For decades, the manufacturing gospel insisted on a trade-off: you could move fast or you could move efficiently, but never both. China’s carmakers are quietly tearing up that scripture. They are fusing speed with scale, treating cars like fast-evolving software products and factories as data-rich platforms. The result is not just evident on production lines or in code—it is increasingly visible on roads from Guangzhou to Gothenburg. 

In 2024 China accounted for more than 70% of the world’s electric-vehicle output. That volume gives its firms a vast domestic laboratory for rapid product iteration. The playbook blends “Agile” software cycles with “Lean-4.0” manufacturing disciplines—five interlinked moves that borrow from Japan’s quality control, Korea’s heavy-industry investment, and Silicon Valley’s software obsession, but recast for an era of connected machines and continuous updates.

1. The New Keiretsu - Where Japan’s post-war carmakers forged tight supplier alliances, China’s giants increasingly bring key parts in-house. BYD now makes its own batteries, motors and electronics, selling some 4.27m new-energy vehicles last year—profits and scale that fund yet more integration. The effect is a shortening of decision chains, insulation from geopolitical supply shocks, and capital deployment at speeds rivals find hard to match. Battery firms amplify this advantage: CATL alone supplied roughly 38% of the world’s EV battery installations last year, giving China leverage over chemistry, capacity and pricing.

2. Cars as Code - Chinese car firms behave less like Detroit in the 1970s and more like Shenzhen’s smartphone makers today. Products ship early and improve relentlessly through over-the-air (OTA) software updates. Xpeng (pronounced Zhaw-peng), NIO and BYD push fresh features, safety patches and AI-driving tweaks in weeks rather than years. Fleets serve as A/B-testing grounds; drivers’ dashboards become focus groups. The result is post-sale evolution: cars improve in owners’ driveways, not just in next-generation showrooms.

3. Factories as Flexible Algorithms - On shop floors, Industry-4.0 tech buttresses lean methods. Plants use digital twins, predictive maintenance and modular “island” lines that can switch models in hours. Robots handle the precision; humans orchestrate customisation and quality. This marriage of kaizen-style improvement with real-time analytics turns manufacturing from a fixed pipeline into a living system.

4. Data Loops as Competitive Moats - Millions of connected vehicles now double as roving R&D labs. Every kilometre feeds back data: on battery thermal profiles, autonomous-driving hazards, energy-management quirks. Engineers retrain AI models, patch bugs and monetise new services without a recall. Product development becomes not a series of launches but a continuous curve.

5. Ecosystem Lock-In - The infrastructure build-out is equally relentless. In 2024 China added around 830,000 public chargers, swelling a base in the millions. NIO’s battery-swap network crossed 3,000 stations, making “refuelling” as quick as coffee and creating subscription-style revenue. This fusion of vertical control, rapid software iteration, and infrastructure depth is not confined to EVs. AI chipmaking is undergoing a similar metamorphosis. 

For years, the model in advanced silicon was: design in-house, outsource fabrication, focus on software. That model is crumbling. AI chips demand constant iteration between design and manufacturing, precisely the advantage Chinese EV makers enjoy in hardware-software co-development. Tesla’s recent tie-up with Samsung illustrates the point. Facing brutal competition from Chinese EVs and a bleeding-cash Samsung fab in Texas, the two joined forces. Tesla designs its AI6 chips for its own needs; Samsung optimises production. Proximity matters: Samsung’s Taylor plant sits near Tesla’s Austin HQ, enabling Musk to drive to the fab and tweak designs in near real-time. The implications are threefold. First, vertical integration is becoming mandatory for leaders in AI, just as it has in EVs. Second, the once-cosy oligopoly in chipmaking is fragmenting. A $4.75bn injection from America’s Chips Act into Samsung’s Texas facilities has created excess capacity—something nimble AI start-ups can exploit. Third, geography is again destiny: when design and fabrication happen within commuting distance, iteration cycles compress dramatically. 

In both cars and chips, the winners will not be those with the prettiest models—whether automotive or algorithmic—but those who control the full industrial stack. China’s carmakers have already shown what happens when you erase the line between factory floor and software update. The next industrial revolution may depend on who else can follow suit.

Switching lanes: Is Europe the solution to China’s EV glut? and Have Chinese EV companies become a victim of their own success?

Not so long ago Chinese-made cars were considered badly designed and poorly made. But government subsidies, China’s rare-earth dominance and its famously nimble production processes have turned the country’s EV industry into the world’s largest. Nowadays Chinese EVs are well-made, chock full of great technology…and cheap. But there are roadblocks. At home, a price war rages and few of the country’s hundred or so manufacturers turn a profit. Meanwhile governments abroad are weary of Chinese competition.

