin’s answers some inquiry from the grammarian with incorrect speech, the grammarian asks “Haven’t you studied grammar?” At Nasruddin’s answering to the effect that this was not the case, he proffers out of his righteousness and well informed self-satisfaction, “You have lost half of your life.” Later, Nasruddin asks the grammarian “Do you know how to swim?” And since our worthy grammarian responds that this is not the case, Nasruddin remarks, “Then you have lost your whole life, for we’re sinking.”
The joke poignantly alludes to the dissociation between the “grammarian mentality” and life. A process of rigidification and loss of meaning through excessive concern for form and detail has taken place. Even when the pursuit of goodness rather than that of formal correction, such as in school matters, there is beyond consciously cultivated kindness a coldness that entails both lovelessness and insubstantiality, or being-loss.
Just as Dante shows us, in his conception of Purgatory, various types of sinners at different levels on the mountain of purification, the psychology of enneatypes holds that people belong to a variety of human types, each of which is animated for any of the sins; only that we use the word 'passions' instead of 'sins' to emphasize that these are not behaviors prohibited by God, but rather destructive emotional excesses for the individual that should be overcome to remain faithful to life and one's own development. I begin this explanation of the characters with the wrathful, which can be distinguished according to three varieties; but let us not forget that, according to this vision of personality, characters are distinguished not only according to passions, but also according to irrational ideas associated with passions, which have been called 'fixations' because they constitute errors of perspective about life and the human relationships that sustain passions, giving them special stability; and in the case of anger, the corresponding fixation is 'perfectionism'.
The trait we call perfectionism can occur in people of various characters, but it is one of these that I have chosen to call a perfectionist; which corresponds to what academic psychology calls 'obsessive personality disorder'. But those who suffer from an emotional pathology recognized in a broad sense of the word are not only perfectionists, since there are also perfectionists that medicine would call normal and even some that the world calls saints, like Paul, whom we could consider as the inventor of the Christianity. Here is a brief explanation of perfectionism that will help to understand how, as a fixation, it is about something much more problematic than a simple character trait.
Oscar Ichazo used terms for fixations that were not consistent with his definition, specifically calling the fixation corresponding to the first enneatype 'resentment', which doesn't mean much more than rage and does not allude to a cognitive process or mistaken assumption about life. So I changed it to 'perfectionism', wanting to express more than just a character trait (roughly equivalent to what Barry Stevens meant by 'pushing the river': a lack of confidence in the natural flow of life, such as when you want to interfere too much in the spontaneous growth process of a child by trying to impose certain behaviors on him, manipulating him so that he becomes an adult prematurely, or training him in toilet training with an exaggeration that will influence his character forever) . Whereas, as a behavioral trait, perfectionism only refers to one who works with great zeal and strives to do things very well, sees things started through to completion, and deals with the details of things, as fixation is refers to a belief that could be formulated as: "If I am unable to do things perfectly, I am not worthy of love", or perhaps even, "if I do not do things perfectly (or "if I do not think and feel like a whole person ") I don't deserve to be alive." Furthermore, such a judgment can be extended to others: “The imperfect do not deserve to live—so we must eliminate defective or mentally retarded babies. Or perhaps the Chinese, the blacks or the Jews, if they seem to us to be inferior races»…
Perfectionism is a very inhuman attitude, no matter how noble it may seem to aspire to the ideal. It starts with the idea that one should be equal to one's ideal self right now, and it does not take into account that, since we live in a causal universe, things are the only way they can be right now. For if at this very moment things are as they were conditioned by the immediate past, it is very inhuman not to consider that "to err is human"; To err is intrinsic to human nature, since it is in the nature of things that reality differs from our idea of the ideal, which we only approach through a process of self-improvement. In other words, it's good to have ideals, and even want to get closer to them, but it's not good to beat ourselves up for not reaching them. Thus, for example, forcing children (or our inner child) to be better can constitute a very cold and inhuman attitude, unloving, if not monstrous. In animal symbolism we can roughly say that the wrathful (strong, but somewhat blind, like anger itself) are the bulls, only that when differentiating the subtypes it would be more accurate to say that, while the sexual E1 is the most aggressive and resembles In relation to the bull, the conservation E1 resembles a cow or an ox, which has been domesticated through castration, and the social E1 an eagle, as suggested by its morphology, as can be seen in the corresponding cartoon by Roberta Ranalli.
