ABSTRACTS

Martino Banchio (Bocconi)

Title: Search and Rediscovery (joint work with Suraj Malladi) 

Abstract: We model search in settings where agents know what can be found but not where to find it. A searcher faces a set of choices arranged by an observable attribute. Each period, she either selects a choice and pays a cost to learn about its quality, or she concludes search to take her best discovery to date. She knows that similar choices have similar qualities and uses this to guide her search. We identify robustly optimal search policies with a simple structure. Search is incremental, recall is never invoked, there is a threshold stopping rule, and the policy at each history depends only on a simple index.

Bruno Biais (HEC)

Title: Dynamic contracting with many agents

Abstract: We analyze dynamic capital allocation and risk sharing between a principal and many agents, who privately observe their output. The state variables of the mechanism design problem are aggregate capital and the distribution of continuation utilities across agents. This gives rise to a Bellman equation in an infinite dimensional space, which we solve with mean-field techniques. We fully characterize the optimal mechanism and show that the level of risk agents must be exposed to for incentive reasons is decreasing in their initial outside utility. We extend classical welfare theorems by showing that any incentive constrained optimal allocation can be implemented as an equilibrium allocation, with appropriate money issuance and wealth taxation by the principal.

Michael Greinecker (ENS Paris Saclay)

Title: Sequential Equilibria in a Class of Infinite. Extensive Form Games (with Martin Meier and Konrad Podczeck)

Abstract: Sequential equilibrium is one of the most fundamental refinements of Nash equilibrium for games in extensive form but is not defined for extensive-form games in which a player can choose among a continuum of actions. We define a class of infinite extensive form games in which information behaves continuously as a function of past actions and define a natural notion of sequential equilibrium for this class. Sequential equilibria exist in this class and refine Nash equilibria. In standard finite extensive-form games, our definition selects the same strategy profiles as the traditional notion of sequential equilibrium.

Satoshi Fukuda (Bocconi)

Title: Shaping Institutions (joint with William Fuchs)

Abstract: We propose a simple model of the evolution of institutions, where leaders' actions have a persistent effect by shaping the norms of the institutions they lead. This can lead to different long-run behaviors even for institutions with the same formal rules. The early history of leaders plays a crucial role in determining which outcome prevails. Every period, a leader decides to respect or abuse their position. Respect strengthens the norms; abuse weakens them. Leaders' type and current norms determine the benefit/cost of abusing the position. Norms also determine the replacement probability of leaders. We elucidate democratic backsliding and corporate-board capturing.

Marie Laclau (HEC)

Title: A belief-based approach to signaling (joint with F. Koessler and T. Tomala)

Abstract : In this paper, we provide a geometric characterization of the set of interim equilibrium payoffs in a general class of signaling games. To obtain a tractable characterization, we use the belief based approach found in the literature on repeated games with incomplete information, cheap talk and Bayesian persuasion. This approach avoids  to specify the prior, the strategies of the sender and receiver, and the  belief system. The key ingredient is to consider  Bayes-plausible belief distributions that are incentive-compatible for the sender. Geometrically, this  leads to a constrained convexification of the graphs of the interim value correspondences. Our characterization extends the analogous result for  sender-receiver cheap talk games. We illustrate the results with some classical signaling games. We derive the best equilibrium payoff for the sender when his preferences are type-independent. For zero-sum preferences, we obtain an explicit formula for the ex-ante equilibrium payoff and establish a simple condition for the uniqueness of interim equilibrium payoffs.

Christoph Carnehl (Bocconi)

Title: Inputs or Outputs? What to Test and How to Test (with Matteo Camboni) 

Abstract: We study the optimal design of pass-fail tests in environments where agents can invest in inputs (e.g., effort) to enhance their individual outputs (e.g., human capital), which are then sold in a competitive market (e.g., labor market).  Recognizing agents' heterogeneity in converting inputs into outputs, the designer devises a test to maximize the expected total output. Our findings indicate that tests focusing solely on inputs are most effective for achieving this goal, provided the designer can coordinate market beliefs and agents' behavior on her preferred equilibrium. However, such input tests are prone to adverse equilibria, supported by pessimistic market beliefs about passing agents. If the designer is concerned about the worst equilibrium outcome, input tests are suboptimal. Conversely, tests that are based solely on outputs are robust to adversarial equilibrium selection but fail to motivate high-productivity agents adequately, who may ``free-ride on their talent.'' We derive the optimal pass/fail test designed to incentivize total output production robustly, and show its straightforward implementation through three simple components: two output thresholds (one high, one low) and one input threshold. Agents achieve a passing grade exclusively when their input-output combination exceeds at least two of these three thresholds.

