Adaptation refers to the process of changing behavior in response to a variation in the environment. We propose a model of an adaptive individual that contemplates two forces: on the one hand the individual benefits from adopting the ideal response to the new environment, but on the other hand, behavioral change is costly. We lay down the axiomatic foundations of the model. We then study two applications. The first studies a situation where ideal behavior depends on the response of another adaptive individual. The second analyzes the case where the ideal response is influenced by the strategic interaction in a cheap talk-like game.
In the context of stochastic choice, we introduce an individual decision model which admits a cardinal notion of peer influence. The model presumes that individual choice is not only determined by idiosyncratic evaluations of alternatives but also by the influence from the observed behavior of others. We establish that the equilibrium defined by the model is unique, stable and falsifiable. Moreover the underlying preference and influence parameters as well as the structure of the underlying network are uniquely identified from, arguably, limited data. The baseline model includes two individuals with conformity motives. Generalizations to multi-individual settings and negative interactions are also introduced and analyzed.
We explore the inequality measurement of a discrete ordinal variable between social groups. We provide an axiomatic characterization for the Net Difference Index (Lieberson: Sociol. Methodol. 7, 276–291 1976), that makes use of rank-domination to evaluate the discrepancy between the distributions of two social groups over ordered categories. Adapting well-known principles of cardinal inequality measurement to the between-group ordinal inequality setting, we show that the Net Difference Index mimics the Gini Index in terms of its relationship to the Lorenz curve, in our setting.
Interaction, the act of mutual influence, is an essential part of daily life and economic decisions. This paper presents an individual decision procedure for interacting individuals. According to our model, individuals seek influence from each other for those issues that they cannot solve on their own. Following a choice-theoretic approach, we provide simple properties that aid to detect interacting individuals. Revealed preference analysis not only grants underlying preferences but also the influence acquired.
We consider situations of multiple referendum: finitely many yes-or-no issues have to be socially assessed from a set of approval ballots, where voters approve as many issues as they want. Each approval ballot is extended to a complete preorder over the set of outcomes by means of a preference extension. We characterize, under a mild richness condition, the largest domain of top-consistent and separable preference extensions for which issue-wise majority voting is Pareto efficient, i.e., always yields out a Pareto-optimal outcome. Top-consistency means that voters’ ballots are their unique most preferred outcome. It appears that the size of this domain becomes negligible relative to the size of the full domain as the number of issues increases.
'Person's name'. 2023. 'Article name here.' Publication name, 1 January 2023. Article link.
'Person's name'. 2023. 'Article name here.' Publication name, 1 January 2023. Article link.
'Person's name'. 2023. 'Article name here.' Publication name, 1 January 2023. Article link.
'Person's name'. 2023. 'Article name here.' Publication name, 1 January 2023. Article link.
'Person's name'. 2023. 'Article name here.' Publication name, 1 January 2023. Article link.
'Person's name'. 2023. 'Article name here.' Publication name, 1 January 2023. Article link.
'Person's name'. 2023. 'Article name here.' Publication name, 1 January 2023. Article link.
'Person's name'. 2023. 'Article name here.' Publication name, 1 January 2023. Article link.
'Person's name'. 2023. 'Article name here.' Publication name, 1 January 2023. Article link.
'Person's name'. 2023. 'Article name here.' Publication name, 1 January 2023. Article link.