Abstract: In centralised matching markets, an institution is often a committee rather than a single decision maker, and the ranking it reports to the clearinghouse is the outcome of a vote among its members. The clearinghouse does not consult the institution once. It asks the institution about one group of applicants and then about another group containing it, and the guarantees of the mechanism hold only when these answers are consistent with one another. We ask which voting rules make them consistent. We show that when committee members report rankings, no rule can fill every position, treat its members equally, judge only the applicants who applied, respect unanimous agreement, and remain consistent across applicant pools. The proof reduces the committee's problem to an Arrovian aggregation problem. We then identify the rules that avoid this impossibility. A rule is separable if it turns the reports into one ranking of the applicants and applies that ranking to every pool. Separable rules deliver everything the clearinghouse requires, and approval voting and the Borda rule scored over all applicants are two examples that avoid the impossibility in different ways. Allowing a position to go unfilled gives a larger class, in which the committee also restricts which applicants may be admitted together, and separability is the case of this class that never leaves a position unfilled. We close with a condition under which no committee member gains by misreporting.

Abstract: This paper develops a theoretical framework for International Kidney Paired Exchange (IKPE) to address efficiency and fairness concerns in multi-country kidney-paired exchange networks. Drawing on a discrete version of the Kalai–Smorodinsky (KS) bargaining solution, we propose a mechanism that first maximizes worst country’s relative gain, and then selects an allocation that achieves the largest overall transplant benefit. The model features a dynamic weighting scheme that adjusts over time to compensate countries whose participation yields lower gains in the past rounds compared to other countries, ensuring an equitable distribution of cooperative gains. We prove that the proposed mechanism guarantees Pareto optimality and individual rationality of the resulting allocation as no country is worse off by cooperating than by acting alone. 

Abstract: In Shapley–Scarf housing markets, Ma (1994) shows that top trading cycles (TTC) is the unique mechanism satisfying individual rationality (IR), Pareto efficiency (PE), and strategy-proofness. We ask what other mechanisms become possible when strategy-proofness is replaced by a weaker condition called non-obvious manipulability (NOM), introduced by Troyan and Morrill (2020). We first show that this weaker condition does not help on its own: every IR and PE mechanism is already NOM. We therefore introduce a new condition: NOM with groups, under which each agent knows the preferences of the other members of her group, but not those of agents outside the group. This condition reduces to strategy-proofness when all agents belong to one group, and to standard NOM when every group is a singleton. Also, we introduce a participation condition called group rationality (GR), which requires that no group do worse than it would by trading only among its own members. We then define a class of mechanisms called TTC with super-groups, whose members satisfy GR, PE, and NOM with groups. The class includes mechanisms that differ from standard TTC, including mechanisms that are not strategy-proof. Furthermore, we show that every mechanism that satisfies GR, PE, and NOM with groups has the same best- and worst-case outcomes as every TTC with super-groups mechanism.

Abstract coming soon!

Abstract coming soon!

Abstract: We study a model in which a sender tries to persuade a decision-maker by committing to a signaling strategy (Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011). The decision-maker observes this and, in turn, commits to an interim verification strategy that reveals the true state of the world with an endogenously determined probability. The possibility of verification induces a trade-off for the sender: providing more information decreases the verification probability but also decreases the ex-ante persuasion payoff. The decision-maker trades off learning the state with more precision against the cost of verification. We provide the precise conditions under which introducing verification leads to (a) strictly more informative signaling, and (b) higher ex-ante welfare for the decision-maker compared to the canonical persuasion game.