The Anatomy of Industrial Renaissance: How strategic discipline and bold vision breathe new life into automotive giants

The automotive industry has rarely been more unforgiving. Legacy manufacturers face existential threats from electric upstarts, supply chain disruptions, and shifting consumer preferences. Yet amid this turbulence, some executives have proven that even the most entrenched industrial giants can be transformed through strategic clarity and operational excellence.

When Luca de Meo seized the steering wheel at Renault in 2020, the storied French carmaker was sputtering towards irrelevance. Bloated costs, fractured alliances, and a product portfolio caught between mass and premium had pushed the firm into a strategic ditch. Yet within five years, de Meo orchestrated a turnaround so dramatic it now features in Harvard Business Review case studies and the documentary "Anatomy of a Comeback". His "Renaulution" was no marketing gimmick but a masterclass in precision: operational rigour married to technological reinvention, wrapped in unapologetic strategic clarity. The plan consisted of three phases, initiated at the same time in January 2021: “REsurrection”, “REnovation” and “Revolution”. The transformation was neither cosmetic nor coincidental. De Meo resisted the siren call of flashy launches, choosing instead to dig deeper into fundamentals. Platform consolidation slashed complexity, unprofitable geographies were abandoned, and electrification bets were placed where they mattered most. The bloated product lineup was pruned, priorities re-ranked, and R&D refocused with surgical precision. By 2024, Renault had carved out €3 billion in costs while achieving record vehicle sales—a testament to the power of saying no to everything except what truly matters.

Critically, de Meo understood that revival required more than cost-cutting; it demanded coherence. Renault's identity had frayed over decades—neither fish nor fowl, caught between East and West, combustion and electric. Renaulution became an exercise in identity restoration: Alpine was elevated to premium performance, Dacia sharpened its value proposition, and the Renault brand itself was repositioned as accessible yet aspirational. The effect was palpable not merely on balance sheets but in boardrooms across Europe, where executives began studying the French firm's playbook.

On the other side of the globe, another automotive giant is staging its own act of reinvention. Call it Maruti 3.0. The analogy is no accident. Like Renault, Maruti Suzuki has been a totem of national mobility—dominating India's roads with affordable small cars and unmatched distribution. But as India's automotive landscape shifted towards SUVs, electric aspirations, and digitally-savvy consumers, the country's largest automaker found itself at a crossroads. The old playbook was no longer sufficient. Vision and velocity were needed.

Enter a new strategic compass. With initiatives spanning hybridisation, premiumisation through the Nexa channel, and a fundamental reconfiguration of its product mix, Maruti is realigning itself with 21st-century demand curves. Unlike rivals betting all-in on electric vehicles, Maruti's hybrid-first pragmatism mirrors Renault's selective electrification strategy. The company's renewed attention to export markets and deeper integration with Toyota echo the kind of alliance discipline that de Meo demanded in Europe—partnerships as strategic tools, not emotional entanglements.

Both transformations share architectural DNA. First, they prioritise operational discipline over innovation theatre. De Meo's success stemmed not from revolutionary products but from getting the basics right—manufacturing efficiency, cost control, and strategic focus. Similarly, Maruti's 3.0 strategy builds on the company's core competencies in mass manufacturing while extending them to new technologies. Second, both strategies demonstrate the power of clear strategic alignment. Rather than pursuing multiple directions simultaneously, each company identified its core strengths and built transformation plans around them.

Both transformations share common architectural principles. 

• First, they prioritise operational discipline over flashy innovation. De Meo's success at Renault stemmed not from revolutionary products but from getting the basics right—cost control, manufacturing efficiency, and strategic focus. Similarly, Maruti's 3.0 strategy builds on the company's core competencies in mass manufacturing and distribution while extending them to new technologies. 

• Second, both strategies demonstrate the power of clear strategic alignment. Rather than pursuing multiple directions simultaneously, each company identified its core strengths and built transformation plans around them. Renault leveraged its European engineering heritage and Formula 1 expertise to revitalise Alpine. Maruti is extending its mastery of affordable mobility to electric and hybrid platforms. 

• Third, both examples illustrate the importance of timeline discipline. De Meo's five-year transformation at Renault was neither rushed nor leisurely—it followed a methodical progression from stabilisation to growth. Maruti's 3.0 strategy similarly sets realistic timelines, recognising that sustainable transformation requires patience and persistence. 

The broader implications extend beyond automotive manufacturing. In an era of rapid technological change, the temptation for established companies is either to pursue radical reinvention or to cling to familiar strategies. Both approaches often fail. The Renault and Maruti examples suggest a third path: evolutionary transformation anchored in operational excellence and strategic clarity. 

