Publications

Constraints and Incentives in the Investment Regime: How bargaining power shapes investment treaty reform, Review of International Organizations, Vol. 18, 2023, pp. 361-391.

States have increasingly started to terminate and renegotiate their bilateral investment treaties (BITs). Dominant explanations for the developments have however overlooked the underlying bargaining dynamic of investment treaty negotiations. This paper argues that states that initially were in a weaker position when negotiating the terms of investment protection have the strongest incentives to change their existing BITs. However, their ability to do so is constrained by their bargaining power. Without sufficient changes in bargaining power in relation to the treaty partner, a state will not be able to demand renegotiation or exit old BITs even if they become dissatisfied with them. This paper identifies observable implications of the weaker states’ incentives and bargaining power constraints for adjusting their bilateral investment treaty commitments. Leveraging a panel dataset on BITs, interaction effects between bargaining power and incentives stemming from rationalist and bounded rationality assumptions about states' decision-making are analyzed in relation to the occurrence of renegotiations and terminations. It finds that change in bargaining power in relation to the treaty partner is an important factor underlying the weaker states’ ability to terminate or renegotiate BITs.

Working Papers

Terminating to Renegotiate: Strategic Exit from Investment Treaties (R&R at The Review of International Political Economy)

How can weaker parties adjust the terms of cooperation in international agreements? Strong states can sometimes successfully demand concessions simply by threatening exit from international organizations or agreements. But pushing for redistribution of cooperative benefits is harder for the weaker parties, as they lack the credibility to threaten to walk away from such arrangements. I investigate the negotiation dynamics between asymmetric treaty partners in the context of the investment treaty regime. Some states have increasingly begun to terminate BITs, often with partners that at the time of treaty negotiations were much stronger. I argue that termination of investment treaties can provide a negotiation strategy for the weaker states: they can execute strategic exit to attempt to credibly signal their improved bargaining position and resolve, in the hopes of renegotiating more favorable treaty terms in later negotiations. I support my theoretical argument with two case studies: Ecuador’s process of withdrawing from BITs between 2007-2017, which is yet to result in substantive concessions in its investment agreements; and Indonesia's initial unilateral BIT terminations, followed by successful renegotiations with important regional partners. The paper contributes to the study of change in international governance regimes and exit from IOs by conceptualizing withdrawal from international agreements as merely an intermediate step in a longer negotiation process.

Never Let Me Go:  Exit clauses in international investment agreements (with Sujeong Shim) (under review)

Growing international relations literature examines when states exit international institutions and why. International agreements, however, differ in how easy it is for signatory states to withdraw from them. Why do some states sign up to treaties that are difficult to terminate, while others prefer treaties that are easy to withdraw from? We investigate this phenomenon in the context of bilateral investment agreements, exploiting variation in the flexibility of their exit clauses. We argue that the regime type as well as capital importer-exporter dynamics explain states' preferences over flexibility in treaty termination. In general, democracies prefer agreements that are easier to terminate to reflect any changes in domestic political preferences and because democracies face less credibility costs. However, when capital importing states are autocratic, capital exporting states, regardless of their regime type, prefer hard exit clauses to lock in their partner state for a longer time. To test our arguments, we have constructed an original dataset of termination features in over 2,500 international investment treaties, and find strong and supportive evidence for our claims. The paper contributes to the understanding of durability in international institutions, as well as negotiations over economic agreements.

Women in International Negotiations: Evidence from the Council of the European Union (with Tom Hunter)

What is the impact of increasing women's participation in international negotiations? Although growing international relations scholarship is examining the role of women leaders on interstate conflict and crisis bargaining, we know less about the wider dynamics of women getting a seat at the table where the terms of international cooperation are negotiated. Although long-standing assumptions hold that women are more peaceful, cooperative, and empathetic than men, it has been suggested that women who have made it to the relevant top offices are likely unrepresentative. Leveraging text-as-data from the negotiations at the Council of the EU in 2011-2016, combined with novel data on gender-composition of speakers and the member-state delegations, we investigate whether women employ systematically different negotiation strategies than men. Which negotiations do women participate in? Do they speak more often or at length than men? Do they deploy more cooperative language or make harsher demands? Building on existing work on international relations, psychology, and business studies, the paper investigates a set of hypotheses about the individual-level sources of negotiation strategies, as well as the challenges and opportunities disproportionately affecting women at the negotiation table.

Why  states  publicly  admit  to  breaking  international  law (with Yuan Yi Zhu)

Why do states sometimes publicly admit to breaking international law and continue breaking it? Past cases of such explicit breach illustrate a phenomenon whereby a government can benefit from openly admitting to breaking international law, even if it intends to continue with the breaching act after the public admission. We argue that an explicit breach can serve as a powerful tool to initiate change in international law favourable to the breacher: by publicly voicing their disagreement and demonstrating defiance, states can put pressure on the other members in the legal regime and successfully shape related agreements to match their preferences. However, states differ in their ability to benefit from the strategy of explicit breach. Only states that enjoy high international legal standing, defined by their past compliance and embeddedness in international legal regimes, can credibly initiate such change, as their disobedience has more detrimental consequences to the legal regime in question. Otherwise, the other states are more likely to punish the defiant state, reflecting badly on them, and hence making the strategy unattractive. Paradoxically, the strategy of explicit breach can only be used sparsely, as every instance of breach in turn corrodes the states international legal standing.

Work in progress

"Female leaders, cabinet ministers, and international cooperation"

"Gendered Communication in International Politics"

"BIT Terminations and International Bank Lending"

Doctoral thesis

My doctoral thesis "Withdrawing from international regimes: Bargaining power in the investment treaty regime" can be found here.

Suomeksi (In Finnish)

"Kun Yritykset Haastavat Valtiot Oikeuteen: Ovatko sijoitussuojasopimukset vaaraksi demokratialle?" 2020, The Ulkopolitist.

"Globaalin yhteistyön merkitys pandemian aikana" 2020, SAM Foundation Magazine 4/20