Preferences for Wages and Job Tasks: Selection Arising from Endogenous Search
with Todd Stinebrickner and Ralph Stinebrickner
We study worker preferences over wages and job tasks when job opportunities are endogenously determined through search. Using unique data from the Berea Panel Study on search behavior, accepted and rejected job offers, wages, and detailed job tasks, we estimate a joint model of job search and job choice that corrects for selection bias arising from the endogenous determination of observed offers. A distinctive feature of the data is that we observe offers arriving both with and without worker search, providing the variation needed to identify this selection. Workers value both wages and non-wage job attributes, particularly high-skilled tasks. Accounting for endogenous search is quantitatively important: ignoring selection substantially changes estimated preferences for wages and high-skilled tasks, measures of inequality in the total value of jobs, and estimated effects of search on job changing, wages, and tasks.
Fertility Beliefs and Outcomes: The Role of Relationship Status and Attractiveness
with Yifan Gong, Todd Stinebrickner, and Ralph Stinebrickner, The Economic Journal, 135(668) , 2025
Unique data from the Berea Panel Study provides new evidence about fertility outcomes before age 30 and beliefs about these outcomes elicited soon after college graduation. Comparing outcomes and beliefs yields a measure of belief accuracy. Individuals who are unmarried and not in relationships at age 24 are extremely optimistic about the probability of having children, while married individuals have very accurate beliefs. Novel attractiveness measures are central for understanding fertility beliefs and outcomes for females but not for males. Marriage is a mechanism that is relevant for understanding differences in beliefs, outcomes, and misperceptions across relationship and attractiveness groups.
The Unattractiveness Penalty: Wages, Other Outcomes, and Overall Well-Being
with Yifan Gong, Todd Stinebrickner, and Ralph Stinebrickner
Using data from the 1970s, Hamermesh and Biddle (1994) find that unattractive workers suffer substantial wage penalties, with this unattractiveness penalty seemingly larger for males than females. Using unique data from the Berea Panel Study, we find that large unattractiveness penalties in wages remain for a sample of more recent college graduates, but find no evidence of gender differences in this penalty. Extending the analysis, we find large unattractiveness penalties are also present for a variety of non-wage outcomes, including a measure of overall well-being. Further investigation reveals that the unattractiveness penalty in overall well-being can be largely explained by unattractiveness penalties in outcomes such as earnings, health, marriage, and children. We also provide evidence about college students’ perceptions of these unattractiveness penalties. Our results show that unattractive individuals face an extensive set of disadvantages.
Non-Rational Expectations, Information Sets, and the Estimation of Decision Rules
with Yifan Gong, Todd Stinebrickner, and Ralph Stinebrickner
This paper supersedes my earlier sole-authored paper, circulated under the title: Decomposing Deviations from Rational Expectations: The Role of Information Sets
Many economic decisions depend on beliefs about uncertain future events that are often unobserved. Researchers often address this challenge by imposing the Rational Expectations (RE) assumption, treating beliefs as conditional distributions of future outcomes given an observed information set. However, discrepancies between stated and RE-implied beliefs may arise from both deviations from RE and misspecification of the information set. This paper examines these sources of discrepancy and their implications for empirical analyses of economic behavior through both theoretical analysis and empirical applications. We first decompose the overall discrepancy into three components, two of which depend on the choice of information set, and then characterize the bias in estimated decision rules arising from constructing RE beliefs using alternative information sets. We show that both the discrepancy and the bias from a given information set depend on the nature of individuals’ deviations from RE, and vice versa.
The Origins of Wage Inequality: Endowments, Effort, Preferences, and Luck
with Thomas Crossley, Yifan Gong, Todd Stinebrickner, and Ralph Stinebrickner
How Workers Find Jobs: Search Channels, Offers, and Job Mobility
with Todd Stinebrickner, and Ralph Stinebrickner
The Dimensions of Attractiveness and Their Economic Consequences