with Niels Gormsen and Kilian Huber
Abstract:
A firm's cost of capital is a central object in economics. It is often defined based on the expected long-run returns on the firm's assets in financial markets, but these expected returns are unobserved and there exists no method that delivers unbiased estimates out of sample. We provide a method that uses machine learning to predict future cash flows of firms and then derives long-run expected returns from observed market prices and the present value identity. We show that this method works better than predicting returns directly if the model determining cash flows is more stable than that determining expected returns, a condition that holds empirically. The resulting estimates are unbiased out of sample and have greater predictive power than existing alternatives. We use them to construct a firm-level ``market-based cost of capital'' (MCC). Consistent with the standard prediction that firms maximize their market value by using expected returns as their cost of capital, we find that firms whose perceived cost of capital is closer to the MCC have higher market values.with Roberto Gomez-Cram, Yunhan Guo, and Howard Kung, R&R at The Review of Financial Studies
Abstract:
Prediction markets produce remarkably accurate forecasts, but the source of this accuracy is poorly understood. Two explanations dominate: crowd wisdom and insider trading. Using the universe of Polymarket transactions, we show it is neither. Instead, accuracy comes from a minority of persistently skilled traders, around 3% of accounts. Unlike insiders, whose private edge is localized, these traders exhibit depth and breadth. They react to public news when it arrives, eliminate law-of-one-price violations, and trade against the crowd’s behavioral mistakes. The crowd, in turn, generates most of the volume but little of the information, and its losses fund the minority’s profits.with Roberto Gomez-Cram, Yunhan Guo, and Howard Kung
Abstract:
We construct a high-frequency measure of earnings expectations using financial prediction markets. Unlike analyst forecasts, which are updated infrequently and prone to agency conflicts, prediction market prices reflect real-time, stake-backed beliefs. Each contract pays one dollar if realized earnings exceed the analyst consensus; we derive the conditions under which these prices represent subjective probabilities and introduce a methodology to convert them into implied expectations about earnings. Relative to analyst forecasts, we find that market-implied expectations are (i) more accurate; (ii) incrementally informative for earnings announcement returns; and (iii) significantly less biased, though they exhibit short-term overreaction in contrast to the underreaction typical of analysts. Our current sample covers the market's inception from September 15, 2025, through November 15, 2025; we will regularly update this analysis as new contracts resolve. We expect this measure to become increasingly informative as the market matures, liquidity deepens, and financial prediction markets become part of mainstream finance.