Direct Inference, Reichenbach’s Principle, and the Sleeping Beauty Problem. Episteme, forthcoming.
Physical Grounding and the Intrinsic Nature of Phenomenal Consciousness. In Gabriel Rabin (ed.), Grounding and Consciousness, forthcoming.
Ontological Vagueness: Why It’s Impossible, and Why the Metaphysical and Semantic Consequences are Severe (with M. Potrč). In A. Abasnezhad and O. Bueno (eds.), The Sorites (Synthese Studies in Philosophy), forthcoming.
Moral Phenomenology (with M. Timmons). In D. Copp and C. Rosati (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Meta-Ethics, forthcoming.
The Expected, the Contra-Expected, the Supererogatory, and the Suberogatory (with M. Timmons). In D. Heyd (ed.), Handbook on Supererogation, forthcoming.
Agentive Self-Awareness and the Nature of the Conscious Self. In J. Bugnon, M. Nida-Rümelin, and D. O’Conaill (eds.), The Phenomenology of Self-Awareness and the Nature of Conscious Subjects, forthcoming.
The Supervenient Causal Efficacy of Chromatically Illuminated Conscious Experience (with D. Henderson, M. Potrč, and V. Strahovnik). ProtoSociology 39 (2022): 169-203.
Is Agentive Freedom a Secondary Quality? (with M Timmons). Humana Mente: Journal of Philosophical Studies, 15, no. 42 (2022): 63–87.
Expressing Gratitude as What’s Morally Expected: A Phenomenological Approach (with M. Timmons). Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 25 (2022): 139-155.
Explanatory Emergence, Metaphysical Emergence, and the Metaphysical Primacy of Physics. In I. Stewart and S. Wuppuluri (eds.), From Electrons to Elephants and Elections: Exploring the Role of Content and Context (Springer, 2022).
Content-Determinacy Skepticism and Phenomenal Intentionality (with G. Graham). In S. Hetherington and D. Macarthur (eds.), Living Skepticism: Essays in Epistemology and Beyond (Brill, 2022): 138-160.
Chromatic Illumination: Conscious Intentionality without Conscious Representation (with D. Henderson, M. Potrč, and V. Strahovnik). ProtoSociology 38 (2022): 35-58.
Reflective Intuition and the Copi Card Problem. Philosophical Psychology 34, 3 (2021): 327-344.
On the Satisfaction Conditions of Agentive Phenomenology: A Dialogue (with M. Nida-Rümelin). In C. Erhard and T. Keiling (eds.), The Routledge Handbook on the Phenomenology of Agency (Routledge, 2021), 264-299.
Norms: You Can’t Always Get What You Want...But You Can Get What You Need (with D. Henderson). In C. Adair-Toteff (ed.), Stephen Turner and the Philosophy of the Social. (Brill Rodopi, 2021), 150-173.
Strawson on Panpsychism. In W. Seager (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Panpsychism (Routledge, 2020), 340-352.
Morphological Content and Chromatic Illumination in Belief Fixation (with D. Henderson and M. Potrč). In T. Chan and A. Nes (eds.), Inference and Consciousness (Routledge, 2020), 229-252.
Evidentially Embedded Epistemic Entitlement (with D. Henderson). Synthese 197 (2020): 4907-4926.
The Soritical Centipede (with N. Ballantyne and B. Fiala). Nous 53, 2 (2019): 491-510.
Pre-Reflective vs. Reflexive Self-Awareness. In M. Borner, M. Frank, and K. Williford (eds.), Senses of Self: Approaches to Pre-Reflective Self-Awareness. Protosociology 36 (2019): 298-315.
Seventy Years in Philosophy of Mind: An Overview, with Emphasis on the Issue of Mental Causation. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 13, 3 (2018): 300-331.
Philosophy and Science Dialogue: Mental Causation (with T. Wheatley). Frontiers of Philosophy in China 13, 3 (2018): 349-60.
The Phenomenology of Moral Authority (with M. Timmons). In D. Machuca (ed.), Moral Skepticism: New Essays (Routledge, 2018), 115-140.
Gripped by Authority (with M. Timmons). Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48, 3-4 (2018): 313-336.
Core and Ancillary Epistemic Virtues (with M. Potrč and V. Strahovnik). Acta Analytica 33, 3 (2018): 295-309.
Troubles for Bayesian Formal Epistemology. Res Philosophica 94 (2017): 233-255.