The broader implications extend far beyond automotive manufacturing. In an era of relentless technological disruption, the temptation for established companies is either to pursue radical reinvention or cling to familiar strategies. Both approaches often fail spectacularly. The Renault and Maruti examples suggest a third path: evolutionary transformation anchored in operational excellence and strategic clarity. Legacy need not be a burden—it can be a potent advantage when paired with leadership that knows when to press the brakes, when to change lanes, and when to accelerate. 

Maruti's 3.0 strategy paints a promising picture for sustainable mobility in India, much as de Meo's Renaulution repositioned the French manufacturer for European leadership. Both transformations prove that even the most entrenched industrial giants can rediscover their edge through disciplined execution and visionary leadership. If turnaround tales have a blueprint, these two belong in the opening chapter—not as curiosities, but as templates for industrial renaissance in an age that waits for no one.

The automotive industry's next chapter will be written by companies that master this delicate balance. As de Meo moves from automobiles to luxury goods, his legacy at Renault stands as proof that even the most established industrial giants can be reborn through strategic discipline and visionary leadership. Maruti's 3.0 journey suggests that this lesson travels well across continents and cultures, offering hope for industrial renaissance in an age of disruption.

India's automotive journey represents one of the most remarkable transformations in global industrial history, evolving from royal curiosities to becoming the world's third-largest automobile market. This book traces every pivotal milestone across more than 130 years of automotive development, revealing how technological adoption, policy shifts, and market forces shaped India's transportation landscape.

Early Imports and Aristocratic Adoption (1890s-1940s)

The automobile era in India began as a technological novelty for the elite, gradually transitioning into a symbol of industrial progress. The first Indian owned vehicle was by ‘Sir Ranji’ in the UK in the 1880s. The first recorded automobile arrival in India occurred in 1892 when Maharaja Rajinder Singh of Patiala imported a French De Dion-Bouton steam car, predating most global automotive developments. This pioneering acquisition marked India's early engagement with motorised transport, though its operational history remains debated by historians. A watershed moment came in 1897 when British businessman J.B. Foster introduced the first gasoline-powered car to Calcutta, coinciding with the city's status as colonial India's capital. By 1898, industrialist Jamshedji Tata joined the ranks of early adopters, importing an Oldsmobile that demonstrated the growing interest among Indian entrepreneurs. These initial imports operated on rudimentary road networks called Macadam roads, often sharing space with bullock carts, horses and pedestrian traffic. These were more like “horseless carriages”. At the turn of the century, France was the leading car maker of the world. Soon, the British industry laid claim to the crown jewel of the empire.

The early 20th century (1900s) saw automotive culture take root through motorsport events, with the Motor Union of Western India organising the first official races (called reliability trials) in 1904, 1906 and 1908. Princely states emerged as luxury car collectors, notably the Nizams of Hyderabad, Rajasthani Rajputanas, Gujarati Kings, Punjabi Maharajas, Mysore’s rulers and Deccan’s kings, amassed Delaunay-Belleville, Rolls-Royce, Delahyde, Benz, Bugatti into their ‘stables’ using them as Throne/ state procession cars, Hunting (game) safari cars. Cars of this period were mostly soft-top tourers. Unlike the British officials, wealthy merchants, and professionals who started owning cars, the Maharajas, to show their pomp and status, customised their luxury cars from prominent French coachbuilders like Figoni et Falaschi with Hermes leather, crushed pearls paint, etc.. This period also witnessed foundational infrastructure developments, including the 1934 establishment of the Indian Roads Congress and the ambitious 1943 Nagpur Plan targeting a 532,700 km of asphalt road network.

Indigenous Manufacturing Foundations (1940s-1960s)

Post World War II, cars became hard-top closed saloons. Indian independence laid the groundwork for domestic automotive production through strategic industrial policies. Hindustan Motors, founded in 1942 by B.M. Birla, became India's first car manufacturer, later producing the iconic Ambassador. The 1944 establishment of Premier Automobiles Limited (by Walchand Hirachand) and Mahindra & Mahindra's in 1945 (then known as Mahindra & Mohammed) entry marked the beginning of diversified vehicle production, including trucks and jeeps.  India’s inclination towards the USSR’s communist framework led to the 1952 Tariff Commission policies initiating the "License Raj" era, restricting foreign competition to nurture domestic industry. India was inclined towards the USSR after the Sino-Indian War of 1962, when China took Aksai Chin. USSR and China shared borders and the USSR wanted a divided China. So, USA and China became friends to counter balance USSR. Accordingly, India adopted the socialist character and befriended USSR. After this, Pakistan was lured for proxy wars for USA and China during cold war period.