According to proto-analytic theory, the difference between these subtypes relates to what happens when the main passion force, in this case anger, invades predominantly the realm of self-preservation, sexuality, or social life; We are therefore talking about three instinctive variants of perfectionism and the specific characteristics that anger acquires in each of these three areas. In addition to these transformations of anger, in each of the subtypes there appears a secondary passion or 'satellite passion', as I will explain below and will continue to do throughout this book until I explain the twenty-seven passions that, according to proto-analysis, are added to each of the subtypes. The nine basic passions.
In order to understand the passion of anger, we must first distinguish it from the form of anger that we understand as an emotion. Through the commonly used term anger, we think of the aggressive emotional reaction as a response to a danger or invasion. The passion of anger, on the other hand, is an angry and out-of-control energy that this personality feels when facing the existential void that was created through the loss of their original state of fullness.
It is as if, having lost any semblance of paradise on earth, the E1 considered this loss to be a mistake needing to be repaired. While for the head types, and even more so for the heart types, the passion is an attempt to regain existential fulfillment through contacting with suffering and fear of loss, the E1 distances themselves from their pain and fear through taking on a superior attitude seeking to repair their dis-attachment, as they consider it an error. Therefore, they conclude that their form of reparation will have an effect toward concrete and perfect action that will eliminate suffering.
Generally, the E1 did not have the experience of being guided or taken care of as a child, instead finding themselves obligated to behave judicially, renouncing their instincts, emotions, and expression, typical qualities of being a child. They felt as if they lived under very high expectations that would not allow the possibility of making mistakes. The sensitivity of the child toward their parents’ suffering quickly transformed into an availability to resolve problems for them.
The passion of the E1 is the solution; in a way, we can see that anger is not necessarily something emotional, but more of a burning energy that carries them forward, skipping over connecting with feelings linked to the context and their mental elaborations. The attitude of the E1 of “parting the river” demonstrates the internal need to try to change the situation instead of adapting to it; this can give them a feeling of superiority and criticality to those who “are incorrect.”
Anger can be manifested quite differently, depending on the subtype; in the social and self-preservation subtypes, anger underlies a kind of action formation that is transformed into self-composure or benevolence. In relationships, the E1 demonstrates an automatic tendency to impose their own mental and behavioral standards, expecting of others the same perfectionism (their fixation) that they expect of themselves. They control and demand discipline so that, whether it be on a behavioral or emotional level, a kind of order or standard is respected, which they believe will lead to mistakes being avoided.
Their feeling of superiority comes from a type of self-certification, given that they see themselves as virtuous and just, which gives them the merit to occupy a position of authority way that they are exempt from feeling imperfect for having had impulses or emotions (which are considered flaws).
Anger, whose proximity to indolence of consciousness acknowledges the old saying that “anger is blind.” We shall see that the character that has anger as its motivational core is not a violent character, but rather, on the contrary, is someone who opposes violence both in him or herself and in others. The violence he or she blindly commits is not exactly what we call violence, but rather is expressed in a critical attitude, an interest in power, in being demanding and dominating.
The saying that anger is blind is not concretely expressed as the violence of an Ajax who thrashes out in the dark against bulls: it may express itself as subtly as in the situation characterized by Quino in a cartoon that represents a shepherd with a harsh, serious expression who in his implicit criticism of the stupidity of one among his sheep (which does not eat randomly) fails to see that it has sketched a smiling shepherd image on the meadow; and he would be even less capable of conceiving that it wished to communicate something to him in such a friendly and intelligent way.
