On this page, you can find my publications, papers under review, future research projects, and select conference presentations. For my full conference history, see my cv.

Publications 

• The Normative Connection Between Paternalism and Belief 

The Journal of Ethics (forthcoming, online first November 29, 2021)

Abstract: This paper aims to answer the following question: what is the normative connection between paternalism and the paternalist’s belief about the recipient’s agency? I consider the following two views. The Robust View says that paternalism is pro tanto wrong insofar as the paternalist’s belief about the recipient’s agency is always disrespectful. The Less Robust View says that whenever the paternalist’s belief about the recipient’s agency is disrespectful, paternalism is pro tanto wrong. I interpret the major motive-based theories of paternalism as endorsing the Robust view. While this view is susceptible to a devastating criticism, I argue that the Less Robust view is true. To make my case, I elucidate three ways in which the paternalist’s belief about the recipient’s agency may be disrespectful. I then argue that any paternalistic action which is predicated on or motivated by a disrespectful belief about the recipient’s agency is pro tanto wrong. Consequently, I suggest that motive-based theorists endorse the Less Robust view instead.

• On the Normative Connection Between Paternalism and Rights

Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 21(2): 282-289.

https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v21i2.1304 

Abstract: Some scholars working on the ethics of paternalism are interested in whether there is a systematic normative connection between hard paternalism and people’s moral rights. One affirmative view is that hard paternalism is pro tanto wrong inasmuch as it always involves a rights infringement. Daniel Groll defends this view on the grounds that hard paternalism always infringes a competent adult’s right to be the only one to act only (or overridingly) for his own good. I call this right the right to self-beneficence. In this note, I argue that Groll misidentifies a right that competent adults have. Rather than the right to self-beneficence, I argue that if hard paternalism infringes any particular right, it is a right that a competent adult has against others “taking over” matters that fall within his sphere of legitimate agency or, by extension, the legitimate exercise of his agency. I call this right the right against legitimate agency interference. 

Under Review 

• A paper concerning what it is to distrust someone to do something (i.e., contractual distrust). According to Katherine Hawley’s commitment account, to contractually distrust someone is to “believe that she has a commitment to doing it, and to not rely on her to do it” (2014: 10). I criticize Hawley’s account on the grounds that it is underinclusive in two respects. I propose an alternative, belief-based account, which says that to contractually distrust someone is to believe that she has, or ought to have, a commitment to doing it, and to believe that she will not, or likely will not, do it. An implication of this view is that distrust is not a voluntary attitude. 

• A paper concerning Basu's (2019) case of the supposedly rational racist. Sometimes we form beliefs about each other on the basis of strong demographic evidence. Yet, these beliefs may seem morally problematic, especially when the demographic evidence we rely on is the result injustice, e.g., structural racism, pernicious patriarchal norms, etc. For example, a waiter’s supposedly rational belief that "the black diner in their section will tip less than the white diners" (Basu, 2019). In this paper, I argue that these beliefs are sometimes disrespectful and that they are disrespectful when they falsely deflate, i.e., incorrectly underestimate, and thereby undervalue, a morally significant feature of each other’s person, e.g., each other’s virtuous character. I also argue that, even when our beliefs are true, we nevertheless disrespect each other when we form these true beliefs on the basis of mere demographic evidence. In doing so, we fail to respect each other’s separateness of person. 

Future Research Projects

I have research projects in various stages of progress on the following topics:

• Agential Injustice. A paper concerning a special sort of autonomy based injustice, what I call an agential injustice. I argue that a person perpetrates an agential injustice against another when they interfere with or "take over" matters or decisions in another's legitimate control based on a disrespectful belief about another's agency. Disrespectful beliefs are ones that undervalue a morally significant feature of our personhood, e.g., our autonomy, character, dignity, etc. Our beliefs undervalue when they falsely deflate, i.e., incorrectly underestimate, the morally significant aspect at hand. When it comes to beliefs about each other's autonomy, in particular, our beliefs are disrespectful when they falsely deflate either the soundness of a person’s judgment or the strength of a person’s will. I argue that the primary harm of an agential injustice is that it constitutes a morally objectionable form of objectification, what I call agential objectification.  [Paper draft available upon request]. 