This protectionist framework enabled Tata Motors' 1954 entry into commercial vehicles and Hindustan Motors' 1957 launch of the Ambassador - a vehicle that would dominate Indian roads for decades. By 1960, indigenous manufacturers controlled 98% of the commercial vehicle market, though passenger cars remained luxury items with annual production under 20,000 units. HM, PAL and Telco were called the ‘Small Three’.

The Indigenous People’s Car (1970s-1980s)

The 1970s-1980s witnessed the transformation of automobiles from elite symbols to mass mobility solutions. Premier Automobiles' 1970 Padmini (Fiat 1100D, essentially an early 1960s Fiat 1200) and Hindustan Motors' Ambassador (1950s Morris Oxford) became ubiquitous as taxi fleets, covering 68% of commercial passenger transport by 1980, these were ancient vehicles from the ’50 and ‘60s.

MML :: Prime Minister Mrs. Indira Gandhi's younger son Sanjay, her political heir apparent, was a true-blue automobile aficionado. His interests were beyond academics, after Doon School, using his mother’s connections, he apprenticed at Rolls-Royce UK, in the UK for 2.5 years till 1967. On coming back to India, he wanted to build an indigenous ‘people’s car’, but had no business experience. He designed a few models with his airplane instructor ‘Tillu’ at a garage in Delhi. In 1971 Maruti Motors Limited was incorporated after the Parliament issued license to just 3 companies from a list of multiple applicants. With the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War and victory over Pakistan muted the critical voices of accusations of nepotism. During the emergency 1975-77, Sanjay’s lost interest in the project but business was good for subsidiary Maruti Heavy Vehicles, but after emergency, business collapsed. After the emergency, Janta Dal coalition government was voted to power. A series of inquiries ensued for the grant of 300 acres of land to the company for its Gurgaon Plant. On 6 March, 1978, Punjab & HR High Court ordered winding up of Maruti Motors Limited. When his mother returned to power in January 1980, the people's car project was revived. However, on June 23, 1980, Sanjay’s Pitts aircraft crashed, with him producing just 21 cars before death.

MUL :: Sanjay's vision was endured, when on 24 Feb 1981, MML was acquired 100% by the Government as ‘Maruti Udyog Limited’. On advised by Mr. Arun Nehru, who suggested finding international partners for revival and technical knowhow. The triumvirate from BHEL, Dr. V Krishnamurthy’s, Mr. DS Gupta and IAS Mr. RC Bhargava were selected to head the company. American cars were gas guzzlers, so they looked towards European car manufacturers like Volkswagen to produce the Golf and the Jetta, but that led nowhere, as VW was interested in China not India. Fiat weren’t interested after their previous deal with Premier Automobiles. Peugeot and Renault were interested and Maruti started discussions with Renault. Both companies agreed the Renault 18 would be a car of interest, but then the Indian delegation visited the Japanese auto show and realized that actually a car that was bigger than the Hindustan Ambassador wasn’t the right thing for an Indian people’s car. Suez Crisis of 1956 triggered off a strong demand for low-consumption small cars like the Mini. The subsequent oil price shocks of 1973–74 and 1979 also bolstered this trend.

America’s people’s car was the Ford Model T – a cheap car that everyone could own. Germany’s people’s car was the Beetle - a cheap car that everyone could own. Britain’s people’s car was the Mini, in France it was the 2CV, in Italy it was the Fiat 500. Maybe the right car was one of these tiny “Kei jidosha cars” that were zipping around Japan. Maruti talked with Daihatsu (Toyota), Mitsubishi, Nissan and Subaru – all lead nowhere. But then an opportunity came from out of the blue and as last resort. Mr. Osamu Suzuki, director of Suzuki Motor Co. was in India to discuss JV with TVS motorcycles.  He read a newspaper article on his flight to India about Maruti's search for a partner. SMC acquired 26% stake in Maruti Udyog Ltd in 1982. SMC had launched the Alto (SS80) in Japan a few years earlier in 1979, and this car seemed perfect fit for the people’s car as the CKD value of the car was Rs. 30,000, which was below the target price of Rs. 50,000. The first Maruti Suzuki 800 (MB308) was presented to its owner by Mrs. Indira Gandhi on December 14, 1983 – what would have been Sanjay's 37th birthday.

