Research

Publications

AEA Papers and Proceedings. Vol. 112, May 2022. 

[Accepted, Industrial and Labor Relations Review]

Abstract: Public sector organizations often struggle to provide adequate promotion incentives. I study how bureaucrats' performance and career decisions respond when promotion opportunities become limited. In Chicago Police, strict eligibility criteria suddenly reduced the promotion chances of some officers relative to otherwise similar officers. The deterioration of chances to become managers induced the ineligible officers to sharply raise arrest performance and join high-performance tactical teams. The increase in arrests cannot be explained by overtime pay, selective quitting, or problematic behavior. Given sufficient opportunities to develop their careers, bureaucrats who face reduced promotion chances may maintain their motivation and effort levels. 

Working Papers

[Revise and Resubmit at Journal of Public Economics]

Abstract: Body-worn cameras (BWCs) have emerged as a crucial reform to restore police legitimacy. However, mixed results from previous single-agency studies have raised concerns about the generalizability of positive findings. This study addresses these limitations by analyzing data from 1,001 agencies across the US that adopted BWCs between 2014 and 2016, using a quasi-experimental event study approach. I find that BWCs reduced police-involved homicides, particularly in regions with higher incidents of such events and agencies with comprehensive activation policies. This study also provides the first evidence of BWC effects on agency-wide crime control activities, revealing no substantial reductions in overall policing or crime rates. The findings provide insights into the circumstances under which BWCs can effectively enhance police accountability and performance.

[Revise and Resubmit at Journal of Policy Analysis and Management]

Abstract: We study how civilian complaint investigators affect officer behavior in Chicago. We exploit quasi-random assignment of complaints to supervising investigators and use variation in whether supervisors tend to acquire sworn affidavits that substantiate the complaints. When the assigned investigator opens more investigations through obtaining affidavits, accused officers accumulate fewer complaints in the first three months of the investigation. We find that, prior to a scandal, assignment to high-investigation supervisors causes officers to make more arrests. However, this reverses after the scandal. Our findings suggest that police watchdogs can improve officer behavior in ordinary oversight environments but may backfire in heightened oversight environments.

Abstract: The persistent gender pay gap is often linked to women avoiding competitive activities, particularly salary negotiation. Despite initiatives aimed at promoting negotiation skills, the impact of such skills on labor market outcomes remains unclear. In our field experiment with real job seekers, we introduced two interventions: negotiation training combined with the provision of market wage information and the provision of wage information alone. Following the intervention, we evaluated salaries and non-salary benefits through an obfuscated survey. Although the training increased negotiation frequency, it resulted in reduced salaries and employment propensity, particularly for women. The most consistent explanation for these declines appears to be social backlash against negotiation.

Abstract: In an effort to improve policing and enhance public trust in minority communities, police departments have sought to increase racial diversity among their leadership. Yet, evidence on whether this makes a difference is lacking.  In this paper, we ask whether team-level outcomes such as total arrests differ when minority police supervisors are on duty.  We do so in the context of the Chicago Police Department (CPD), where we exploit the annual, pre-determined, rotational nature of CPD's operations calendar to compare team-level outcomes (within the same unit and watch) on days when Black and Hispanic police lieutenants (LTs) are predicted to be on duty as compared to days when they have a day off (and another LT is working).  Underlying crime conditions are balanced across these two sets of days.  We find that fewer arrests take place on days when Black or Hispanic LTs are predicted to be on duty.  The reductions in arrests are concentrated in arrests related to low-level crimes, such as disorderly conduct arrests, which decline by 17% of the mean. However, we see no change in arrest quality, as proxied for by court records, and cannot rule out potentially meaningful declines in arrests for more severe offenses.   Differences in subordinate officer composition do not explain our results. Instead, reductions in arrests appear to be driven by watch operations LTs, who are stationed in the district headquarters and in charge of approving arrests.Together, these results suggest that supervisors can influence the policing practices of their subordinates, and open up avenues for interventions involving supervisors.

[Accepted based on Pre-results Review, Journal of Development Economics; Final publication venue is unknown.]

Abstract: How should firms allocate workers to jobs? A standard approach is for firms to assign workers to jobs and to train workers for one job. An alternative approach is for firms to rotate workers to different jobs while providing training for multiple jobs. This study investigates the impact of job rotation on worker allocation and efficiency within a garment manufacturing firm in Asia. In this randomized controlled trial, the control group follows the standard, pre-existing practice at the firm, receiving training for and assignment to one job. In the treatment group, workers undergo training for multiple jobs. After training, preferences of both workers and managers guide permanent job assignments using a version of the deferred acceptance algorithm. We examine how the treatment affects performance, employee turnover, work satisfaction, and job preference discovery.