Facilitating Police Reform: Body Cameras, Use of Force, and Law Enforcement Outcomes [Click for Draft], Journal of Public Economics, Accepted.
Strengthening Police Oversight: Impacts of Misconduct Investigators on Police Officer Behavior (with Andrew Jordan), Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, March 2025.
Measuring Police Performance: Public Attitudes Expressed in Twitter. AEA Papers and Proceedings, May 2022
Negotiation, Employer Demand, and Gender Disparities (with Ratchanon Chotiputsilp and Clémentine Van Effenterre) [Click for Draft]
Abstract: We study how candidates' negotiation behavior shapes employer decisions using a field experiment in which 493 professional recruiters evaluated more than 7,000 job applications and counteroffers. Negotiation updates employer beliefs about both outside options and productivity. Employers revise outside-option beliefs similarly for male and female candidates, and wage gains from intensive negotiation are similar across genders. However, employers revise productivity upward for men and not for women. As a result, more intensive negotiation increases recommendations for higher-level roles substantially more for men than for women, and female candidates face larger increases in rejection rates than comparable male candidates. Combining these effects, we estimate optimal counteroffers of 11--12 percent above the initial offer for women and 20--30 percent for men. Pay transparency attenuates gender differences in the returns to negotiation in higher-level role recommendations by constraining recruiter discretion.
How Frontline Supervisors Shape Priorities: Evidence from Police Lieutenants (with Matthew Gudgeon and Andrew Jordan) [Click for Draft]
[Reject and Resubmit at Journal of Labor Economics]
Abstract: We study how frontline supervisors shape outcomes in public organizations with competing objectives and limited monitoring. We examine lieutenants in the Chicago Police Department, exploiting its rotational operations calendar for identification. We document dispersion in lieutenant fixed effects on team arrests and find race to be a key predictor. We then compare days Black and Hispanic lieutenants are predicted on duty to days supervised by white lieutenants. Teams under Black and Hispanic lieutenants make fewer low-level arrests while improving 911 call dispatch time. Lieutenants shape effort allocation by differentially granting overtime and awards for serious rather than discretionary arrests.
Job Rotation and Worker Performance (with Brighton Chotiputsilp, Mitchell Hoffman, and Shing-Yi Wang) [Click for Draft]
[Accepted based on Pre-results Review, Journal of Development Economics; Final publication venue is unknown.]
Abstract: How should firms allocate workers to jobs? A standard approach is for firms to assign workers to jobs and to train workers for one job. An alternative approach is for firms to rotate workers to different jobs while providing training for multiple jobs. This study investigates the impact of job rotation on worker allocation and efficiency within a garment manufacturing firm in Asia. In this randomized controlled trial, the control group follows the standard, pre-existing practice at the firm, receiving training for and assignment to one job. In the treatment group, workers undergo training for multiple jobs. After training, preferences of both workers and managers guide permanent job assignments using a version of the deferred acceptance algorithm. We examine how the treatment affects performance, employee turnover, work satisfaction, and job preference discovery.
The Cost of Salary Negotiation: An Experimental Evaluation with Job Seekers in Thailand (with Brighton Chotiputsilp) [Click for Draft]
Abstract: The persistent gender pay gap is often linked to women avoiding competitive activities, particularly salary negotiation. Despite initiatives aimed at promoting negotiation skills, the impact of such skills on labor market outcomes remains unclear. In our field experiment with real job seekers, we introduced two interventions: negotiation training combined with the provision of market wage information and the provision of wage information alone. Following the intervention, we evaluated salaries and non-salary benefits through an obfuscated survey. Although the training increased negotiation frequency, it resulted in reduced salaries and employment propensity, particularly for women. The most consistent explanation for these declines appears to be social backlash against negotiation.