Small car, Big impact! :: Before, the bigger, heavier, and the more elaborate a car was, the better it was considered. With Suzuki’s kei-jidosha cars like Maruti 800, Omni Van and Gypsy - lightweight, smallness in size and easy to drive were attributes that became popular amongst Indians. Small was not puny anymore, lightweight was not weak, and many preconceived notions of the automobile changed. The game-changing Maruti-Suzuki joint venture in 1981 revolutionized the market, with the 1983 Maruti 800 achieving unprecedented affordability at ₹47,500 (equivalent to ₹8.5 lakh today). This era saw car ownership grow at 11.3% CAGR, with Maruti capturing >75% market share by 1985. Simultaneously, infrastructure development accelerated, with national highway length expanding from 24,000 km (1947) to 34,000 km by 1980. The automotive workforce grew exponentially from 25,000 (1950) to 290,000 by 1985, signaling the industry's rising economic importance.

Government Largesse :: To start with, license was given to just one another insignificant carmaker, Sipani Automobiles, then import duties were reduced drastically, as was excise. Almost complete CKD and SKD cars  were allowed to be imported initially. Maruti was always behind its localization commitments, yet the govt turned a blind eye to that. Lower excise for fuel-efficient cars was just an excuse to justify minimal taxation. When Rajiv Gandhi came to power and decided to ‘broadband’ licensing, which was supposed to allow other 4-wheeler manufacturers to make cars too, their JV proposals were never given green signal, so that Maruti could be continuously protected and treated as a favored child. Govt largesse in terms of tax benefits gave Maruti at least 15% cost advantage over others.

For the first 3 decades of India’s nascent car industry, it was mostly under govt regulation, as India chose the planned economy route towards growth. Given the circumstances and international environment then, it must had made sense to make most of limited resources. It was a choice which several other democratic nations made too, countries like Japan and South Korea included. In Japan, automotive industry was a priority sector, with just 4 extremely strong manufacturers surviving and dominating the world even today. South Korea too followed the planned economy system providing necessary protection followed by Japanese style government-backed export-led growth, encouraging a select group of five chaebol carmakers, not unlike the oligopolistic system that the Indian economy evolved into. A more recent very good example of planned growth with intensive state intervention is China. Thus, planned economy was not the problem of the Indian Auto Industry. The problem was ‘Very Low Priority’ and the planning only on socialistic thinking in the form of License Raj, which in turn, curtailed growth potential, while benefiting certain oligopolistic groups.

Liberalization and Global Integration (1990s-2000s)

Economic reforms like Liberalization in 1991 dismantled the License Raj, triggering a foreign investment surge. Maruti realized that the good times of Government Largesse wont last. This galvanized into some serious action. Dr. Krishnamurthy wanted MUL to be a board-managed company without any single shareholder taking full control. Mr. Osamu Suzuki had realized that MUL was the ultimate ‘cash cow’ SMC could ever have had, and he was insistent in increasing SMC’s stake to over 50%, which is what Mr. RC Bhargava, as then MD, pushed for too. On 02 June, 1992, SMC increased its stake in MUL from 40% to 50%, making it a public company. SMC just paid Rs. 269 per share, a valuation with most feel was as good as gifted to SMC. Virtually nobody protested.

Maruti launched Zen in 1993 to face the upcoming competition. Peugeot Citroen was first to enter into an ill-fated JV with Premier Automobiles Limited. South Korean carmaker Daewoo followed in with Cielo and Matiz in 1994. Maruti responded with Esteem in 1994. Mercedes-Benz's 1994 entry as the first luxury brand post-liberalization marked a new era of market segmentation. GM tied up with Hindustan Motors and brought Opel Astra in 1996. Hyundai had failed in US market and placed bet on the Indian market in 1996 with its plant near Chennai. Hyundai’s marketing blitz was coupled with deep resources, good manufacturing fundamentals and export led growth. It was not until 1998-99, that Maruti saw serious competition from Hyundai Santro and Tata Indica, while Toyota's Qualis (2000) popularized UVs and Honda entered into a tie-up with Shriram Industrial Enterprises Ltd in 1998 introducing the City. Santro’s popularity since 1998 resulted in Maruti launching Wagon R in 1999 and Alto in 2000.

1997 Asian financial crisis (recession) had ripple effects and reached India, which led to many auto companies like Daewoo etc to close shop.

FY 1999-2000, MUL reported its first loss of Rs. 269.4 crore followed by Maruti’s first ever labor dispute. Environmental concerns emerged as priorities, with Bharat Stage - II emission standards introduced in 2001 by the Suo-moto cognizance of the Supreme Court and were progressively tightened. This resulted into drastic cost-cutting measures by Maruti like VRS etc. and embarked itself on model renewal program. In 2005, Swift was launched as stylish, funky and with attitude – as a symbol of transition. Next SX4 was launched in 2006, Dzire and A-star in 2008, and Ritz in 2009. Passenger vehicle production skyrocketed from 346,000 units (1991) to 1.4 million by 2005.

