"Shill Bidding and Information in eBay Auctions: A Laboratory Study ", with Jim Ingebretsen Carlson, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 202 (2022), 341-360
Abstract: In online auction platforms, like eBay, sellers have frequently been observed to bid on their item to artificially increase its price, and this is known as shill bidding. We represent the eBay auction in a sequential auctions environment using lab experiments and study the behavioral consequences of sellers being able to participate as shill bidders and of being informed about buyers’ past bidding histories. We find that the possibility of shill bidding in ongoing and future auctions benefits sellers and mostly affects high private-value buyers. At the same time, buyers seem to overreact to the threat of shill bidding in the future auctions by bidding too high in the current auction. However, providing sellers with buyers’ bidding histories between auctions has little impact on auction outcomes and players’ bidding behavior. Moreover, there are significant differences between buyers’ and sellers’ dynamic bidding behavior during auctions, which can be used to identify shill bidding sellers from buyers.
"Changes in Social Capital during the COVID-19 Pandemic: Empirical Evidence from Singapore and Switzerland ", with Mijie Li, Schubert Renate, and Joerin Jonas, Natural Hazards Review, Volume 25, Issue 4, Nov 2024
Abstract: Social capital (SC) is a key factor of social resilience and is crucial for effective crisis response and recovery. The unprecedented levels of social distancing measures during the global Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic limited social interactions and restricted traditional support channels. This study assessed SC changes during the COVID-19 pandemic among representative groups of adults living in Singapore (total n = 3,774) and Switzerland (total n = 4,115), respectively. We assessed changes in SC, specifically in horizontal SC (i.e., ties between individuals) and vertical SC (i.e., ties between individuals and decision makers), between June 2020 and July 2021. Key results show that the overall horizontal SC increased significantly (although modestly) in both countries. Overall vertical SC increased significantly (also modestly) in Singapore and had no significant change in Switzerland. Thus, despite social distancing measures,horizontal SC and vertical SC indicators remained stable in both countries.
"Giving Decision of Time and Money: A Laboratory Experiment", Working paper
(Click here for the latest version)
Abstract: When studying the preference for giving, most researchers have centered on giving money. However, time, as the other principal resource, has been understudied. Existing evidence from psychology suggests that when people are focused on time, they behave in a less self-interested way than when they are focused on money. I compare giving time and giving money by measuring crowd-out at different levels and across different resources of others' giving. Using a within-subject experiment, I find that, consistent with the psychologists' evidence, the generosity level of giving time is significantly higher than that of giving money. On average, time giving is sensitive to both others' time giving and money giving while giving money does not respond much to others' time giving.
"Coordination Under Censorship", with Manwei Liu, Working paper
(Draft available upon request)
Abstract: Leaders have the power to censor undesired information from subordinates to maintain power and extract surplus in the presence of a conflict of interests. This experimental study investigates the effect of censorship on collective decision-making and how it interacts with the possibility of communication among subordinates using a modified Coordinated Resistance (CR) game. In our game, payoffs are contingent on the state of nature. The leader is capable of censoring state-related information before it reaches the subordinates, while the subordinates can coordinate their decisions to resist or cooperate with their leader. We find that censorship works to affect subordinates' coordination decisions and benefits the leader in a bad state. However, when censorship is not allowed, and communication is allowed, we can get a higher total welfare.
"Strategic Naivety to Undisclosed Information", with Manwei Liu, Working Paper (currently being updated)
"Sustainable Investing or Charitable Giving" with Peiran Jiao and Jan Schmitz, Working in Progress
“Social Resilience during the Covid-19 Pandemic: Comparisons between Singapore and Switzerland” Future Resilient Sytems, Technical Notes Series, June 2021, No.1, (With Renate Schubert, Ante Busic Sontic, Natalia Borzino and Jonas Joerin)