research

summary

There is reason to think that contemporary metaphysics has moved beyond basic modal notions such as metaphysical necessity and now primarily appeals to metaphysical grounding, real definitions, and sometimes even non-trivial metaphysical impossibilities. In my research, I develop and defend novel characterizations of these “post-modal” tools in terms of conceptual analysis and conceptual engineering. In addition, I argue for a number of applications of my overall view. I show how my view can be applied to a number of important phenomena in social philosophy and feminist metaphysics, e.g., the nature of love, grief, family, or cultural appropriation. 

publications and papers in progress

Modal Normativism and Metasemantics (Palgrave Macmillan 2023) I argue that we can accept modal normativism—a view that the function of modal claims is to express semantic rules—while also accepting possible worlds semantics. This is important because modal normativism comes with significant methodological advantages over alternative accounts of modality, but possible worlds semantics arguably provides the best model of semantic competence with modal claims, e.g., the recognition of entailments involving modal claims. I argue that by keeping the metaphysical insights of normativism at the level of metasemantics—i.e., at the level of accounts of what metaphysically explains facts about the meaning of modal claims—it is open to the normativist to wholeheartedly accept possible worlds semantics. One might worry that an appeal to metaphysical explanation or possible worlds in the metalanguage reintroduces substantive metaphysics that undermines modal normativism, but I argue that this is not the case. (Thomasson on Ontology, Philosophers in Depth, Palgrave Macmillan)

Modal Knowledge and Modal Methodology (w/ Amie Thomasson; Routledge, Spring 2023) In this paper, Amie Thomasson and I clarify the epistemology and methodology of modal normativism. Modal normativism is the view that the function of claims about what is metaphysically necessary (or possible) is not to describe modal features of reality but instead to express semantic rules. We respond to an objection raised by Antonella Mallozzi that modal normativists cannot explain modal knowledge unless they appeal to and explain knowledge of essences and metaphysical laws. We show how the normativist can explain model knowledge without appealing to essences or metaphysical laws but also show how to expand normativism to include talk of essences and metaphysical laws for those that would like to make use of these "post-modal" tools (Routledge Anthology on The Epistemology of Modality and Philosophical Methodology, eds. Dusko Prelevic and Anand Vaidya).

Metaphysical Explanations for Modal Normativists (Metaphysics 2020) When someone asks for a metaphysical explanation for why something is a bicycle, they presumably aren't asking about the causal history of the object in question. In this paper, I expand modal normativism, a theory of metaphysical modality, to give a normativist account of metaphysical explanation. A major payoff of my normativist account of metaphysical explanations is that it yields a plausible story about how we come to evaluate and know metaphysical explanations—we do this primarily by conceptual analysis. I also respond to a number of objections, including the objection that the epistemic payoffs of my view are not worth the metaphysical costs. (https://doi.org/10.5334/met.35)

Counterpossibles for Modal Normativists (Synthese 2019) I assume that claims of metaphysical necessity reflect rules of language use (i.e. modal normativism). I then argue that non-trivial metaphysical impossibilities reflect ways in which the actual rules of language use have changed in order to accommodate the description of some hypothetical impossible scenario . ( https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-019-02103-1)

Grief and the Love and Wrath of Divinity (Passage, Autumn 2022) In this work of autotheory, I combine personal narrative, prose poetry, and philosophical methods to argue that grief is a response to a metaphysical injury. Building on the theoretical work of others, I use personal narrative to develop the premise that persons are partly constituted by their relationships. Therefore, when a relationship to, say, a caretaker is severed, the bereaved literally loses a part of their self, and grief is a response to that injury. My argument is complicated by relationships where a caretaker sometimes acted in abusive ways. So, I discuss how a relationship partly founded on abuse can be a proper object of grief. I also argue that since grief is a response to a metaphysical injury, a proper response to grief ought to be based on care rather than rational evaluation. Finally, the essay itself is not merely an act of descriptive or argumentative narration but is itself an act of repair. (Faculty of Architecture and Arts of Hasselt University; ISSN: 2795-6644)

Modal Normativism and Modal Respresentationalism (forthcoming in Metaphysics today: in conversation with Amie Thomasson, Springer) Let modal representationalism be a view of modality that utilizes (possible) worlds to talk about possibilities, necessities, and counterfactuals.  According to modal normativism, basic modal claims, e.g. ‘necessarily, p’, ‘possibly, p’, etc., do not describe possible worlds but serve the normative function of reflecting semantic rules in the object language using rather than mentioning the terms. I argue that, despite appearances, normativism is consistent with modal representationalism and so can keep biconditional claims such as “necessarily p if and only if for all possible worlds p.”

*A paper on impossibility (under review).

Social Necessities (in progress; draft available) Some have argued that certain propositions about the natural world, e.g., the laws of nature, are not metaphysically necessary, but they are necessary in some more restricted, natural sense. In this paper, I will motivate the idea that there are social necessities, i.e., certain propositions about the social that are necessary. I will then argue that if there are social necessities, some of these propositions are neither metaphysically nor physically necessary but are necessary in some more restricted social sense. An important result from my arguments is that there is a kind of modality distinct from both natural and metaphysical modality, i.e., social modality. In turn, this has an important methodological upshot: questions about what is socially possible are best raised and resolved from the perspective and interests of social inquirers, e.g., social scientists or social-political activists. 


Linguistic and Conceptual Counterparts (in progress) I develop an account of conceptual counterparts, which is that idea that the meanings of various expressions found in one language have counterparts in another language (or in the same language over time), and these semantic counterparts can be more or less similar to one another. I argue that conversational contexts determine a semantic similarity relation that tracks semantic and metasemantic features such as extension, conceptual role, genealogy, and function.

Deflationary Approaches to Feminist Metaphysics (in progress; draft available) One might worry that deflationary metaontological commitments imply dismissiveness about debates in feminist metaphysics, that these disputes are insignificant verbal disputes no different than disputes over whether a glass is a cup. I argue that this is false and develop a general deflationary framework for feminist metaphysics.

Negotiating ‘Love’ (in progress; draft available) Philosophers and ordinary folk make all sorts of claims about love and what it is, e.g.: love is both biological and social; love is an emotion; love is love; etc. All of these claims might appear to be descriptive claims about love and not the concept or word ‘love’. I argue that, despite appearances, some claims about love are not made in order to describe some metaphysical fact about love but are in fact made in order to negotiate what the word ‘love’ ought to mean or how it ought to be used despite its dominant socio-cultural role.

Cultural Appropriation and Semiotic Authority (in progress) Discussion of cultural appropriation typically focuses on various forms of (unjustified) taking or exploiting between persons or groups. I argue that another potential problem with cultural appropriation is that it changes the meaning or significance of cultural items through misuse. I then argue that misuse, especially by socially and politically dominant groups, changes the meaning and significance of cultural artifacts, representations, and practices. I then show how this undermines the semiotic authority of (often already marginalized) groups, which in term undermines the group's existential autonomy  

conference presentations

A Modal Approach to Cultivating Intersubjective Values

Social Necessities

Cultural Appropriation and Semiotic Authority

Metaphysical Explanations for Modal Normativists

An Easy Way to Talk About Impossible Worlds

Counterpossibles and Metalinguistic Negotiation

Counterpossibles for Modal Normativists

Grounding and Impossible Worlds

comments

Comments on “Normative Metaphysics” by Dee Payton; Social Metaphysics Workshop, Duke University (June 2023)

Comments on "Against Conventional Wisdom" by Alexander W. Kocurek, Ethan Jerzak, Rachel Rudolph; Eastern APA (Philadelphia, January 2020)