Over the years, the Indian government gradually reduced its stake in the company, culminating in a complete exit in 2007 when it sold all remaining shares to Suzuki Motor Corporation and other institutional investors. Suzuki Motor Corporation had progressively increased its stake in Maruti, gaining majority control as early as 2002 when its holding rose above 50%. By the time of the rebranding in September 2007, Suzuki held a 54.2% stake, making it the clear majority owner. Maruti Udyog Limited (MUL) was officially renamed Maruti Suzuki India Limited (MSIL) with effect from September 17, 2007. The decision to rebrand Maruti Udyog Limited as Maruti Suzuki India Limited was directly linked to significant changes in ownership and management control. This ownership shift was accompanied by a move to align the company’s identity with its global parent.

In 2008, Tata Nano launched for Rs. 1 Lakh, but had several quality issued. The best-laid plans, of mice and men, often go awry. Over the years Indian market had matured and consumers wanted more. The 2008 Tata Nano launch, priced at ₹1 lakh, attempted to redefine affordability though faced market challenges. By 2009, India became the 7th largest vehicle producer globally, exporting 1.8 million units annually.

Modernization and Electrification (2010s-Present)

The 2010s solidified India's position as an automotive powerhouse, surpassing Germany (2017) and Japan (2022) in market size. Stringent BS-VI norms implemented in 2020 reduced particulate emissions by 82% compared to BS-IV. The SUV revolution transformed consumer preferences, with UVs accounting for 55% of 2024 sales. Electric vehicle adoption gained momentum through FAME subsidies, reaching 8% market penetration in 2024. Hyundai had bought Kia in the 90’s and brought it to India in 2019.

Policy initiatives like Make in India (2014) and PLI schemes (2021) boosted manufacturing capabilities, with automotive exports valued at $27.1 billion in 2023. The industry's valuation reached $108 billion in 2023, supporting 37 million jobs directly and indirectly. Emerging trends include connected car technologies (19% penetration in 2024) and hydrogen fuel cell prototypes from Tata and Ashok Leyland (a 1955 JV between Chennai based Ashok Motors and British Leyland, now owned by Hinduja group which also owns IndusInd bank).

In late 2017, Toyota and Suzuki signed an MoU to cooperate on electric vehicles in India, and by August 2019 they formalized the capital tie-up to jointly develop advanced powertrains and autonomous technologies. Since 2018–19, Toyota has taken an equity stake of just under 5 percent in Suzuki Motor Corporation (for $900 mn) in order to share technology and gain market access in India, while Suzuki in turn rebadges its home-grown models for Toyota’s Indian joint venture, Toyota Kirloskar Motor (TKM) – a JV of Toyota (89 %) and Kirloskar Group (11 %). Suzuki took ~1.2 % of Toyota for about $500 mn. cementing a long-term technology and manufacturing alliance. This exchange has powered Toyota’s record sales of over 300,000 units in FY 2024–25, with about one-third of those coming from Suzuki-developed, Toyota-badged models.

Globally - From Big Three to Magnificent Seven :: Chrysler, General Motors and Ford are the Detroit's Big Three (Stellantis is now considered one of Detroit’s "Big Three" automakers, alongside General Motors and Ford. This status comes from Stellantis inheriting Chrysler’s legacy after the merger of Fiat Chrysler Automobiles (FCA) with PSA Group in 2021). It took America's car industry 20 years and a world war to recover the three-quarters of production wiped out by the 1929 Great Depression. But now the Magnificent seven control the American Auto Market i.e. General Motors (GM), Ford, Chrysler, Toyota, Honda, Nissan, Hyundai–Kia. The Japanese automakers could take cues from Hyundai-Kia, which overcame early reputations for poor quality in the U.S. by steadily improving their vehicles and investing in strong marketing. This transformation turned them into credible competitors. BYD, a Chinese company, began emerging as the next challenger with its electric cars and plans to launch its American sales network. Here, car enthusiasts tend to fall into one of two camps: those who fawn over the power and speed of German automotive engineering; and those who think Japanese cars are superior, admiring their reliability and value for money.

Automotive Global Value Chain: The Rise of Mega Suppliers

A trend of formation of powerful oligopolies (a market dominated by a few large suppliers) is being observed world-wide in the automotive component industry, specifically in tires, car seats, constant velocity joints (CVJ), braking systems, batteries and semiconductors through a mix of acquisition and organic growth. ‘Mega suppliers’ have grown, their impact on the overall automotive industry, and the decline of smaller component manufacturers.