The fact that the defense mechanism of the obsessive character is “reactive formation,” which through compensation transforms psychological contents into their opposites, means that the anger of the irate constitutes a less visible passion than the pride of the proud or the lust of the lustful. While the envious may not wish to see their envy, thus negating it, or those who are very afraid of being afraid ignore their fear, the negation of anger in the perfectionist character seems to be an especially accusatory case of unconsciousness, and makes the term “irate” particularly inept for suggesting the apparent personality of its bearer.
The “irate” person is one who typically acts the part of the “good boy or girl” in life. In today’s world, he or she is often a pacifist. An “irate” mother probably will not like her son to have war toys or lead soldiers. The aggressive potential in her psyche is overcompensating for something much more apparent: the ethical mandate of non-aggression. And the perfectionist character is usually that of a moralist, and if not, that of a person whose enthusiasm for rules, norms, good intentions, and noble resolutions stand out. For no one else is the following refrain so appropriate: “The road to hell is paved with good intentions.”
I have sometimes described this character as that of “angry virtue,” an expression that reflects both the passionate-emotional aspect of the character and this type’s “fixation” or mistaken perspective on life: the idea that one is worth nothing nor is one worthy of love unless one is perfect. This leads this person, so characteristically devoted, and an advocate of good, to be excessively critical and not at all affectionate. To be able to love only what is perfect is truly a form of not being able to love.
The self-image of a good person, however, is maintained by a continuous diet of good intentions and good works, and by the rationalization of perfectionist anger as a noble battle in the name of higher ideals.
There are perfectionists who identify more with their idealized image than with their denigrated image and therefore feel superior due to their excellence, while at the same time undervaluing their fellow men. The expression Holier than Thou is fitting here: it refers to the tendency to exalt one’s own nobility and to see the plebeian or uncultivated aspect of others in an exaggerated manner. The English have been caricatured for their excessive inclination to feel that they are in the right and to perceive others as savages, particularly in the days of their empire and colonies. This variant corresponds to rigid characters that expect the whole world to adapt to them, to listen to them, and to imitate their noble example, in so far as they identify with their idealized self.
Others, in comparison, criticize themselves more; they have greater contact with their denigrated self. What strikes one most of all about these EI people is their respect for the excellence of others, as well as their diminished tendency to set themselves up as an authority, in contrast with the rigid. These are people whose perfectionism never allows them to become satisfied; they never feel that they have done things well enough to be at peace with themselves. We can characterize them as worried individuals.
When we move from the religious discourse to the observation of human life made by the writers who have specialized in character analysis, we can observe that the personality syndrome that we are dealing with here has been studied since Antiquity, though not in the sense that we nowadays call “psychodynamics.”
Among his characters, Theophrastus describes one whom he calls “the oligarch,” and defines oligarchy as “the desire for control that aspires to power and riches.” The oligarch portrayed here goes beyond an aristocratic combination of presumptuousness, refinement, and unrecognized dominance. He tells us that he constantly uses certain phrases, expressions that allude to aristocratic feelings, disdain, and ceremony.
We ought to get together, just ourselves, and make decisions concerning these matters, avoiding the crowd and the agora. Let us put an end to our participation in magistracy, and thus to the criticisms and honors of this rabble. This city must be governed by them or by us ... The oligarch never goes out before midday; his cloak is carefully draped, his beard neat and tidy and his fingernails properly cut. ... They dislike sitting in the assembly next to a subject who is dressed in rags.
In the spectrum of Commedia Dell’Arte characters, EI is manifest in Pantalone—the authoritarian old nobleman that seems to have originated in the more ancient senex: the unpleasant critical old man already ridiculed since Roman comedy. The plots of stories involving Pantalone emphasize his repressive control over his astute servant Arlechino and most attractive maid Colombina. His appearance is shown in the dagger-bearing bearded figure in the illustration on page 90.
Such pedantry and distraction from what is essential is reflected by the anecdote of the Frenchman who, just before dying, states: “Je meure”(“I die”). Or, “Je me meure” (“I die myself”)—which may be said in both forms.
