Published Papers

How Does the Vaccine Approval Procedure Affect COVID-19 Vaccination Intentions? Angerer, S., Glätzle-Rützle, D., Lergetporer, P.,  Rittmannsberger, T. (2023)

How does the vaccine approval procedure affect COVID-19 vaccination intentions? European Economic Review, 104504 

Beliefs about social norms and gender-based polarization of COVID-19 vaccination readiness.  Angerer, S., Glätzle-Rützle, D., Lergetporer, P.,  Rittmannsberger, T. (2024) Beliefs about social norms and gender-based polarization of COVID-19 vaccination readiness - ScienceDirect  European Economic Review, 104640 

Working Papers

The value of rating systems in healthcare credence goods markets.  Angerer, S., Glätzle-Rützle, D., Mimra, W., Rittmannsberger, T., & Waibel, C. (2021)  

http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3965318

Non-standard errors. Menkveld, A. J., Dreber, A., Holzmeister, F., Huber, J., Johannesson, M., Kirchler, M., … Rittmannsberger, T., ... & Weitzel, U. (2021), forthcoming in Journal of Finance. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3961574

Work In Progress

The reliability of rating systems in healthcare credence goods markets. Angerer, S., Glätzle-Rützle, D., Mimra, W.,  Rittmannsberger, T., & Waibel, C. (2021) 

We experimentally investigate the effect and limits of a public rating system in healthcare credence goods markets. Therefore, we plan to employ a laboratory experiment framed in a healthcare context, where experts are called physicians and consumers are called patients, using a student sample from the University of Innsbruck. We plan to run at least four experimental conditions. In the baseline condition, there is no feedback mechanism in place. Next, we introduce a public rating mechanism into the market, where patients can rate their interactions with physicians on a five-star rating scale. Given that the feedback mechanism enhances market outcomes, we plan to run at least two follow-up conditions where we introduce noise into the feedback mechanism. We plan to implement noise as a situation, where physicians receive random ratings (from zero to five stars) on top of each patient rating. The conditions with noise vary in the number of additional ratings. We will start with one random rating for each patient rating and — depending on its effect on market outcomes — will increase (decrease) the amount of noise (i.e. the number of random ratings) in the following condition(s). Our design allows us to investigate the robustness of public rating mechanisms to noise by introducing additional random ratings. 

Discrimination in a nationwide survey.

Angerer, S., Brosch, H., Glätzle-Rützle, D., Lergetporer, P.,  Rittmannsberger, T. (2023)

Third-Party Punishment, Cooperation, and the Intention to Vaccinate against COVID-19.  

Angerer, S., Baier, H., Glätzle-Rützle, D., Lergetporer, P.,  Rittmannsberger, T. (2023)