Nonconciliation in Peer Disagreement: Its Phenomenology and Its Rationality (with D. Henderson, M. Potrč, and H. Tierney). Grazer Philosophische Studien, 94 (2017): 194-225.
Sentimentalist Moral-Perceptual Experience and Realist Pretensions: A Phenomenological Inquiry (with M. Timmons). In R. Debes and K. Steuber (eds.), Ethical Sentimentalism (Cambridge, 2017), 86-106.
The Exchange Continued: Response to Pust’s Response to My Reply. In my Essays on Paradoxes (Oxford, 2017), 226-246.
Epistemic Probability. In my Essays on Paradoxes (Oxford, 2017), 281-318.
A Solution to the Paradox of Analysis (with M. Balaguer). Analysis 76 (2016): 3-7.
Abductive Inference, Explicable and Anomalous Disagreement, and Epistemic Resources (with D. Henderson). Res Philosophica 93 (2016): 567-584.
What’s the Point? (with D. Henderson). In J. Greco and D. Henderson (eds.), Epistemic Evaluation: Point and Purpose in Epistemology (Oxford, 2015), 87-114.
The Zero Point and I (with S. Nichols). In S. Miguens, G. Preyer, and C. B. Morando (eds.), Pre-Reflective Consciousness: Sartre and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind (Routledge, 2015), 143-175.
Newcomb’s Problem Revisited. The Harvard Review of Philosophy 22, (Fall 2015): 4-15.
Reprinted with additions in my Essays on Paradoxes (Oxford, 2016), 46-59.
Modest Quasi-Realism and the Problem of Deep Moral Error (with M. Timmons). In R. Johnson and M. Smith (eds.), Passions and Projections: Themes from the Philosophy of Simon Blackburn (Oxford, 2015), 190-209.
Injecting the Phenomenology of Agency into the Free Will Debate. In D. Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, 3 (Oxford, 2015), 34-61.
Generalized Conditionalization and the Sleeping Beauty Problem, II. Erkenntnis 80 (2015): 811-839.
Exploring Intuitions on Moral Twin Earth: Reply to Sonderholm (with M. Timmons). Theoria 81 (2015): 355-375.
Blobjectivism and Art (with M. Potrc). In J. Jaskey, S. Malik, and C. Cox (eds.), Realism Materialism Art (Sternberg Press, 2015), 145-149.
Virtue and the Fitting Culturing of the Human Critter (with D. Henderson). In A. Fairweather and O. Flanagan (eds.), Naturalizing Epistemic Virtue (Cambridge, 2014), 197-222.
Phenomenal Intentionality and Secondary Qualities: The Quixotic Case of Color. In B. Brogaard (ed.), Does Perception Have Content? (Oxford, 2014), 329-350.
Twin Earth, Moral (with M. Timmons). International Encyclopedia of Ethics (2013), 5242-5249.
Risk Sensitive Animal Knowledge (with D. Henderson), Philosophical Studies 166 (2013), 599-608. Book symposium on Ernest Sosa’s Knowing Full Well.
The Synthetic Unity of Truth (with B. Barnard), in C. Wright and N. Pederson (eds.), Truth and Pluralism (Oxford, 2013), 157-179.
The Real Moral of the Chinese Room: Understanding Requires Understanding Phenomenology. American Philosophical Association Newsletter on Philosophy and Computers 12: 2 (2013), 1-6.
Original Intentionality is Phenomenal Intentionality. The Monist 96 (2013), 232-251.
On the Armchair Justification of Conceptually Grounded Necessary Truths (with D. Henderson), in A. Casullo and J. Thurow (eds.), The A Priori in Philosophy (Oxford, 2013), 111-133.
Generalized Conditionalization and the Sleeping Beauty Problem (with A. Mahtani). Erkenntnis 78 (2013), 333-351.
Epistemological Skepticism, Semantic Blindness, and Competence-Based Performance Errors (with M. Potrc). Acta Analytica 28 (2013), 161-177.
A Dialogue on Free Will. Methode 2, 3 (2013), 66-80.
Phenomenal Intentionality and Content Determinacy (with G. Graham). In R. Schantz (ed.), Prospects for Meaning (de Gruyter, 2012), 321-344.
In Spanish translation as “Intencionalidad fenoménica y determinación del contenido,” in D. Pérez y L. Fernández Moreno (comps.) Cuestiones filosóficas. Ensayos en honor de Eduardo Rabossi, Editorial Catálogos, Buenos Aires (2008).
Introspection about Phenomenal Consciousness: Running the Gamut from Infallibility to Impotence. In D. Smythies and D. Stoljar (eds.), Introspection and Consciousness (Oxford, 2012), 405-422.
Connectionism, Dynamical Cognition, and Non-Classical Compositional Representation. In E. Machery, W. Hinzen, and M. Werning (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Compositionality (Oxford, 2012), 557-573.
Existence Monism Trumps Priority Monism (with M. Potrc). In P. Goff (ed.), Spinoza on Monism (Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 51-76.
The Phenomenology of Agency and Freedom: Lessons from Introspection and Lessons from Its Limits. Humana Mente 15 (Jan. 27, 2011), 77-97. Issue: Agency: From Embodied Cognition to Free Will.
From Agentive Phenomenology to Cognitive Phenomenology: A Guide for the Perplexed. Invited for T. Bayne and M. Montague (eds.), Cognitive Phenomenology (Oxfordm 2011), 57-78.
Introspection and the Phenomenology of Free Will: Problems and Prospects (with M. Timmons). Journal of Consciousness Studies 18, 1 (2011), 180-205. Issue topic: Describing Inner Experience: A Symposium Debating Descriptive Experience Sampling (DES).
Attention, Morphological Content and Epistemic Justification (with M. Potrc). Croatian Journal of Philosophy 11 (2011), 75-88.
The Phenomenology of Agency and the Libet Results. In L. Nadel and W. Sinnott-Armstrong (eds.), Conscious Will and Responsibility: A Tribute to Benjamin Libet (Oxford, 2010), 159-172.
Untying a Knot from the Inside Out: Reflections on the ‘Paradox’ of Supererogation (with M. Timmons). Social Philosophy and Policy 27, 2 (2010), 29-63.
This volume also published as E. Paul, F. Miller, and J. Paul (eds.), Moral Obligation (Cambridge, 2010).
Transvaluationism about Vagueness: A Progress Report. Invited for Southern Journal of Philosophy, 48 (2010), 67-94. Re-inaugural issue.
Materialism, Minimal Emergentism, and the Hard Problem of Consciousness. In G. Bealer and R. Koons (eds), The Waning of Materialism (Oxford, 2010), 309-329.
Mandelbaum on Moral Phenomenology and Moral Realism (with M. Timmons). In I. Verstegen (ed.), Maurice Mandelbaum and American Critical Realism (Routledge, 2010), 105-126.
The Epistemic Relevance of Morphological Content (with M. Potrc). Acta Analytica 25 (2010), 155-173.
What Does the Frame Problem Tell Us about Moral Normativity? (with M. Timmons), Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (2009), 25-51. Invited for an issue on ethics and psychology.
Terence Horgan. In P.Grim (ed.), Mind and Consciousness: 5 Questions (Automatic Press, 2009), 105-106. Invited contribution, together with those of 19 other philosophers.
Phenomenology, Intentionality, and the Unity of Mind (with G. Graham and J. Tienson). In B. McLaughlin, A. Beckermann and S. Walter (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind (Oxford, 2009), 512-537.
Mental Causation (with C. Maslen and H. Daly). In H. Beebee, C. Hitchcock, and P. Menzies (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Causation (Oxford, 2009), 523-553.
Expressivism and Contrary-Forming Negation (with M. Timmons). Philosophical Issues 19 (2009), 92-112. Issue on metaethics.
Epistemic Virtues and Cognitive Dispositions (with D. Henderson), in K. Steuber, G. Damschen, and R. Schnepf eds.), Debating Dispositions: Issues in Metaphysics, Epistemology and Philosophy of Mind (DeGruyter, 2009), 296-319.
Analytical Moral Functionalism Meets Moral Twin Earth (with M. Timmons). In I. Ravenscroft (ed.), Minds, Ethics and Conditionals: Themes from the Philosophy of Frank Jackson (Oxford, 2009), 221-236.
What Does Moral Phenomenology Tell Us about Moral Objectivity? (with M. Timmons), Social Philosophy & Policy 25, 1 (2008): 267-300.
Issue also published as E. F. Paul, F. Miller, and J. Paul (eds.), Objectivism, Subjectivism, and Relativism in Ethics (Cambridge, 2008).
Qualia Realism, Its Phenomenal Contents and Discontents (with G. Graham). In E. Wright (ed.), The Case for Qualia (MIT Press, 2008), 89-107.
Synchronic Bayesian Updating and the Sleeping Beauty Problem: Reply to Pust. Synthese 160 (2008), 155-159.
Prolegomena to a Future Phenomenology of Morals (with M. Timmons), Psyche 8 (2008): 115-131. Issue on moral phenomenology.
Phenomenal Intentionality Meets the Extended Mind (with U. Kriegel). The Monist 91 (2008), 353-380.
An Objectivist Argument for Thirdism (with J. Pollock and 15 other participants in his OSCAR seminar), Analysis 68 (2008), 149-155.
Contextual Semantics and Particularist Semantic Normativity (with M. Potrc). In M. Lance, M. Potrc, and V. Strahovnik (eds.), Challenging Moral Particularism (Routledge, 2008), 123-139.
Some Ins and Outs of Transglobal Reliabilism (with D. Henderson). In S. Goldberg, Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology (Oxford, 2007), 100-130.
Transglobal Evidentialism-Reliabilism (with D. Henderson and M. Potrc). Acta Analytica 22 (2007), 281-300
Synchronic Bayesian Updating and the Generalized Sleeping Beauty Problem. Analysis 67 (2007), 50-59.
Phenomenal Epistemology: What is Phenomenal Consciousness that We May Know it So Well? (with U. Kriegel). Philosophical Issues 17 (2007), 123-144.
Morphological Rationalism and the Psychology of Moral Judgment (with M. Timmons), Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (2007), 279-295.
Moorean Moral Phenomenology (with M. Timmons). In S. Nuccetelli and G. Seay (eds.), Themes from G. E. Moore: New Essays in Epistemology and Ethics (Oxford, 2007), 203-226.
Mental Causation and the Agent-Exclusion Problem. Erkenntnis 67 (2007), 183-200. Papers from the 2005 Tuebingen Conference on Mental Causation, Externalism, and Self-Knowledge.
Consciousness and Intentionality (with G. Graham and J. Tienson). In M. Velmans and S. Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness (Blackwell, 2007), 468-84.
Agentive Phenomenal Intentionality and the Limits of Introspection. Psyche 13/2 (April 2007), 1-29.
Truth as Mediated Correspondence (with B. Barnard). The Monist 89 (2006), 28-49.
Transvaluationism: The Benign Logical Incoherence of Vagueness. Harvard Review of Philosophy 14, (2006), 20-35.
Transglobal Reliabilism (with D. Henderson). Croatian Journal of Philosophy 6 (2006), 171-195.
Particularist Semantic Normativity (with M. Potrc). Acta Analytica 21 (2006), 45-61.
Morality without Moral Facts (with M. Timmons). In J. Dreier (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory (Blackwell, 2006), 220-38.
Materialism: Matters of Definition, Defense, and Deconstruction. Philosophical Studies 131 (2006), 157-183.
Expressivism, Yes! Relativism, No! (with M. Timmons). In R. Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 1 (Oxford, 2006), 73-98.
Cognitivist Expressivism (with M. Timmons). In T. Horgan and M. Timmons (eds.), Metaethics After Moore (Oxford, 2006), 255-98.
Cognition Needs Syntax But Not Rules (with J. Tienson). In R. Stainton (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science (Blackwell, 2006).
Introduction (with M. Timmons), T. Horgan and M. Timmons (eds.), Metatethics After Moore (Oxford, 2006), 1-15.
Abundant Truth in an Austere World (with M. Potrc). In M. Lynch and P. Greenough (eds.), Truth and Realism: New Essays (Oxford, 2006), 137-167.
What Does It Take to Be a True Believer? Against the Opulent Ideology of Eliminative Materialism (with D. Henderson), invited for C. Erneling and D. Johnson (eds.), Mind as a Scientific Object: Between Brain and Culture (Oxford, 2005), 211-24.
The Phenomenology of Embodied Agency (with J. Tienson). In M. Saagua and F. de Ferro (eds.), A Explicacao da Interpretacao Humana: The Explanation of Human Interpretation. Proceedings of the Conference Mind and Action III—May 2001. Lisbon: Edicoes Colibri (2005), 415-23.
Moral Phenomenology and Moral Theory (with M. Timmons), Philosophical Issues 15 (2005), 56-77.
Mary Mary, Au Contraire (with G. Graham), Philosophical Studies 122 (2005), 203-212. Invited response to D. Raffman, “Even Zombies Can Be Surprised: A Reply to Graham and Horgan,” Philosophical Studies 122 (2005), 189-202.
Internal-World Skepticism and the Self-Presentational Nature of Phenomenal Consciousness (with J. Tienson and G. Graham). In M. Reicher and J. Marek (eds.), Experience and Analysis: Proceedings of the 27th International Wittgenstein Symposium (Obv & hpt, 2005), 191-207.
Also in U. Kriegel and K. Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness (MIT, 2006), 41-61.
Sleeping Beauty Awakened: New Odds at the Dawn of the New Day. Analysis 64 (2004), 10-20.
Phenomenal Intentionality and the Brain in a Vat (with J. Tienson and G. Graham). In R. Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge (Walter de Gruyter, 2004), 297-317.
The Phenomenology of First-Person Agency (with J. Tienson and G. Graham). In S. Walter and H. D. Heckmann (eds.), Physicalism and Mental Causation: The Metaphysics of Mind and Action (Imprint Academic, 2003), 323-40.
Replies to Papers, Grazer Philosophische Studien 63 (2002), 303-41. Issue on the philosophy of Terence Horgan.
Themes in My Philosophical Work, Grazer Philosophische Studien 63 (2002), 1-26. Issue on the philosophy of Terence Horgan.
Conceptual Relativity and Metaphysical Realism (with M. Timmons), Philosophical Issues 12 (2002), 74-96. Issue on realism and relativism.
The A Priori Isn’t All That It’s Cracked Up to Be, But It Is Something (with D. Henderson). Philosophical Topics 29 (2002), 219-50. Issue honoring Alvin Goldman.
Addressing Questions for Blobjectivism (with M. Potrc), Facta Philosophica 4 (2002), 311-21.
Sensations and Grain Processes (with G. Graham). In J. Fetzer and G. Mulhauser (ed.), Consciousness and the Algorithms of Evolution (J. Benjamin, 2002), 63-86.
The Salem Witch Project (with S. Tammelleo), Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2002), 193-200. For a symposium on M. Lance and J. O’Leary-Hawthorne, The Grammar of Meaning.
The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality (with J. Tienson). In D. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings (Oxford, 2002), 520-33.
The Two-Envelope Paradox and the Foundations of Rational Decision Theory. in B. Brogaard and B. Smith, eds., Rationality and Irrationality: Proceedings of the 23rd International Wittgenstein Symposium (öbv & hpt, 2001), 172-91.
Practicing Safe Epistemology (with D. Henderson). Philosophical Studies 102 (2001), 227-58.
Multiple Reference, Multiple Realization, and the Reduction of Mind. Invited for F. Siebelt and B. Preyer, eds., Reality and Humean Supervenience: Essays on the Philosophy of David Lewis (Rowman & Littlefield, 2001), 205-21.
Deconstructing New Wave Materialism (with J. Tienson). In B. Loewer, ed., Physicalism and Its Discontents (Cambridge, 2001), 307-18.
Contextual Semantics and Metaphysical Realism: Truth as Indirect Correspondence. Invited for M. Lynch (ed.), The Nature of Truth: Classic and Contemporary Perspectives (MIT Press, 2001), 67-95.
Causal Compatibilism and the Exclusion Problem. Theoria 16 (2001), 95-116. Issue on mental causation, edited by J. Corbi.
What Is A Priori and What Is It Good For? (with D. Henderson). Southern Journal of Philosophy 38, Spindel Conference Supplement on the Role of the Empirical and the A Priori in Philosophy (2000), 51-86.
The Two-Envelope Paradox, Nonstandard Expected Utility, and the Intensionality of Probability, Nous 34 (2000), 578-602.
Simulation and Epistemic Competence (with David Henderson). In H. Kobler and K. Steuber, (eds), Empathy and Agency: The Problem of Understanding in the Social Sciences (Westview, 2000), 119-43.
Nondescriptivist Cognitivism: Framework for a New Metaethic (with M. Timmons). Philosophical Papers 29 (2000), 121-53. Reprinted in R. Shafer-Landau and T. Cuneo, eds., Foundations of Ethics (Blackwell, 2007), 58-70.
Mary Mary, Quite Contrary (with G. Graham). Philosophical Studies 99 (2000), 59-87.
Iceberg Epistemology (with D. Henderson). Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (2000), 497-535.
Facing Up to the Sorites Paradox. In A. Anamori (ed.), Proceedings of the 20th World Congress of Philosophy. Volume 6: Analytic Philosophy and Logic. Philosophy Documentation Center (2000), 99-111. Invited symposium paper for a session on Logic and Metaphysics.
Copping Out on Moral Twin Earth (with M. Timmons). Synthese 124 (2000), 139-52. Appears with D. Copp, “Milk, Honey, and the Good Life on Moral Twin Earth.”
Blobjectivism and Indirect Correspondence (with M. Potrc), Facta Philosophica, 2 (2000): 249-70.
Short Precis of Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology (with J. Tienson). Acta Analytica 22 (1999): 9-21.
Authors’ Replies (with J. Tienson). Acta Analytica 22 (1999), 275-87. Issue containing proceedings from the 1997 conference on Horgan and Tienson’s Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology.
Resisting the Tyranny of Terminology: The General Dynamical Hypothesis in Cognitive Science (with J. Tienson). Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (1998), 643. Invited commentary on T. van Gelder, “The Dynamical Hypothesis in Cognitive Science.”
Actualism, Quantification, and Contextual Semantics. Philosophical Perspectives 12 (1998), 503-09. Invited reply to J. Tomberlin, “Actualism, Naturalism, and Ontology.”
Recognitional Concepts and the Compositionality of Concept Possession. Philosophical Issues 9 (1998), 27-33. Symposium paper on J. Fodor’s “There are No Recognitional Concepts; Not Even RED,” Sociedad Filosofica Ibero Americana, 1997.
The Transvaluationist Conception of Vagueness. The Monist 81 (1998), 316-33.
Kim on Mental Causation and Causal Exclusion. Philosophical Perspectives 11 (1998), 165-84.
Modelling the Noncomputational Mind: Reply to Litch. Philosophical Psychology 10 (1997), 365-71. Symposium on T. Horgan and J. Tienson, Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology (MIT Press).
Precis of Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology (with J. Tienson), Philosophical Psychology 10 (1997), 337-56. Symposium on T. Horgan and J. Tienson, Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology (MIT Press).
Connectionism and the Philosophical Foundations of Cognitive Science. Metaphilosophy 28 (1997), 1-30. Based on an invited overview talk, 1994 Eastern Division APA meeting. Reprinted in Chinese translation in L. Magnani and Li Ping, eds. Philosophical Investigations from a Perspective of Cognition. Guangdong People’s Publishing House, 2006.
Brute Supervenience, Deep Ignorance, and the Problem of the Many. Philosophical Issues 8 (1997), 229-36.
From Moral Realism to Moral Relativism in One Easy Step (with M. Timmons). Critica 28 (1996), 3-39.
Troubles for Michael Smith's Metaethical Rationalism (with M. Timmons). Philosophical Papers 25 (1996), 203-231.
The Perils of Epistemic Reductionism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (1996), 891-97. Symposium essay on C. Wright’s Truth & Objectivity.
Kim on the Mind-Body Problem. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 47 (1996), 579-607.
Transvaluationism: A Dionysian Approach to Vagueness. Southern Journal Philosophy 33 (1995), Spindel Conference Supplement, 97-125.
Let’s Make a Deal. Philosophical Papers 24 (1995), 209-22.
Connectionism and the Commitments of Folk Psychology (with J. Tienson). Philosophical Perspectives 9 (1995), 127-52.
A Nonclassical Framework for Cognitive Science (with J. Tienson). Synthese 101 (1994), 305-345. Issue on philosophy and connectionism.
Southern Fundamentalism and the End of Philosophy (with G. Graham). Philosophical Issues 5 (1994), 219-47.
Reprinted in M. DePaul and W. Ramsey (eds.), Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and Its Role in Philosophy (Rowman and Littlefield, 1998).
Robust Vagueness and the Forced-March Sorites Paradox. Philosophical Perspectives 8, Logic and Language (1994), 159-88.
Representations Don’t Need Rules: Reply to James Garson (with J. Tienson). Mind and Language 9 (1994), 38-55. Invited reply to Garson’s critique of “Predecision Processes in Chess.”
Nonreductive Materialism. In R. Warner and T. Szubka, eds., The Mind-Body Problem (Blackwell, 1994), 236-41. In Polish translation in Znack.
Reply to Egan. Philosophical Studies 76 (1994), 339-47. Reply to F. Egan's commentary on “Naturalism and Intentionality.”
Naturalism and Intentionality. Philosophical Studies 76 (1994), 301-26.
Computation and Cognition. In S. Stich and F. Warfield, eds., Mental Representation: A Reader (Blackwell, 1994), 302-311. Excerpted from “From Cognitive Science to Folk Psychology.”
On What There Isn’t. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (1993), 693-700. Symposium essay on P. van Inwagen’s Material Beings.
Nonreductive Materialism and the Explanatory Autonomy of Psychology. In Wagner & Warner, eds., Naturalism: A Critical Appraisal (Notre Dame, 1993), 295-320.
Metaphysical Naturalism, Semantic Normativity, and Meta-Semantic Irrealism (with M. Timmons), Philosophical Issues 4 (1993), 180-203.
Levels of Description in Nonclassical Cognitive Science (with J. Tienson). Philosophy 34 (1993), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, 159-88.
Reprinted in J. L. Bermudez, ed., Philosophy of Psychology: Contemporary Readings (Routledge, 2006).
From Supervenience to Superdupervenience: Meeting the Demands of a Material World. Mind 102 (1993), 555-86. Invited “State of the Art” essay.
The Austere Ideology of Folk Psychology. Mind and Language 8 (1993), 282-97. Forum on eliminativism in philosophy of mind.
Analytic Functionalism Without Representational Functionalism. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1993), 51. Peer commentary on “The Psychology of Folk Psychology,” by Alvin Goldman.
Troubles for New Wave Moral Semantics: The “Open Question Argument” Revived (with M. Timmons). Philosophical Papers 21 (1992), 153-75.
Reprinted in A. Fisher and S. Kirchin, Arguing About Metaethics (Routledge, 2006), 179-199.
Troubles on Moral Twin Earth: Moral Queerness Revived (with M. Timmons). Synthese 92 (1992), 221-60.
Structured Representations in Connectionist Systems? (with J. Tienson), in S. Davis., ed., Connectionism: Theory and Practice (Oxford, 1992), 195-228.
From Cognitive Science to Folk Psychology: Computation, Mental Representation, and Belief. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (1992), 449-84. Review essay on books by J. Fodor, L. R. Baker, J. Garfield, and R. Cummins.
Cognitive Systems as Dynamical Systems (with J. Tienson). Topoi 11 (1992), 27-43.
New Wave Moral Realism Meets Moral Twin Earth (with M. Timmons). Journal of Philosophical Research 16 (1991), 447-65; and in J. Heil (ed.), Rationality, Morality, and Self-Interest: Essays Honoring Mark C. Overvold (Rowman and Littlefield, 1993).
Reprinted in R. Shafer-Landau and T. Cuneo, eds., Foundations of Ethics (Blackwell, 2007), 495-504.
Metaphysical Realism and Psychologistic Semantics. Erkenntnis 34 (1991), 297-322.
In Defense of Southern Fundamentalism (with G. Graham). Philosophical Studies 62 (1991), 107-34.
Reprinted in S. Christensen and D. Turner, eds., Folk Psychology and the Philosophy of Mind (Erlbuam, 1993).
Actions, Reasons, and the Explanatory Role of Content. In B. McLaughlin, ed., Dretske and His Critics (Basil Blackwell, 1991), 73-101.
Psychologistic Semantics, Robust Vagueness, and the Philosophy of Language. In S. L. Tsohatzidis, ed., Meanings and Prototypes: Studies in Linguistic Categorization (Routledge, 1990), 535-57.
Soft Laws (with J. Tienson). Midwest Studies in Philosophy 15 (1990), 256-79.
Connectionism and the Kuhnian Crisis in Cognitive Science (with J. Tienson). Acta Analytica 6 (1990), 5-17.
Predecision Processes in Chess: Masters, Experts, and Novices (3rd author, with D. Horgan, K. Millis, and R. Niemeyer). In D. Topping et. al., eds., Thinking Across Cultures (Erlbaum, 1989), 309-21.
Mental Quausation. Philosophical Perspectives 3 (1989), 47-76.
Attitudinatives. Linguistics and Philosophy 12 (1989), 133-65.
Settling into a New Paradigm (with J. Tienson). Spindel Conference 1987: Connectionism and the Philosophy of Mind, Southern Journal of Philosophy 26, Supplement (1988), 97-114. Reprinted in T. Horgan and J. Tienson (eds.), Connectionism and the Philosophy of Mind (Kluwer, 1991).
How to be Realistic About Folk Psychology (with G. Graham). Philosophical Psychology 1 (1988), 69-81.
Braving the Perils of an Uneventful World (with Michael Tye). Grazer Philosophische Studien 31 (1988), 179-186.
Supervenient Qualia. Philosophical Review 96 (1987), 491-520. Reprinted in The Philosopher’s Annual, 1987.