It is hard to distinguish between the habitual use of anger and hate, since the opposite of love is called hate. Accordingly, the passion of EI would be an anti-love. Its manifest character, however, is not the “counter-love” we described as characteristic of the violence, abuse, and exploitation of EVIII. We have already seen how EI is a good character—in the sense of someone who does not hate, but professes love instead.
Whereas the love of EII is an emotional phenomenon that lacks action, the love of EI is made up of intentions and acts that lack emotion. It is a barely affectionate love, it might even be said to be tough if the prohibition of toughness together with a conscious effort to be tender did not make this less apparent.
The personalities of Enneatypes VIII and I are comparably aggressive, except that in one, (valued) aggression is bare, and in the other (unvalued) aggression is negated and to a certain extent overcompensated, specifically in their love lives and in the loving aspect of human relations and situations. While EVIIIs are “bad” exploiters who demand indulgence or complicity, EIs face others as givers, generous types, by virtue of which they feel in possession of the corresponding rights.
Their aggression does not disappear, however, but metamorphoses into demands and superiority, into dominance and control over others similar to that of the domineering character—except that here it is disguised (in the eyes of the subjects themselves) as something that is justified by impersonal reasons.
One of Quino’s illustrations explains the profound self-deception of those with a passion for justice or perfectionists (to distinguish them from amoral, lustful avengers), who disguise their desire as presumably disinterested, just demands. Justice, commonly personified as a woman whose bandaged eyes distinguish neither between persons nor objects, is wearing a bandage over only one of her eyes (which comically recalls the stereotyped pirate’s patch) while cutting a slice of ham with her powerful sword.
The image here of the ham seems implicity to contradict this disinterested desire of the Puritans, characterized by Canetti in the portrait of an incorruptible vestal whose mouth is exclusively dedicated to the service of words and is never corrupted by receiving anything as low as the food that common mortals live on.
The way of affirming desires is hence their transformation into rights; and while the rights of the rebel are sustained by brute force, those of the virtuous rest on their superior morals. This transformation of “I want” into “you should” is alluded to by Quino in the rest of his cartoon, which portrays, alongside the potent, somewhat corpulent woman (who as a parody of Justice was cutting the ham), a judge on a high seat. A judge who, due to his height and the type of seat he is sitting on, as well as to the presence of a toy on the floor and his gesture of licking his lips as he eats, is the image of a child. As impotent as it is powerful is the arm of justice.
To allude to this disturbance of love as “superior love” implies an “inferiorizing love”: the other, who apparently benefits so much from this character’s benevolent acts, is deprived of moral quality or spiritual stature. He or she is “vilified” to a certain extent, at the same time as being controlled and subjected to demands.
The inferiorization of the other is done via criticism, which may be explicit criticism that is conscious of the other’s performance, decisions, or attitudes (“you have done this or that wrong” or “I do not approve of this or that aspect of your life”) or the less explicit criticism of not being satisfied with the manifestations of the other, which do not reach the ideal of perfectionist excellence.
Among the three loves, the most dominant one here is that of admiring-love: love for greatness, for the ideal. Love for others takes second place, because it is a love in the name of ideals, a love that adheres to duty, at the same time as being a love that is lacking in tenderness. And even more in second place is to be found love of self, which is unconscious and denied. Their morals do not allow these characters their “egoistic desires,” just as they do not allow the desires of others. We may speak of an anti-life attitude in these characters, in view of the excessive repressive control of their own impulses, of the taboo of their instinctiveness and of that of others. Whether it be their overprotective love towards their children or their possessive love towards their partners, there is not only a loss of spontaneity in these people themselves, but also a relationship that takes spontaneity away from others, who find themselves enveloped in an invisible repressive field.
This exceptionally conditional love demands unattainable merits and loses spontaneity. It is unaware of its destructiveness; it assumes the parental role not to support, but to interfere with the inner child of the other.
On the plane of individual problems, point I of the Enneagram—to the right of the upper vertex of the triangle—represents that facet of our neurosis that we may call “perfectionism,” which affects all of the characters to a greater or lesser extent. We demand that we be a certain way, in spite of our rebelling against our own demands. We lack a certain self-acceptance, and we do not allow ourselves to be natural or spontaneous. We live disconnected from our inner nature and its wisdom.
