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Who is the ideal orator?
The ideal orator is hard to define, and we know this because scholars have been trying to define the ideal orator for thousands of years. Historically, of course, there have been strict limitations on who could practice rhetoric. Since rhetoric has been thought of as something that only occurred in public gatherings, it has largely excluded women and other oppressed peoples. There are powerful politics at work in deciding who gets to speak. Cixous addresses this issue in "The Laugh of the Medusa." On the topic of women writing themselves, Cixous writes that it is "an act that will also be marked by woman's seizing the occasion to speak, hence her shattering entry into history, which has always been based on her suppression" (1236). Defining the ideal orator is a political process.
Various rhetoricians have various ideas on the qualities of the perfect orator. Some care about their level of knowledge, some care about their moral character, some think that anyone can make a good orator (of course, for some that requires training and for others it does not). There is not a single stable understanding of what an orator should be. Below, I will explain what I believe to be important for an orator.
Character
What should an orator's character be? Must they abide by their culture's morals and values? Must they be honorable, or can they have a less than pleasant reputation? Must they be fully honest, or is it ethically permissible for orators to lie to their audiences? These are the kinds of questions that scholars have been pondering for millennia. I won't pretend to have a new or even close-to-perfect answer, but I will use these questions to guide my idea of the ideal orator.
Quintilian writes in Book 12: "I am not only saying that the orator must be a good man, but that no one can be an orator unless he is a good man" (199). In Book 1, he writes: "I am proposing to educate the perfect orator, who cannot exist except in the person of a good man. We therefore demand of him not only exceptional powers of speech, but all the virtues of character as well" (57). There is a historical precedent for requiring orators to conform to their culture's morals and values. However, I am wary of setting that as a standard that orators must meet. First and foremost, I think there are too many examples of immoral and effective rhetoricians for that to be accurate. Take Hiter's rhetoric as an example. Hitler fulfilled the goal of rhetoric as advancing knowledge and educating others, there's no denying it. To pretend that what Hitler was doing wasn't rhetoric is factually incorrect and morally irresponsible. Rhetoricians must reckon with the fact that Hitler used rhetoric very effectively to do great harm. Pretending that he wasn't a good orator only causes harm, and that is why Burke's study of Hitler's rhetoric is so important: by learning about harmful rhetoric, we can be equipped to resist it. Hitler was morally reprehensible, and he is in no way the only effective orator with a bad character. I do not believe it is possible or responsible to mandate that orators have morally excellent character. We can hope for this, of course, but there are too many exceptions to make it a rule.
Can orators lie?
This is a challenging question to answer because this is a very nuanced topic. On one hand, it would be easy to say that no, orators should never lie. It is disrespectful to the audience at best and at worst does harm to a misinformed audience. On the other hand, it's somewhat reasonable to say that yes, it is perfectly okay for orators to lie to their audience. Consider cases of public safety or personal privacy.
Even Cicero, who is generally regarded as an incredibly good orator, lied in order to get the guilty Murena elected. Due to extenuating dangerous political circumstances and an impending attack on the people, Cicero was able to claim “with justice, that the national security, not the technical question of Murena’s guilt, was the overriding factor in the case” ("Pro Murena" 59). By using wisdom, Cicero protected national security and the safety of the citizens. In this instance, it was just to tell lies for the sake of the greater good.
Yes: Because rhetoric occurs interpersonally and not always in public, it’s easy to understand when lying might be ethical or even necessary. For instance, someone might confide in me a secret that is only for me to know, and it would be unethical and unjust to share that secret with another audience without permission. The importance of lying for privacy’s sake extends beyond the interpersonal, though. In a press conference, for example, a celebrity’s agent might lie about something in their client’s personal life to protect their privacy. That’s not unjust, because the right to personal privacy is important, especially before a public audience. Moreover, lying can protect the public. For instance, sometimes government officials might choose to not communicate honestly about an attempted attack on the public. This is not done to keep the masses ignorant in a negative sense, but some occasional lying or lying by omission to protect the public by keeping fear and mass panic at bay.
No: Lying is manipulative and immoral. For instance, we can think about Trump's rhetoric about COVID-19. He used lies about the virus, many of which were blatantly racist, to unite the public in fear. As the result of his intentional misinformation, the country's response to COVID was lacking, disorganized, and slow. Hundreds of thousands of people died. Furthermore, the racist lies he employed did real damage to the AAPI community. The Washington Post found that in the time following Trump's first tweet that included the phrase "Chinese virus," an "avalanche of tweets using the hashtag #chinesevirus, among other anti-Asian phrases," followed (Salcedo). The study being reviewed in the Post article came out "days after eight people, including six Asian women, were shot dead in Atlanta-area spas" (Salcedo). As we can see, lying to one's audience can have catastrophic effects. Furthermore, lying to the audience is disrespectful and damages the orator's credibility. As Aristotle writes, "Persuasion is by the means of character whenever the speech is spoken in such a way as to make the speaker trustworthy; for we are more persuaded, and more quickly, by decent people, about all matters without exception, and completely so in matters in which there is nothing precise but there is divided opinion" (138). As audiences, we are more persuaded by credible speakers.
