Robust Information Disclosure and Buyer Learning, June 2026
I study a robust model of information disclosure and pricing in a monopoly market with buyer learning. A seller offers an indivisible good to a buyer who is uncertain about his valuation and can acquire additional costly information from outside sources. The seller chooses a price and a signal, but does not know which additional signals are available to the buyer and maximizes a robust objective. I characterize the seller's optimal price and information structure when the cost of outside signals is monotone in the informativeness of the signal. I then provide comparative statics and show that greater uncertainty with regard to the informational environment of the buyer leads to more disclosure from the seller. Since this also changes the optimal price the seller charges, the effect on consumer surplus is ambiguous.
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