Research Interests
Political economics. Formal theory. Collective action; Democratization; Non-democratic politics
Published papers
Basir, T., & Datta, S. (2024). Bread, freedom or social justice? An empirical investigation into the determinants of the Arab Spring. Democratization, 31(4), 788-806. https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2023.2280993
Basir, T., Murtazashvili, I. & Murtazashvili, J.B. (2024). Institutional stickiness and Afghanistan’s unending revolution. Public Choice 200, 403–422. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-023-01119-z
Job Market Paper
Abstract: Prominent theories of democratization revolve around the dynamic commitment problem in the face of a transitory threat of revolution to explain the divergent nature of political transitions in different societies. This paper tries to tackle the same problem with a focus on the elite side of society, by developing a redistributive model of democratization with reference to the bargaining failure literature. We find that democratization is more likely when elite has medium repression power and is less ideologically averse towards democracy. The paper contends that the democratization dynamics in the Acemoglu-Robinson class of models emanates from the simplifying assumption of no repression stage, whereas accounting for repression overturns the original results. Moreover, we find that commitment problem alone does not cause conflict, while informational asymmetry and issue indivisibilities determine the conflict. The comparative statics analysis adjudicates some opposing debates on the effect of inequality on democratization in existing literature.
Working Papers
Carrots and Sticks to Solve the Collective Action Problem in Revolutionary Movements (joint w/ Soumya Datta) (Under review)
Abstract: We analyze the collective action problem in revolutions by employing a model in global games, in line with several existing models of regime change in the literature. We contribute to the literature by associating the coordination problem with the underlying structure of the society, tying the model to its deep parameters. We consider a setup where revolutionary leadership attempts to resolve the collective action problem by punishing the non-participants (compradors/loyalists). The incumbent regime responds with the strategy of punishing the revolutionaries. We find that the revolutionary leadership’s punishment strategy might work when participation rates to revolution is already low and citizenry is poor, but when such movements gain momentum it turns counter productive . Further, the strategy of punishing the revolutionaries by the regime reduces the prospects for regime change at low participation rates, while its effect is indeterminate and may turn counter-productive when participation rate is already high. We also find that a highly destructive revolution exacerbates the collective action problem.
Work-in-progress
Formalizing the informal order in Afghanistan (work-in-progress)
Democratization under Institutional Variation: a Comparative Study of Zahir Shah’s Decade of Democracy and the Post-2001 Era. (Book chapter in Omar Sadr & Jennifer B. Murtazashvili (Eds.), The Failure of Liberal Intervention in Afghanistan)