· Tires: Bridgestone, Michelin, Goodyear : >40% market share (‘ms’)

· Seats: Adient, Lear, Faurecia : > 75% ms

· CVJ: GKN, NTN : >66% ms

· Braking systems like ABS, ESC, TCS: Continental, Bosch, ZF > 75% ms

· Automobiles contain 50 to more than 100 microprocessors, also known as ‘ECUs’ or electronic control units. Traditional ECUs 50nm, Advanced SoC ECUs 4nm. Emerging from consolidation tsunami of the past decades are the industry titans: NXP, Infineon, Renesas and STM >40% ms

· Battery:  CATL (Contemporary Amperex Technology Co. Limited), BYD (Beyond your dreams), CALB, Gotion High-Tech, EVE Energy produce LFP ((Lithium Iron Phosphate): Favored for safety, longevity, and cost-effectiveness) and NCM ((Nickel Cobalt Manganese): Used where higher energy density is needed (longer range)) batteries, and non-conventional Sodium batteries.

Future Projections and Sustainable Mobility (2020s-2030s)

Till 2010’s, Thailand was called the Detroit of South-East Asia, the country built a car-export powerhouse by combining Japanese auto-making know-how with a competitive network of Thai car-parts suppliers. Suzuki and Subaru, two Japanese carmakers, are closing down factories in Thailand. EVs built by Chinese firms in Thailand have elbowed out Japanese competitors, which tend to rely more on Thai parts suppliers.

Chinese cars are taking over the global south and how China became a car-exporting juggernaut:: Petrol engines, not batteries, are powering their growth. After 2008, the global automotive industry has been overhauled. China has taken a decisive lead as the world’s biggest manufacturer of cars. Despite its unpromising start, BYD has surpassed Tesla as the world’s largest maker of fully electric vehicles (EVs) by volume (and is far ahead when plug-in hybrids are included). The company has assisted in wresting China’s car market from once-dominant foreign competitors. At the same time, it and other Chinese firms such as BYD, Chery, Geely, Great Wall, Xiaomi and SAIC have turned their country into the world’s top exporter of vehicles, speeding ahead of Germany and Japan. A bulk of China’s car exports are ICE and are aimed neither at western Europe nor America, but at the rest of the world. Victory has come at a price, however. Creating a homegrown EV industry using subsidies and other government inducements has resulted in severe overcapacity. Oversupply has led to a vicious price war. Seeking an alternative outlet, Chinese carmakers have turned abroad.

Conclusion

From the De Dion-Bouton steam car to connected electric vehicles, India's automotive evolution mirrors its economic transformation. Each phase - colonial imports, indigenous manufacturing, liberalized growth, and electrified future - demonstrates adaptive responses to technological and policy landscapes. As the industry navigates sustainability challenges, its continued export growth remains pivotal.

Six Decades ago Mr. Peter Drucker, an American contributor to the modern management theory, dubbed automobile manufacturing as “the industry of industries.” Today, it still holds true as automobile manufacturing is the world’s largest manufacturing activity, with nearly 100 million new vehicles produced yearly. Most of us own one, many of us own several, and, although we may be unaware of it, these cars and trucks are an important part of our everyday lives. Yet the auto industry is even more important to us than it appears.

Twice in the previous century, we saw changes in our fundamental ideas of 'how we make things'. And how we make things dictates not only how we work but what we buy, how we think, and the way we live.

• After World War I, Henry Ford and General Motors’ Alfred Sloan moved world manufacturing from centuries of craft production-led by European firms, into the Age of mass production. Largely as a result, the United States soon dominated the global economy.

• After World War II, Eiji Toyoda and Taiichi Ohno at the Toyota Motor Company in Japan pioneered the concept of lean production. The rise of Japan to its current economic preeminence quickly followed, as other Japanese headquartered companies and industries in the West copied this remarkable system. Manufacturers around the World are now trying to embrace lean production, but they're finding the going rough. Many Western companies now understand lean production, and at least one is well along the path to introducing it. However, superimposing lean-production methods on existing mass production systems causes great pain and dislocation. Lean production is 'lean' because it uses less of everything compared with mass production.