• Governmental Paternalism and Disrespectful Belief. My research on agential injustice and the moral significance of our beliefs about each other’s agency finds its origins in the context of interpersonal paternalism, namely paternalism that takes place between friends, intimates, siblings, etc. The aim of this project is to build on my current research by investigating how to apply the concept of an agential injustice to an institutional paternalistic context. In particular, I am interested in understanding how the government may perpetrate an agential injustice against its citizens in acting paternalistically. [Research proposal available upon request]. 

• A Right Against Legitimate Agency Interference.  In my “On The Normative Connection Between Paternalism and Rights,” I argue that if paternalism impermissibly infringes any particular right, it is a right that a person has against others interfering with or “taking over” matters or decisions in their sphere of legitimate control. I call this the right against legitimate agency interference. This project concerns whether competent adults actually have this right, and, if so, whether it is ever permissibly infringed. [Research proposal available upon request]. 

• Doxastic Disrespect. A central question at the intersection of ethics and epistemology asks whether we can wrong others by what we believe about them. Although many are skeptical of this possibility, there are those who defend it (Basu and Schroeder 2018). While I am sympathetic to the idea that our beliefs can be morally objectionable, I disagree with proponents of doxastic wronging that we wrong others by what we believe. Rather, drawing on my current research on disrespectful belief, I plan to show that we can (and sometimes do) disrespect each other by what we believe about each other.  [Abstract available upon request]. 

• Withholding Belief For The Wrong Kind of Reasons: Is Acting Irrationally Ever Morally Required? A major question at the intersection of ethics and epistemology asks how moral norms and epistemic norms interact, if they do at all. According to theories of moral encroachment, epistemic norms of rationality are sensitive to moral considerations. We can distinguish between two types of moral encroachment based on the moral considerations that epistemic norms are sensitive to. Proponents of radical moral encroachment hold that epistemic norms are sensitive to the moral badness of beliefs (e.g., Pace 2011; Basu and Schroeder 2018). Proponents of moderate moral encroachment hold that epistemic norms are sensitive to the moral badness of actions and options (e.g., Moss 2018; Fritz 2019; Bolinger 2020). Fritz (2019) argues that theories of radical moral encroachment are implausible on the grounds that they invoke reasons of the wrong kind (WKR) in epistemology. The idea is that the moral badness of a belief is a WKR for withholding belief and, as such, epistemic norms are not sensitive to this moral consideration. As a consequence, theories of radical moral encroachment fail to show that it is unjustified or irrational to hold morally bad beliefs. Suppose that Fritz (2019) is correct: the moral badness of a belief is a WKR for withholding belief. It seems to follow from this supposition that both the moral badness of a particular belief formation process and the moral badness of the evidence a person relies on (assuming that these can be morally bad) are also WKR for withholding belief. Yet, borrowing from (and adding to) the literature on radical moral encroachment, I plan to show that there are several cases in which there is strong intuitive support for the idea that morality demands that we withhold (or not withhold) belief precisely because the epistemic process or evidence we rely on is morally bad. I have two primary research interests. The first is to show that we should not be too surprised by (or worried about) the possibility of this normative situation, namely one in which morality demands that a person act irrationally by relying on a WKR for withholding belief. The second is to defend our intuitions about some of these cases by explaining why it is that morality demands that we withhold (or not withhold) belief on the basis of a WKR.  [Abstract available upon request].

• The Ethics of Making Sexual Promises. This project concerns whether we have a moral duty to abstain from making positive sexual promises. [Research proposal available upon request].

• The Ethics of Returning Extremists. This project concerns returning extremists. It asks whether it is wrong for a state to disallow a former extremist citizen the opportunity to return to the state to undergo a fair hearing [Research proposal available upon request]. 

Selected Presentations

• On Distrust. APA Pacific Division, upcoming March 2024.

• Paternalism, Discrimination, and Injustice. Paternalism and Discrimination Workshop, upcoming November 2023

• Agential Injustice

  • Central States Philosophical Association, April 2022

  • Ohio Philosophical Association, April 2022

  • New Mexico Texas Philosophical Association (remotely by Zoom), April 2022

• What is Paternalistic Intervention? Freedom and Autonomy Conference, May 2019

• Teaching Ethics. Eastern APA Graduate Student Council Panel, January 2019

• A Paternalist Friendly Capabilities Approach. The Human Development and Capabilities Association, September 2018; Ethics and Political, Social and Legal Annual Conference, November 2018

• A Capabilitarian Account of Fairness. The Human Development and Capabilities Association, September 2017