Research

``Mechanism games with multiple principals and three or more agents'', Econometrica, 2010, 78(2), 791-801.

``Implementation in Weakly Undominated Strategies: Optimality of Second-Price Auction and Posted-Price Mechanism'', Review of Economic Studies, 2015, 82 (3), 1223-1246.

``Strategic and Structural Uncertainties in Mechanism Design'', Journal of Economic Theory, 2015, 159, 267–279.

``Double Auction with Interdependent Values: Incentives and Efficiency'', with Fuhito Kojima, Theoretical Economics, 2017, 12(3), 1393-1438

``Revenue-capped efficient auctions'', with Nozomu Muto and Yasuhito Shirata, Journal of European Economic Associasion, 2020, 18(3), 1284–1320.

``Asymmetric information allocation to avoid coordination failure'', with Fumitoshi Moriya, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 2020, 29(1), 173-186.

``Maximal miscommunication'', with Shintaro Miura, Economics Letters, 2020, 188.

``Order on types based on monotone comparative statics'', with Takashi Kunimoto, Journal of Economic Theory, 2020, 189.

``Adverse selection and bounded rationality: an impossibility theorem'', with Takeshi Murooka, Japanese Economic Review, 2022.

``On the foundations of ex post incentive compatible mechanisms'', with Shuguang Zhu, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2022, 14(4), 494-514.

``Preventing Bottlenecks in Organizations'', with Fumitoshi Moriya, AEA Paper and Proceedings, 2022, 112, 444-451.

``Optimal Persuasion via Bi-Pooling'', with Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Rann Smorodinsky, Theoretical Economics, 2023, 18(1), 15-36.

• One of the Ten Most cited articles published in Theoretical Economics between January 1, 2023 and December 31, 2023. 

• One of the Ten Most read articles published in Theoretical Economics between January 1, 2023 and December 31, 2023.

``Optimal student allocation with peer effects'', with Roberto Sarkisian, Review of Economic Design, 2024, 28, 551–571.

``Auction with Heterogenous Priors'', with Hien Pham, Games and Economic Behaviors, 2024, 145, 413-425.

``First Best Implementation with Costly Information Acquisition'', with Daniil Larionov, Hien Pham, and Shuguang Zhu, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 2025, https://doi.org/10.1111/jems.12628.

``Information Design in Concave Games'' with Alex Smolin, EC '22: Proceedings of the 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2022.

``A Mediator Approach to Mechanism Design with Limited Commitment'', with Niccolo Lomys, EC '22: Proceedings of the 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2022.

``Optimal Trade Mechanisms with Adverse Selection and Inferential Mistakes'', with Takeshi Murooka, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2024.

``Robust predictions and hard information in the market for lemons'', with Yusuke Yamaguchi, Economics Letters, 2025.

``Optimal Design of Market Access'', with Shuguang Zhu, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2025.

``Information Design in Smooth Games'', with Alex Smolin, Theoretical Economics, 2025.

``Information Design in Repeated Interaction'', with Joao Correia da Silva, February 2024.

``Mechanism design with expectation-based allocation externality'', with Roberto Sarkisian, April 2022.

``Robust prediction in games with uncertain parameters'', with Shintaro Miura, March 2022.

``Social Choice under Gradual Learning'', with Caroline Thomas and Yiman Sun, November 2021.

``Bayesian persuasion followed by Receiver’s Mechanism Design'' with Shuguang Zhu, November, 2021.

``Optimal Trade Mechanisms with Adverse Selection and Inferential Mistakes'', with Takeshi Murooka, September 2021.

``Type-contingent information disclosure'', with Shuguang Zhu, September, 2021.

``On the veil-of-ignorance principle: welfare-optimal information disclosure in voting'', with Karine Van der Straeten, January, 2021.

``Revenue guarantee in auction with a (correlated) common prior and additional information'', July, 2017.

``Optimal public information disclosure by mechanism designer'', 2021.

``Divergent Interpretation and Divergent Prediction in Communication'', with Shintaro Miura, July 2017.

``On the possibility of information transmission: a signaling case'', with Shintaro Miura, May, 2014.

ERC starting grant, 2016-2022

JSPS research grant, 2023-2027

JSPS Prize, 2023

Japan Academy Medal, 2024