India witnessed something extraordinary in January 2025, when Maruti Suzuki inaugurated Asia's largest automotive gigafactory in Kharkhoda, Haryana—a facility capable of producing one million vehicles annually. To put this in perspective, that rivals Tesla's famous California plant, the very facility that popularised the "gigafactory" concept. But this is more than just another big factory. Maruti's new plant represents a fundamental shift in how India approaches manufacturing. The plant aims to revolutionise Indian automotive manufacturing through Lean Industry 4.0 and sustainable practices. The facility will be 100% automated in welding operations, with artificial intelligence checking every weld spot for quality. Collaborative robots will work alongside humans to detect defects invisible to the naked eye. This isn't just automation—it's intelligent manufacturing. Automation and robotics for repetitive, low-value tasks. IoT for real-time monitoring and predictive maintenance (supporting TPM). The sustainability story is equally compelling. A 100-megawatt solar plant will power operations, with biogas and hydrogen production in development. This aligns perfectly with India's net-zero ambitions by 2070 and positions Maruti ahead of global environmental expectations. The company is essentially proving that large-scale manufacturing and environmental responsibility can coexist. Perhaps most intriguingly, Maruti is solving a uniquely Indian challenge: infrastructure reliability. The company has reserved land adjacent to the factory for key suppliers, creating an integrated ecosystem that reduces logistics costs and improves efficiency. It's a model that other manufacturers in emerging markets will surely study. The broader implications are profound. As Rajiv Gandhi from Maruti's executive committee noted, "If India is to compete globally, we need cost and quality." This gigafactory, powered by Lean Industry 4.0 technologies, delivers both. It signals India's transition from a low-cost manufacturing hub to a high-tech production powerhouse. The integration of lean and Industry 4.0 creates a powerful approach for operational excellence. The timing couldn't be better. As global supply chains fragment with ‘mega component suppliers’ and companies seek alternatives to traditional manufacturing centers, India is positioning itself not just as a participant, but as a leader in the next generation of industrial production.

The 

Endurance Race: 24hrs Le Mans, Reliability Trials 

Sprint Race: Grand Prix (Grand Prix motor racing, a form of motorsport competition, has its roots in organised automobile racing that began in France as early as 1894. Initially, the term was reserved for each country's largest or most prestigious F1 race, in which the winner would receive a “grand prize.” After the sport caught on around the world, the sport of Grand Prix racing would lend its name to all auto competitions raced on an open track styled like a real road.)

The 24 Hours of Le Mans, along with the Monaco Grand Prix and the Indianapolis 500, are considered part of the "Triple Crown of Motorsport".

You enter with ambition. With faith in merit. You believe hard work speaks. That truth carries weight. That doing the right thing earns its place. But slowly, the system teaches otherwise. Meetings are theatre. Decisions are made elsewhere. Speaking up draws attention, not change. The room rewards those who perform alignment over those who pursue clarity. You meet the Carpet Colleagues. Present in every call. Absent in every outcome. They master visibility without substance. Their genius lies in being noticed just enough, without doing enough to be questioned.

Bold ideas are handled like threats. Original thinking is paused, rephrased, or buried. Not because it lacks merit - but because it disrupts comfort. Performance reviews are perception games. Not what you did, but who narrated your story when you weren’t in the room. So you adapt. Speak less. Risk less. Add disclaimers. Smile more. Stay busy. Stay safe. Stay... silent. But that’s how it begins. Your edge fades. Your fire dims. Your voice starts to echo like everyone else’s. Corporate doesn't just take your time. It slowly edits your spirit. So say the thing. Challenge the room. Protect your sharpness. Because the goal isn’t to survive the system. The goal is to stay unmistakably you, within it.

survival instincts

1. ICAI INTT PT

2. Project Management Professional (PMP)

3. Lean Six Sigma Black Belt

4. MBA

The first is what kind of decision is being taken. the idea of one-way and two-way doors to separate decisions into two categories. A one-way door is a big decision which is hard to reverse and should absorb more thought. A two-way door is a decision where changing course is not that difficult and it’s better to move fast even if mistakes are made. (A revolving door is presumably for people who never come to a decision at all.)

The second question is who is taking the decision. Disagreements can quickly lead to an impasse unless someone has the authority to make the choice. There are lots of formal frameworks designed to specify decision-making roles. RAPID stands for Recommend, Agree, Perform, Input and Decide (this is not actually the order in which things happen but in management, acronyms always trump logic.) The RACI framework makes tremendously confusing distinctions between people who are responsible, accountable, consulted and informed. Even then, decisions can end up being countermanded by someone higher up the ladder (a framework informally known as BIG CHEESE). So an awful lot depends on whether bosses are willing to live with decisions if they disagree with them.

The final question is how to reach your decision. Should it follow a codified process? Should there be structured ways to gather opposing views? Should it involve a pre-mortem, which asks people to imagine the things that are likely to cause a decision to turn out badly? For strategic choices, the answer to all these questions and more is probably “yes”. However a decision is made, some rules are better than none. When you wash your hands, you don’t know specifically which virus or bacterium you are washing away, but you know it’s a good idea. A process makes big decisions more hygienic, too.