Title: Is Debating Some Topics Morally Wrong? 

‘No debate!’ is a tactic deployed by (some) proponents of certain positions in certain debates. They refuse invitations to debate their opponents and attack those on their side who initially accept; they pull out of edited volumes or online symposia when they discover their opponents will be included too; they call for speakers on the other side to be deplatformed; they write to university vice chancellors and deans demanding that events giving airtime to their opponents be cancelled. Can this approach ever be justified? That is, are there some topics such that debating them is morally wrong, and the moral wrongness rises to a level of seriousness sufficient to refusing public deliberation? And if the answer is ‘yes’, what is it that makes such debates wrongful? Rather than advancing a position on the justifiability or otherwise of ‘no debate!’ tactics, I’ll focus on offering some conceptual resources to those who want to develop their own position on this issue.

handout

 In order for evidence-based policy (EBP) to make good on its commitment to a solid scientific evidence base it must be just as committed to a solid ethical (or values) base. We support this claim in two steps. First, we argue that which evidence gets used in policy-making depends on our ethical commitments, which are rarely made explicit, let alone being the subject of critical and transparent reflection. In other words, ethical commitments are not just important at the point of spelling out specific policy details and choosing between policy options but they are absolutely essential right from the very beginning of the policy-making process: all the way from deciding which problem should be addressed by policy or regulation to determining which evidence to use and where to look for it. Second, in order to determine when we have enough evidence, we need to take into account relevant moral considerations. Thus, whether or not any particular policy is adequate by EBP’s own standard­—being evidence-based­—cannot be decided without appeal to moral considerations.

Talk

Handout Talk

Manifesting Contentious Beliefs in the Workplace 

Many legal systems protect a fundamental right to hold religious and philosophical beliefs, no matter their content. This protection is usually accompanied by a qualified entitlement to 'manifest' one's beliefs, subject to reasonable limitation, including the protection of the rights of others. In the context of the ongoing social and political debate surrounding the issue of sex and gender identity, this has raised a particular issue with regard to the expression of 'gender critical' and 'gender identity' speech in the workplace, leading to several high-profile employment tribunal cases in the United Kingdom. This paper draws upon speech act theory and legal doctrine to explore precisely when speech can be said to constitute a manifestation of a protected belief and distinguish this from conduct which is merely motivated or inspired by a protected belief. From here, the paper examines when manifestation might nevertheless be impermissible, either by virtue of the illocutionary force or perlocutionary consequences.

Mad, Bad, or Sad? Exploring mental illness and immorality in the ancient world and today 

Why do ancient ideas, doctrines, and ways of living one’s life re-emerge at different times in history? What can explain the ongoing, if intermittent, relevance of ancient Greek and Roman ways of thought? This talk is going to be primarily a talk about Stoicism and neo-Stoic movements, although along the way there will be reason to compare these traditions with Aristotelianism and neo-Aristotelianisms. What interests me is to enquire into the reasons why Stoicism as a way of living one’s life is revived in different periods of history, including today. How to live one’s life was the primary question for ethics, and thus ancient ethical writing – especially amongst the Romans who provided guidebooks for achieving a successful, human, flourishing life. Neo-Stoic movements have emerged within particular contexts of human history motivated by a desire to achieve the aims of that philosophical school, which is to attain happiness by leading a life driven by reason and by extirpating, or freeing oneself from, our passions and emotions. In contrast, however, Aristotle’s ethical writings were never, as far as I know, used as guidebooks for providing direction for individuals who were seeking psychological help to improve their lives. There certainly have been neo-Aristotelian movements throughout history, including today, but these efforts to turn to Aristotle’s philosophy over again were motivated for very different reasons. What, if anything accounts for this difference between Stoic and Aristotelian ethics and their popularity in different eras and contexts?

 A Moderate Theory of Overall Resemblance 

This paper defends the moderate theory of overall resemblance stated by: A) y is at least as similar to x as z is iff: i) every resemblance property shared by x and z is also shared by x and y, and ii) for any resemblance family of properties F, y is at least as similar to x as z is with respect to F. In this account, a resemblance property is a property that corresponds to a genuine respect in which two things can resemble each other, whereas a resemblance family is a set of properties with respect to which things can be more or less similar to each other. An example of a resemblance property is being cubical, an example of a non-resemblance property is being either a gold cube or a silver sphere, and an example of a resemblance family is the set of specific mass properties.