Published Papers
How does the vaccine approval procedure affect COVID-19 vaccination intentions?
(with Angerer Silvia, Daniela Glätzle-Rützler, Lergetporer Philipp).
European Economic Review, 104504:
Beliefs about social norms and gender-based polarization of COVID-19 vaccination readiness
(with Angerer Silvia, Daniela Glätzle-Rützler, Lergetporer Philipp).
European Economic Review, 104640
Non-standard errors
(with Albert J. Menkveld, Anna Dreber, Felix Holzmeister, Jürgen Huber, Magnus Johannesson, Michael Kirchler, ... & Utz Weitzel)
The Journal of Finance, 2339-2390.
Peace in an unequal world? Experimental evidence on the relationship between inequality and conflict in a guns-vs-butter setting
(with Alexandra Baier & Sophia Seelos).
Games and Economic Behavior, 147,74-87
Firms' Expectations about Skill Shortage
(with Helena Baier and Lergetporer Philipp ).
Small Business Economics, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11187-025-01035-0
Working Papers
The value of rating systems in credence goods markets
(with Angerer Silvia, Daniela Glätzle-Rützler, Wanda Mimra & Christian Waibel)
Revise & Resubmit at The Economic Journal.
Discrimination in the general population
(with Angerer Silvia, Daniela Glätzle-Rützler, Lergetporer Philipp)
Firms' Expectations about Skill Shortages
(with Helena Baier & Lergetporer Philipp)
Work In Progress
The reliability of rating systems in healthcare credence goods markets.
(with Angerer Silvia, Daniela Glätzle-Rützler, Wanda Mimra & Christian Waibel)
We experimentally investigate the effect and limits of a public rating system in healthcare credence goods markets. Therefore, we plan to employ a laboratory experiment framed in a healthcare context, where experts are called physicians and consumers are called patients, using a student sample from the University of Innsbruck. We plan to run at least four experimental conditions. In the baseline condition, there is no feedback mechanism in place. Next, we introduce a public rating mechanism into the market, where patients can rate their interactions with physicians on a five-star rating scale. Given that the feedback mechanism enhances market outcomes, we plan to run at least two follow-up conditions where we introduce noise into the feedback mechanism. We plan to implement noise as a situation, where physicians receive random ratings (from zero to five stars) on top of each patient rating. The conditions with noise vary in the number of additional ratings. We will start with one random rating for each patient rating and — depending on its effect on market outcomes — will increase (decrease) the amount of noise (i.e. the number of random ratings) in the following conditions. Our design allows us to investigate the robustness of public rating mechanisms to noise by introducing additional random ratings.
Cooperation and Punishment in the General Population: Evidence from a Representative Experiment in Germany.
(with Angerer Silvia, Helea Baier, Daniela Glätzle-Rützler, Lergetporer Philipp)
Guns, Butter, and Redistribution: An Experimental Study of Inequality & Conflict
(with Alexandra Baier)