I referred previously to the oligarchic character described by Theophrastus, who has many political implications. Theophrastus caricatured him as saying to a colleague: “Look, we, who know better, must control the affairs of the people.” This expresses a superior position in life, and this is a character that is not only superior, but “inferiorizing”—a highly moral character who, from his or her moral superiority, judges others as immoral, degenerate, and perhaps worthy of being sent to jail; or who assumes the right to “educate” them and, if they do not let themselves be educated, possibly decides that they have to be bashed on the head with a civilizing mace. We have a good example in the crusaders (and their adversaries), who insisted on educating the unbelievers or infidels, on converting them to the true religion. “Praise be to God and give them the mace,” as we might paraphrase the Spanish refrain (A Dios rogando y con el mazo dando); aggression in the name of religion, as in so many wars.
This is an inseparable facet of civilization. When we say that we are “civilized” people, we mean that we are people of a certain dignity, a certain cultural refinement, a certain psychological or spiritual evolution, a certain quality. We think that we are civilized and not barbarian, not primitive. But is that so? Up until now, civilized man has shown himself to be the most destructive of animals. And if we do not realize this, it is because we idealize ourselves and reinterpret our will for power as meritorious privilege, as in the case of the oligarchic or aristocratic character.
Clearly, the aristocratic character has fulfilled a function in crystallizing the patrician classes, the privileges of the nobility, and the projection onto the world of inferiorizing relationships, giving rise to injustice in the name of justice. It is not just a question of privileges: these privileges are protected by repression.
When the word repression is used in the social sense, its meaning is different from the psychological sense. Psychoanalysis calls not wanting to see certain things repression, but when we are talking about a repressive or prohibitory culture or society, we are referring to the fact that “those who know,” the moral, the good, tell others what to do and what not to do. In relation to this, here is another anecdote: some time ago I found in a bookshop in Madrid a thick tome on “cultures that repressed humanity” written by a professor in law from the University of Zaragoza, Spain. I bought it, thinking: “Let me see what he has written, which cultures he calls repressive.” The book starts with primitive cultures, continues with the Egyptian and Babylonian cultures, and then every other one we know... not one is left out! The fact is, they are all repressive. Repression is an organ of society and our evolution, the evolution of an illness.
The exaggeration of what is repressive may be seen in the enormous hypertrophy of the criminalizing judicial and police system of modern governments. Today in the United States, the “prison crisis” is becoming obvious. There are so many people in prisons that the public budget cannot cover the cost, and what is more, people recognize that the system is not of any service at all to the majority. If what we pursue is that people change and improve, we will have to consider it much more likely that this occurs by being in contact with the good people there are outside. Prison, we know, is more a “breeding ground” for delinquency. Prisons concentrate the people with the most problems, and so the situation of deterioration increases at an extraordinary speed.
The only justification for prisons is to protect society from certain highly dangerous people, but the majority of those that are there are not so. So many of the people who are in prison in the United States got into the artificial paradises of drugs, and they have committed no greater crime than that of buying a little marijuana, for instance. For a culture like that of the United States, this is an important crime, because “what might this lead to” if it were allowed? “You start off with marijuana and you are sure to end up cutting your mother up into little pieces ... you don’t know what might happen in an altered state of consciousness.” The fear of a lack of control is a very North American phenomenon, but it also forms part of Western society, with a notably anti-Dionysian culture, with very little capacity for surrender. Although the Christian symbol of wine wishes to remind us of a kind of extasis that surrender to a higher power produces, a culture that is saturated with prohibitions and demands can hardly promote the capacity for surrender.
The overcontrolling and over-policing aspect of society is self-perpetuating. The more something is criminalized and the more it is said that “you are bad,” the more “bad” will be done, resulting in greater problems for society. Our hypersocial society, which weighs too much on the person with its “you have to do what I tell you to do,” “you have to be a good citizen,” “you have to be patriotic,” generates rebellion and criminality.