Emotion

Emotion (and the psychology of value more generally) is central to my philosophical interests and receives its most detailed articulation in my 2018 monograph. In my view, the decisive advantage of my approach is that I ground my theory of emotions in a fundamental account of mental content and mental architecture.

The Emotional Mind: A control theory of affective states (Cambridge University Press, 2018)  Amazon link

This book introduces the idea of 'valent representation'. Valent representation is, I claim, the most fundamental unit of the mind. Each valent representation is a negative feedback structure or control loop which is tuned to some specified quality. Basically, when the specified quality (or its absence) is detected, a response is automatically triggered that either increases or decreases the presence of the quality (depending on the kind of loop). In this way, valent representation combines representation, evaluation, and behaviour in a single protean structure. By means of various elaborations, these three basic strands of the mind are then teased apart. In the book I develop an architecture in which increasingly sophisticated representational capacities unlock new kinds of affective states. Thus starting from the basic structure of valent representation I build accounts of pain and pleasure (affect), emotion, empathy and expression, motivated thought, and character-defining attachments. Ultimately, my grand claim about the mind is that all cognition is an elaboration upon valent representation. With regards to emotions specifically, my claim is that they are valent representations of situated concerns (which are things we care about set in a temporal, modal or social context).

Precis of the book on philpapers (forthcoming in a symposium of the Journal of the Philosophy of Emotion)

Pre-publication sample (Introduction and Chapter 1 on mental content) 

The whole book can be quite easily (cough) 'found' online if you know where to look. Or just email me.

Review by Colin Klein for Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews

Review by Dana Mills for Philosophical Quarterly

Popularisations:

What is the relation between reason and emotion? Cambridge University Press blog

On personality traits and mental disorders Imperfect cognitions blog

Featured book on Brains blog (from which the precis was adapted)


Other journal articles related to emotions and the mind

This article links up my theory of the mind with the global workspace theory of consciousness, arguing that affective states and particularly pleasurable and painful affect control the 'trigger point' at which content is globally broadcast to the mind, thereby becoming phenomenally conscious. Predictive coding approaches are also incorporated, particularly in reference to explanations of binocular rivalry.

This article goes beyond my emotions book in developing an account of the conflict between emotional rationality and well-being. It is part of my developing research on well-being.

I argue against somatic theories of emotion which claim that bodily feelings are necessary to emotions. However, I argue that bodily feelings provide an additional significant source of emotional intentionality. This chapter was updated and expanded as Chapter 5 of my emotions book so it is better to refer to book for a more complete view, though there aren't major differences in my position.

A very brief explanation of my claim that emotions essentially involve contrast representations (unlike other sorts of affective state) offered in response to a target article on the neuroscience of emotions by Stefan Koelsch and colleagues.

I outline a basic rationale for dimensional models of emotions, define 8 dimensions, and then offer various applications of the model, including to culturally specific emotion terms and poetic language. In my 2018 book, I provide a summary of this system in which I stick to seven dimensions.

Book reviews on emotions



Here is a picture of my brain.