Academic Year 2020-2021

This season we will be exploring articles in mechanism design with limited commitment. The first session will cover the basics by discussing communication games. The articles below should be discussed in the presented order.

1. Forges (1986). "An Approach to Communication Equilibria", Econometrica, 54(6), pp. 1375-1385.

2. Bester & Strausz (2001). "Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle: The Single Agent Case", Econometrica, 69(4), pp.1077-1098.

3. Bester & Strausz (2007). "Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and Noisy Communication", Journal of Economic Theory, 136, pp. 236-259.

4. Skreta (2006). "Sequentially Optimal Mechanisms", The Review of Economic Studies, 73(4), pp. 1085-1111.

5. Doval & Skreta (2020). "Mechanism Design with Limited Commitment", Working Paper.

As extensions of our discussions, we may also consider the following articles:

1. Netzer & Scheuer (2010). "Competitive Markets without Commitment", Journal of Political Economy, 118 (6), pp. 1079-1109.

2. Skreta (2015). "Optimal Auction Design under Non-Commitment", Journal of Economic Theory, 159, pp. 854-890.

In addition to these articles, knowledge of Chapter 6 in Myerson's "Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict" is particularly useful. All of these can be found in the following link: