Robust Information Disclosure and Buyer Learning, June 2026
I study a robust model of information disclosure and pricing in a monopoly market with buyer learning. A seller offers an indivisible good to a buyer who is uncertain about his valuation and can acquire additional costly information from outside sources. The seller chooses a price and a signal, but does not know which additional signals are available to the buyer and maximizes a robust objective. I characterize the seller's optimal price and information structure when the cost of outside signals is monotone in the informativeness of the signal. I then provide comparative statics and show that greater uncertainty with regard to the informational environment of the buyer leads to more disclosure from the seller. Since this also changes the optimal price the seller charges, the effect on consumer surplus is ambiguous.
Delegation without Priors, November 2026
joint with Wei He, Fei Li, Jiangtao Li, Jan Napp, Hanqing Ye and Wenjun Zheng
A principal makes decisions relying on the private information held by a biased agent. Lacking a prior over the circumstances that may arise, she seeks a delegation rule that minimizes worst-case regret relative to the complete-information benchmark. The optimal delegation mechanism governs two distinct margins: whether to depart from a common default action, and how much discretion to grant conditional on departure. This rule pairs the default action with an action gap, followed by a discretionary interval with randomized boundaries designed to balance regret across states. This structure is globally optimal within the class of all stochastic, incentive-compatible mechanisms.
A Presynaptic Phosphosignaling Hub for Lasting Homeostatic Plasticity. With Müller JA, Betzin J, Oprisoreanu A-M, Engholm-Keller K, Mayer A, Paulußen I, Schönhense E, Gulakova P, Gschossmann LJ, Wark JR, Lamprecht A, Becker AJ, Waardenberg AJ, Graham ME, Dietrich D, Schoch S. Cell Reports 39:110696 (2022).