Science Nominalized Properly. Philosophy of Science 54 (1987), 281-82.
Psychologistic Semantics and Moral Truth. Philosophical Studies 52 (1987), 357-70.
Cognition is Real. Behaviorism 15 (1987), 13-25.
Truth and Ontology. Philosophical Papers 15 (1986), 1-21.
Psychologism, Semantics, and Ontology. Nous 20 (1986), 21-31.
Newcomb’s Problem: A Stalemate. In R. Campbell and L. Sowden, eds., Paradoxes of Rationality and Cooperation (U. of British Columbia Press), 1985), 223-34.
Folk Psychology is Here to Stay (with James Woodward). Philosophical Review 94 (1985), 197-226.
Reprinted in W. Lycan, ed., Mind and Cognition: A Reader (Blackwell, 1990); in J. Greenwood, ed., The Future of Folk Psychology: Intentionality and Cognitive Science (Cambridge, 1991); in S. Christensen and D. Turner, eds., Folk Psychology and the Philosophy of Mind (Erlbuam, 1993); in W. Lycan, ed., Mind and Cognition: An Anthology (Oxford, in press); and in J. Crumley, ed., Problems in Mind: Readings in Contemporary Philosophy of Mind (Mayfield, 1999).
Compatibilism and the Consequence Argument. Phil. Studies 47 (1985), 339-56.
Against the Token Identity Theory (with Michael Tye). In E. LePore and B. McLaughlin, eds., Act and Event: The Philosophy of Donald Davidson (Basil Blackwell, 1985), 427-43.
Supervenience and Cosmic Hermeneutics. Southern Journal of Philosophy 22 (1984), Supplement Issue on Supervenience, 19-38.
Science Nominalized. Philosophy of Science 51 (1984), 529-49.
Jackson on Physical Information and Qualia. Philos. Quarterly 34 (1984), 147-52.
Reprinted in F. Jackson (ed.), International Research Library of Philosophy: Consciousness (Ashgate, 1998); in Neil Campbell, ed., Mental Causation & the Metaphysics of Mind (Broadview Press, 2003); in P. Ludlow, Y. Nagasawa, and D. Stoljar, eds., Something about Mary: Essays on Frank Jackson’s Knowledge Argument (MIT Press, 2004); and in T. Alter and R. Howell, eds., Consciousness and the Mind-Body Problem: A Reader (Oxford, 2012). German translation in S. Walter and H. D. Heckmann (eds.), Phänomenales Bewußtsein: Ausgewählte Beiträge zur Qualia-Debatte 1975-1998 (mentis-Publishers, Paderborn, Germany, 2001).
Functionalism and Token Physicalism. Synthese 59 (1984), 321-38.
Functionalism, Qualia, and the Inverted Spectrum. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 44 (1984), 453-69.
Supervenience and Microphysics. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 63 (1982), 29-43.
To be reprinted in J. Kim, ed., The International Research Library of Philosophy: Supervenience (Ashgate).
Substitutivity and the Causal Connective. Philosophical Studies 42 (1982), 47-52.
Intentional and Unintentional Actions (with M. Gorr). Philosophical Studies 41 (1982), 251-62.
Token Physicalism, Supervenience, and the Generality of Physics. Synthese 49 (1981), 395-413.
Counterfactuals and Newcomb’s Problem. Journal of Philosophy 78 (1981), 331-56.
Reprinted in The Philosopher’s Annual, 1981, and in R. Campbell and L. Sowden (eds.), Paradoxes of Rationality and Cooperation (U. of British Columbia Press, 1985).
Action Theory Without Actions. Mind 60 (1981), 406-14.
Nonrigid Event-Designators and the Modal Individuation of Events. Philosophical Studies 37 (1980), 341-51.
Humean Causation and Kim’s Theory of Events. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 10 (1980), 663-79.
‘Could,’ Possible Worlds, and Moral Responsibility. Southern Journal of Philosophy 17 (1979), 345-58.
Supervenient Bridge Laws. Philosophy of Science 45 (1978), 227-49.
The Case Against Events. Philosophical Review 87 (1978), 28-47.
Reprinted in R. Casati and A. Varzi, eds., The International Research Library of Philosophy: Events (Dartmouth, 1996).
Lehrer on ‘Could’‑Statements. Philosophical Studies 32 (1977), 403-11.
Reduction and the Mind‑Body Problem. In M. Marx and F. Goodson, eds., Theories in Contemporary Psychology, 2nd edition (1976), 223-31.