• Affiliated researcher, Dauphine Foundation Digital Finance Chair

• Head of the Financial Economics team at Centre d'Économie de la Sorbonne

• Recipient of the 2023 Young Researcher in Economics prize, awarded by Autorité des Marchés Financiers (the French SEC). 

Articles

Working papers

• Imperfect Supervision, Regulatory Penalties, and Banks' Disclosing Culture, with Oscar Lange. 

If banks and the regulator have diverging objectives, why do we routinely observe communication between them? We propose a solution based on imperfect supervision. We consider a leading example of regulation---capital requirements, whose optimal level depends on the cost of equity. Banks commit to either reveal this cost or to not communicate, which we interpret respectively as having installed a culture of cooperation with the regulator, or not. In the benchmark case of perfect supervision, we verify that the divergence between private and public objectives never leads to communication. By contrast, under imperfect supervision, we evidence a rich interaction between non-compliance penalties, capital requirements, and banks' incentives to disclose. We prove that there typically exists a range of penalties that induce bank disclosure and that the regulator may indeed find it optimal to select one of them. Viewed through this lens, penalties are not only "threats", but also a cooperation-inducing mechanism. 

• Liquid Staking: When Does It Help?, with Franck Gabriel. (New version coming soon)

Presentations: CY Cergy/ESSEC Seminar; Tech For Finance: AI and Blockchain (@Paris-Dauphine) 2025

In Proof-of-Stake blockchains, staking contributes to security. Traditionally, staked tokens were locked; liquid staking allows to delegate staking and redeploy (assets backed by) this capital in the decentralized finance (DeFi) ecosystem. In the context of DeFi lending, we extend the analytical framework of Carré and Gabriel (2024) to find out conditions under which liquid staking is, indeed, desirable. We show that it is so, for sufficiently small delegation costs, and if the DeFi lending platform is properly designed. Otherwise, there are situations in which liquid staking worsens security. This result holds for small or zero delegation costs, showing the limits of the ‘capital efficiency’ intuition, according to which allowing to redeploy capital can only be good, other things being equal. Finally, our results extend and confirm the robustness of those of Carré and Gabriel (2024), who analyze efficiency and security in DeFi lending when staking is traditional.

• Efficiency and Security in DeFi Lending, with Franck Gabriel. Non-technical summary

Presentations: NEOMA Business School - ISFA Lyon - SKEMA Business School - Apéro DeFi @ Palais Brongniart, Paris - 2nd International Cardiff Fintech Conference - Dauphine Digital Days - Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne  - Banque de France - Tech For Finance: AI and Blockchain (@Paris-Dauphine) 2024

We investigate the design of efficient DeFi lending interest rate functions in a tractable general equilibrium model. The security of the underlying (Proof-of-Stake) blockchain is endogenous. We show, for known parameters, that there exists a unique efficient DeFi rate, which maximizes security and DeFi users utility. The associated utilization rate properly defines an “optimal utilization” and can be below one. Using this state-contingent efficient DeFi rate, we construct explicitly efficient interest rate functions under parameter uncertainty. We provide a condition under which efficiency can be attained with a function of the utilization rate only. When this condition is not met, we show how allowing the interest rate rule to depend on more inputs enables to restore efficiency.

Publications

Banks as Liquidity Multipliers, with Damien Klossner - Review of Financial Studies (2024), volume 37(1), pages 265-307.

Insider Trading with Penalties, with Pierre Collin-Dufresne and Franck Gabriel - Journal of Economic Theory (2022), volume 203, pages 1-36.

Disclosures, Rollover Risk, and Debt Runs - Journal of Banking and Finance (2022),  volume 142, pages 1-18.

The Sources of Sovereign Risk, with Daniel Cohen and Sébastien Villemot - Journal of International Economics (2019), volume 118, pages 31-43. 

(Computer science/Game theory) Smart Proofs via Recursive Information Gathering, with Gabriel, Hongler, Lacerda and Capano - ACM Distributed Ledger Technologies (2024), volume 3(1), pages 1-19.

Thesis

Three Problems of Liquidity under Asymmetric Information