My theory of rhetoric does not support an absolute to the question "Should an orator lie?" It is too complicated an issue to have such a simple answer. I believe that interpersonally, white lies that spare the feelings of other are generally acceptable, although I advise using caution. In terms of lying to the public, I believe that a wise orator can use their wisdom to lie when absolutely necessary for the sake of public safety and personal privacy. Aside from that, I believe that orators should be honest. Honesty improves the orator's credibility and thus makes them a more effective orator. Honestly is respectful to the audience. And honesty is a virtue that, generally speaking, is a good foundation on which to build an ethical society.
Knowledge
The ideal orator needs to know enough to get by. This does not mean that the orator is not broadly educated or does not pursue further learning, but that the orator doesn't get so bogged down in learning that they are never able to speak at all. To be clear, this does not mean that the orator doesn’t need an education; rather, there must be an end goal of knowledge to prevent the orator from the exhaustive task of learning as much as possible. That is too high of a standard to hold, and an impossible qualification for an orator to need. “Getting by” means that the orator must know enough to give a truthful, persuasive account of a subject and be knowledgeable enough to feel comfortable discussing it and answering somewhat basic questions.
Consider the politician. They are orators because they write letters, make public speeches, justify their votes, appear on news shows, and deliberate with their colleagues about issues at hand, among other things. We vote for these politicians and (more or less) abide by their laws. Yet, none of our politicians are super broadly educated on all topics. Still, we trust them to make decisions. That’s because politicians have teams of advisors who inform them on issues enough to make educated decisions. That’s what advisors are for-- to help the advisee make the best decision when the topic is outside the advisee’s specialization. They are not as broadly educated as possible; they are educated enough to get by as politicians. Not knowing everything isn’t bad as long as one has the resources to get enough knowledge to get by. In the politician’s case, this means listening to others to make the most informed decisions.
In Cicero's On the Ideal Orator, Crassus insists that “one must acquire knowledge of a very great number of things” including word choice and arrangement, emotions and the human psyche, humor, gentlemanliness, urbanity, and “the whole past with its storehouse of examples and precedents” (Cicero "Book 1" 61). There is no end to this learning, and in chasing this goal in order to speak well, orators will spend so much time learning that they will never be able to practice oration. Knowing enough to get by, on the other hand, means that the orator is engaged in education while still being able to be an orator.
In response to Crassus’s vision for an impossibly learned orator, Antonius proclaims: “this is a difficult thing to accomplish especially considering the life we lead, with all of its obligations. Secondly, there is a real danger of being drawn away from the popular way of speaking that we normally use in the forum” (Cicero "Book 1" 112). First, Antonius is right in pointing out that Crassus has set a terribly high standard. No orator has the time to achieve this task, and if orators in ancient Rome didn’t have the time, there is no possible way that someone living in the 21st century could learn “the whole past.” Second, Antonius makes a persuasive point that attempting to learn so much will put the orator out of touch: the orator will no longer be able to relate to the crowd. Their jokes will fall flat, they won’t be able to present information in an accessible way, and they will be utterly unable to speak well. Ultimately, although in an ideal world it might be nice to have such incredibly educated orators, it is impractical and impossible to hold orators to that standard. Politicians have advisors, academics have specialties, and all orators must be able to set attainable goals for their education as well.
Works Cited
Berry, D.H., translator. "Pro Murena." Cicero Defense Speeches, by Cicero, Oxford University Press, pp. 59-106.
Cicero. "Book 1." On the Ideal Orator.
Cixous, Hélène. "The Laugh of the Medusa."
Quintilian. "Book 1."
Quintilian. "Book 12."
Sachs, Joe, translator. “Rhetoric.” Plato Gorgias and Aristotle Rhetoric, by Aristotle, Focus Publishing/R. Pullins, 2009, pp. 133-284.
Salcedo, Andrea. “Racist Anti-Asian Hashtags Spiked after Trump First Tweeted ‘Chinese Virus,’ Study Finds.” Washington Post. www.washingtonpost.com, https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2021/03/19/trump-tweets-chinese-virus-racist/.
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