Working Papers
Does altruism undermine incentives to produce in a risky environment? I study a community where agents, embedded in an altruism network, choose effort before facing a loss and make altruistically motivated
transfers afterward. I introduce a network statistic, responsibility, measuring how much each agent values community resources generated by effort, and show that it ranks equilibrium effort. Altruistic support
lowers average effort relative to a selfish community, yet agents with sufficiently high responsibility can exert more effort. Moreover, becoming more altruistic toward another agent can either increase or
decrease one's own effort, as the network shapes how responsibility is distributed across agents. Finally, altruistic support can reduce welfare relative to selfishness even when transfers completely equalize
consumption after every loss. Thus, the altruism network determines not only how losses are shared, but also how responsibility for producing community resources is allocated.
Empirical studies show that social ties influence agents’ market behaviour and respond to market incentives. This paper models the formation of informal risk-sharing links alongside a market for formal insurance. Agents face idiosyncratic shocks and can form costly links, purchase formal insurance, or do both. The model identifies two opposing forces. Cheaper formal insurance reduces residual risk and lowers the value of informal links. However, when some risk remains, larger risk-sharing groups improve diversification and can become more attractive. As a result, when link costs are intermediate, reducing insurance prices may generate a non-monotonic response of network structure and may paradoxically strengthen informal risk-sharing. I characterise stable and efficient networks, and show that the multiplicity of pairwise stable networks also provides a channel through which changes in insurance prices can have persistent effects on network structure.
Publications
We study how altruism networks affect the demand for formal insurance. Agents with CARA utilities are connected through a network of altruistic relationships. Incomes are subject to a common shock and to a large individual shock, generating heterogeneous damages. Agents can buy formal insurance to cover the common shock, up to a coverage cap. We find that ex-post altruistic transfers induce interdependence in ex-ante formal insurance decisions. We characterize the Nash equilibria of the insurance game and show that agents act as if they are trying to maximize the expected utility of a representative agent with average damages. Altruism thus tends to increase demand of low-damage agents and to decrease demand of high-damage agents. Its aggregate impact depends on the interplay between demand homogenization, the zero lower bound and the coverage cap. We find that aggregate demand is higher with altruism than without altruism at low prices and lower at high prices. Nash equilibria are constrained Pareto efficient.
Work in Progress