Yves Le Yaouanq (CREST IP-Paris)

Titre : An Esteem-based Model of Rationalizations and Moral Behaviour (with Peter Schwardmann and Joel J. van der Weele)

Abstract : An influential literature in psychology finds that people tend to make moral judgements based on intuitions and emotions and then reason and rationalize primarily to justify the conclusions they previously arrived at. Our theoretical model formalizes this idea under the assumption that people invest in rationalizations because they value a (self)-image and outward reputation as a reasonable, evidence-based decision-maker. The model produces complementarities in agents’ cognitions, as one’s ability to critically assess others’ actions diminishes when resorting to self-serving rationalizations. Complementarities also occur among opposing political partisans and generate multiple equilibria, one where both sides abide by the facts, and one where they rationalize away inconvenient evidence and assign inappropriate motives to their opponents. Agents are overly eager to share their narratives publicly in the hope of enhancing their reputation, even though such communication decreases social welfare. Our model sheds light on the origin of partisan disagreement about the consequences of public policies and the conditions under which factual polarization increases. It matches empirical facts on the effect of echo chambers and intergroup contact as well as on miscalibrated perceptions of members of the out-group.

Harry Pei (Northwestern)

Title: Community Enforcement with Endogenous Records

Abstract: I study repeated games with anonymous random matching where players endogenously decide whether to disclose signals about their past actions. I establish an-anti folk theorem, that when players are sufficiently long-lived, they will almost always play their dominant actions and will almost never cooperate. When players’ expected lifespans are intermediate, they can sustain some cooperation if their actions are substitutes but cannot sustain any cooperation if their actions are complements. Therefore, the maximal level of cooperation a community can sustain is not monotone with respect to its members’ expected lifespans and the complementarity of players’ actions can undermine their abilities to sustain cooperation.

Justus Preusser (Bocconi)

Title: Surplus extraction and the burden of proof (joint with Deniz Kattwinkel, UCL) 

Abstract: An agent holds a surplus which a principal wants to extract. The size of the surplus is the agent’s private information; they decide how much of the surplus to reveal initially. In addition, both parties can costly produce conclusive proof that reveals the true size of the surplus. The agent’s liability is bounded by the revealed size of their surplus, while the principal is equipped with additional funds. The principal commits to a contract that allocates the burden of proof and the shares of the surplus contingent on the agent’s reports and the evidence presented. We characterize the principal’s optimal contract. Applications include wealth taxation, investment contracts, and procurement contracts.

Chris Turansick (Bocconi)

Title: An Alternative Approach for Nonparametric Analysis of Random Utility Models 

Abstract: We readdress the problem of nonparametric statistical testing of random utility models proposed in Kitamura and Stoye (2018). Although their test is elegant, it is subject to computational constraints which leaves execution of the test infeasible in many applications. We note that much of the computational burden in Kitamura and Stoye's test is due to their test defining a polyhedral cone through its vertices rather than its faces. We propose an alternative but equivalent hypothesis test for random utility models. This test relies on a series of equality and inequality constraints which defines the faces of the corresponding polyhedral cone. Building on our testing procedure, we develop a novel axiomatization of the random utility model. Our new axiom can be interpreted as a condition on surplus allocation in cooperative games.

Giacomo Weber (Paris School of Economics)

Title: TBA

Abstract:

Carlos Akkar (Oxford)

Title: TBA

Abstract:

Loren Fryxell (Oxford)

Title: TBA

Abstract:

Meg Meyer (Oxford)

Title: xxx 

Abstract:

Ines Moreno de Barreda (Oxford)

Title: xxx

Abstract:

Daniel Quigley  (Oxford)

Title:

Abstract:

Nemanja Antic (Northwestern)

Title: 

Abstract:

Michelle Avataneo (Northwestern)

Title: 

Abstract:

Alexander Magnus Jakobsen (Northwestern)

Title: xxx

Abstract:

Pooya Molavi (Northwestern)

Title: xxx 

Abstract: