Research
International Organizations - International Political Economy - Negotiations and Political Communication
International Organizations - International Political Economy - Negotiations and Political Communication
Peer-reviewed Journal Articles
Balancing International Commitments and Democratic Accountability: Exit clauses in international investment agreements (with Sujeong Shim) International Studies Quarterly, June 2025, 69(2), sqaf012.
Growing international relations literature examines when states exit international institutions and why. International agreements, however, differ in how easy it is for signatory states to withdraw from them. Why do some states sign up to treaties that are difficult to terminate, while others prefer treaties that are easy to withdraw from? We investigate this phenomenon in the context of bilateral investment agreements, exploiting variation in the flexibility of their exit clauses. We argue that the regime type as well as capital importer-exporter dynamics explain states' preferences over flexibility in treaty termination. In general, democracies prefer agreements that are easier to terminate to reflect any changes in domestic political preferences and because democracies face less credibility costs. However, when capital importing states are autocratic, capital exporting states, regardless of their regime type, prefer hard exit clauses to lock in their partner state for a longer time. To test our arguments, we have constructed an original dataset of termination features in over 2,500 international investment treaties, and find strong and supportive evidence for our claims. The paper contributes to the understanding of durability in international institutions, as well as negotiations over economic agreements.
Constraints and Incentives in the Investment Regime: How bargaining power shapes investment treaty reform Review of International Organizations, Vol. 18, 2023, pp. 361-391.
States have increasingly started to terminate and renegotiate their bilateral investment treaties (BITs). Dominant explanations for the developments have however overlooked the underlying bargaining dynamic of investment treaty negotiations. This paper argues that states that initially were in a weaker position when negotiating the terms of investment protection have the strongest incentives to change their existing BITs. However, their ability to do so is constrained by their bargaining power. Without sufficient changes in bargaining power in relation to the treaty partner, a state will not be able to demand renegotiation or exit old BITs even if they become dissatisfied with them. This paper identifies observable implications of the weaker states’ incentives and bargaining power constraints for adjusting their bilateral investment treaty commitments. Leveraging a panel dataset on BITs, interaction effects between bargaining power and incentives stemming from rationalist and bounded rationality assumptions about states' decision-making are analyzed in relation to the occurrence of renegotiations and terminations. It finds that change in bargaining power in relation to the treaty partner is an important factor underlying the weaker states’ ability to terminate or renegotiate BITs.
Working Papers
Women's political representation and Foreign Direct Investment into Autocracies (Under review)
Although globalization has coincided with rising women’s descriptive political representation around the world, less work investigates whether representation in domestic politics influences international economic outcomes. I develop a novel theory of informational value of women’s representation to global markets. In low information contexts, foreign investors rely on women’s political representation as an additional heuristic to assess the investment climate in potential host countries. Leveraging panel data from 178 countries (1966–2023), project-level foreign investment data (2003-2023), and firm survey data on investor perceptions, I find that women’s representation boosts foreign direct investment into autocracies by improving firms’ perceptions of political stability of the regime The effects however do not exist for democracies, where ncrease in women’s representation provides little additional information for firms. These findings highlight that improvement of women’s political repre- sentation can have consequences beyond women’s rights and beyond domestic politics.
Can individuals make a difference to international negotiations? Individuals in negotiations face different structural pressures depending on their visible identity characteristics. This is especially true for women, who simultaneously face gendered stereotypes about appropriate behavior, but also underestimation of their professional competence because of their historical under-representation internationally. We theorize that women negotiators have incentives to adjust their negotiation strategies to navigate such structural pressures: when career pressures dominate, women prioritize strategies that demonstrate their toughness as negotiators and professional skills. But when short-term pressures to achieve support for their proposals dominates, they instead adopt more gender-stereotypically congruent negotiation rhetoric to appear diplomatic and likeable. Leveraging novel data on the identities of 700 negotiators and 3,500 negotiation statements at the Council of the European Union in 2011-2016 and large language models (LLMs), we uncover gender differences in negotiator tendency to indicate flexibility and willingness to compromise. Women tend to use less flexible strategies, especially when the gender composition in the negotiation does not require confirming to gendered expectations. In addition to providing a unique insight into real international negotiations, our findings contribute to the understanding of how individuals navigate contradicting structural pressures in international organizations, and how improving representation of underrepresented groups influences world politics.
Terminating to Renegotiate? Strategic exit and the Case of International Investment Agreements (R&R)
Exit from international agreements can severely damage the reputation of the withdrawing state and make negotiation of future agreements more difficult. Yet, several governments have negotiated new agreements with partners whose treaties they have previously exited. This article examines why states sometimes exit from international agreements before effectively negotiating a new, similar agreement with the same partner. Focusing on the context of international investment agreements, I examine the possibility that historically disadvantaged parties exit treaties to catalyze new negotiations. Evidence from interviews with cabinet ministers in Indonesia and Ecuador reveal that exit from their investment treaties was perceived by the governments as the fastest way to initiate investment treaty reform. Decision to exit was aided by domestic political conditions that mitigated the costs of international reputational damage for political elites. However, the strategic benefits of exit are highly uncertain: achieving a new agreement in the future is a rare occurrence, and unlikely unless the exiting states have improved their economic position and diplomatically communicate with the partners during the exit process. The findings contribute to the understanding of strategic as well as political aspects of exit from international agreements and are highly policy relevant for negotiations in the global economy.
"In our position... or if you are Indonesia or India... you terminate, you get rid of it. And then you start negotiating a different model." - Ecuadorian politician
"We cannot say to the US or the French government 'let's mutually adjust' when it's a treaty established precisely in their benefit. We don't have the position in the negotiation to demand renegotiation." - Ecuadorian official
“Not Two Worlds: China’s Multilateralism and the Strategic Allocation of AIIB Projects” (with Sujeong Shim)
How do rising powers compete with established financial institutions? This paper shows how China strategically uses the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) to expand its influence and build legitimacy. Rather than focusing on bilateral relations with China, the AIIB preferentially funds states that are beneficiaries of an established U.S.-led institution, the World Bank (WB). By targeting these countries, China cultivates support within the existing hegemon’s sphere of influence while avoiding perceptions of overt political manipulation. Using a newly constructed dataset of all 326 AIIB projects and an instrumental variable approach, we find that WB beneficiaries are significantly more likely to receive AIIB financing, whereas bilateral ties with China matter less. These findings highlight how U.S. allies retain privileged status in the evolving global order and demonstrate the continued role of international organizations in the midst of global power shifts.
Why states publicly admit to breaking international law (with Yuan Yi Zhu)
Why do states sometimes publicly admit to breaking international law and continue breaking it? Past cases of such explicit breach illustrate a phenomenon whereby a government can benefit from openly admitting to breaking international law, even if it intends to continue with the breaching act after the public admission. We argue that an explicit breach can serve as a powerful tool to initiate change in international law favourable to the breacher: by publicly voicing their disagreement and demonstrating defiance, states can put pressure on the other members in the legal regime and successfully shape related agreements to match their preferences. However, states differ in their ability to benefit from the strategy of explicit breach. Only states that enjoy high international legal standing, defined by their past compliance and embeddedness in international legal regimes, can credibly initiate such change, as their disobedience has more detrimental consequences to the legal regime in question. Otherwise, the other states are more likely to punish the defiant state, reflecting badly on them, and hence making the strategy unattractive. Paradoxically, the strategy of explicit breach can only be used sparsely, as every instance of breach in turn corrodes the states international legal standing.
Work in progress
"Controlling the Agent? Delegation to Permanent Representatives in the Council of the European Union (with Tom Hunter)
"Underestimated: Competence Signaling in International Negotiations"
“The Effect of US Exit on International Organizations” (with Johannes Scherzinger and Christoph Steinert)
My doctoral thesis "Withdrawing from international regimes: Bargaining power in the investment treaty regime" can be found here.
Genderwashing for Capital: How women's political representation influences foreign direct investment
ISA 2025, U. Wellington IPE workshop
Uncertainty and Power in International Negotiations
International Cooperation keynote lecture at IPZ Annual Conference: watch here.
Women in International Negotiations: Evidence from the Council of the European Union
ISA 2024, SVPW 2025, Individuals in Foreign Policy Workshop UT Austin
Never Let Me Go: Exit Clauses in International Investment Treaties
ISA 2023, APSA 2023, ZPESS 2023, GRIPE 2024, SPSA 2024, ERC Workshop 2024, PEIO 2024
Constraints and Incentives in the Investment Regime: How bargaining power shapes investment treaty reform
Invited talk at the World Trade Institute, University of Bern, 16th March 2022
Swiss Political Science Association (SPSA) Annual Congress 2022
Political Economy of International Organization (PEIO) 2021 Virtual Conference
American Political Science Association (APSA) 2021 Virtual Conference
Terminating to Renegotiate: Strategic exit from investment treaties
APSA 2022, panel "New Horizons in International Trade and Investment Negotiations", Montreal
PEIO Workshop on "Power of the Weak in International Institutions" 2022, Virtual/Oxford
ERC Workshop on "International Institutions: Backlash and Resilience" 2021, Filzbach
Political Economy of International Organization (PEIO) 2019 Conference, Salzburg
European International Studies Association (EISA) 2018 Conference, Prague
Keep, Terminate or Renegotiate? Bargaining Power and Bilateral Investment Treaties
Winner of 2021 Best Graduate Student Paper Award of IPE section at ISA
MPSA 2020, Chicago/Virtual
PEIO 2020 Conference, Vancouver
Why do states publicly admit breaking international law
ISA 2022 Conference, Nashville
MPSA 2021 Conference, Virtual
Bargaining Power in the International Investment Treaty Regime (thesis project)
Yale University, MacMillan International Relations Seminar Series, 1st Annual Student Presentations (2019)
Oxford International Relations Student workshop (2019)
Oxford International Institutions Student workshop (2018)
Beyond Dispute Settlement: Alternative Instruments in the Investment Regime
ISA 2019 Conference, Toronto
"Kun Yritykset Haastavat Valtiot Oikeuteen: Ovatko sijoitussuojasopimukset vaaraksi demokratialle?" 2020, The Ulkopolitist.
"Globaalin yhteistyön merkitys pandemian aikana" 2020, SAM Foundation Magazine 4/20