Presentation

"Reducing Mass Atrocities through Transnational Justice”

Are nuclear weapons useful for coercion and, if so, then what factors increase the credibility and effectiveness of nuclear threats? While prominent scholars like Thomas Schelling argue that nuclear brinkmanship, or the manipulation of nuclear risk, can effectively coerce adversaries, others contend nuclear weapons are not effective tools of coercion, especially coercion designed to achieve offensive and revisionist objectives. We develop a theoretical argument that explicit nuclear threats implemented with automated nuclear launch systems are particularly credible and effective compared to ambiguous nuclear threats or explicit nuclear threats implemented via non-automated means. While automated nuclear weapons launch systems may seem like something out of science fiction, the Soviet Union deployed such a system during the Cold War and the technology necessary to automate the use of force has developed considerably in recent years. Two preregistered experiments conducted on members of the United Kingdom public provide support for these expectations. However, we find that automated nuclear threats do entail significant downsides, such as increasing the perceived risks of nuclear accidents. Overall, our study demonstrates the dangers of countries weaponizing automated nuclear launch systems to engage in offensive and revisionist coercive efforts.