Working Papers
-Presented at 2026 ASSA(scheduled), 2025 GLO, 2025 ASSA, 2025 KAEA Job Market Conference, 2025 CAES, 2024 RIT seminar, 2024 SEA, 2024 WEAI, 2024 MEA, 2022 CAAS
-Abstract: This paper investigates the effects of a policy that restricts students to a maximum of six college applications. While the policy was designed to alleviate the financial burden arising from applications, this paper focuses on the unintended consequences of the policy: how it affects student–college match quality and socioeconomic equity in access to prestigious colleges. In the game theoretical model, uncertainty about true ability leads high-achieving students to apply to a safer college after the cap. When incorporating socioeconomic differences, the results show that the cap mitigates disparities in application decisions across socioeconomic status. To test the predictions, I compile a new college-level administrative dataset and exploit the event-study framework. The results support the theoretical prediction in that match quality declines after the cap, while more students from lower socioeconomic backgrounds enroll in top colleges. Results highlight efficiency-equity trade-offs in student–college assignment, offering policy implications for higher education markets facing excessive competition.
Work In Progress
Child’s School Starting Age and Maternal Employment
Does Childcare Burden Affect the Parental Labor Supply? During COVID-19 Pandemic in South Korea