Ongoing and Recent Research Projects
Book Project: Russian Nuclear Modernization under Vladimir Putin
My book project explores the factors that drive Russia's nuclear modernization efforts since 1999. I argue that Russian nuclear modernization is driven by security concerns and status ambitions. Specifically, nuclear modernization hedges against the future development of American ballistic missile defense and conventional counterforce capabilities that could erode Russia’s nuclear deterrent, which Russian leaders perceive to be the ultimate guarantor of Russian sovereignty and territorial integrity. While Russia’s perception of an American threat can explain why Russia is modernizing its nuclear arsenal, it cannot explain why it prioritizes particular systems over others, as multiple weapons systems may increase the survivability of the Russian nuclear arsenal. I argue that the Russian government prioritizes weapons that they can use as status symbols, such as novel weapons and those with some superlative claim. Other domestic factors cannot be ruled out by play a marginal role, at most.
Recent Academic Articles and Scholarly Book Chapters
Spenser A. Warren. 2025. "Russian Novel Nuclear Weapons and Strategic Nuclear Deterrence between the United States and Russia." Comparative Strategy (Online First).
Russia is developing several novel nuclear weapons. This paper examines the impact of these systems on strategic nuclear deterrence between Russia and the United States. I argue that if Russia can produce these weapons in sufficient numbers–and if their claims about the weapons’ capabilities are true–they will allow Russia to maintain a secure second-strike capability but will not erode the second-strike capabilities of the United States. These systems are neither necessary nor sufficient to pose a significant threat to the American nuclear arsenal, nor are they useful weapons for striking American nuclear command, control, and communications systems.
Available here: doi.org/10.1080/01495933.2025.2499828
Spenser A. Warren. Forthcoming (2025). "Russia's Technological Competition with the United States." In In Search of Strategic Advantage: Understanding the Landscape of Technological Competition. Kimberly Peh and Michael Albertson, eds. Livermore, CA: Center for Global Security Research.
Russia is engaging in a multifaceted technological competition with the United States. This competition encompasses investments in a range of emerging technologies from hypersonic weapons to space capabilities to quantum computing. Many of these technologies have significant strategic capabilities, but gaining a strategic advantage is not Russia’s sole purpose for technological competition. In addition to altering the strategic status quo, Russia’s technological ambitions are the result of aspirations for great power status and a need to stimulate high-tech sectors of the Russian economy. Russia’s technological competition is also shaped by a number of limiting factors, including significant brain drain, financial constraints, and international sanctions. Russian investment in emerging technologies has had varying levels of success. Russia’s greatest success has arguably come from its investments in hypersonic weapons, which resulted in the deployment of the first hypersonic glide vehicles and cruise missiles. However, Russia’s hypersonic weapons have had minimal strategic impact and may not ultimately provide the prestige boost Moscow desires. While Russia may have deployed hypersonic weapons first, I argue that they are not inherently leading the United States in technological competition. Rather, I argue that meaningfully leading a technological race requires developing some noticeable strategic advantage, something that hypersonic weapons have failed to do. In the coming years, the United States may actually gain a decided advantage both in the deployment of its own hypersonic weapons and in the development of defenses to counter Russian hypersonics, should Washington decide either are necessary.
Spenser A. Warren. 2025. "Russian Novel Nuclear Weapons and War-Fighting Abilities." Parameters 55 (1).
This article argues that Russia’s novel nuclear-capable weapons will have a minor but real impact on Russian war-fighting capabilities in Eastern Europe. Using publicly available assessments, it evaluates the weapons’ characteristics individually and when taken together to determine their possible impact on war fighting, deterrence, and arms control. Additionally, it analyzes Russian war-fighting concepts to project how Russian strategists think about their use and how they might integrate them into Russian war-fighting concepts. The study’s conclusions will assist military strategists and policy practitioners plan for a potential regional war on NATO’s eastern flank.
Open Access, available here: doi.org/10.55540/0031-1723.3330
Sumit Ganguly and Spenser A. Warren. Forthcoming (2025). "Chinese and Pakistani Nuclear Postures and Strategies." In The Oxford Handbook of Warfare in Asia. Kaushik Roy and Denis Showalter, eds. London: Oxford University Press.
This chapter will look at the nuclear postures and strategies of two Asian states—China and Pakistan. We discuss the stated doctrine of each, including Pakistan and China’s plans for the first use of nuclear weapons. We also discuss the role of nuclear weapons in the relations of China and Pakistan with their nuclear South Asian neighbor and rival, India, as well as their relations with outside powers, including the United States and Russia. Both states are modernizing their arsenals, developing new capabilities and improving existing systems. This nuclear modernization will impact Chinese and Pakistani nuclear strategy and regional nuclear stability.
Spenser A. Warren and Sumit Ganguly. 2022. "Russia-India Relations after Ukraine." Asian Survey 62 (5-6): 811-837.
India and Russia have enjoyed a strong relationship since the collapse of the Soviet Union, partially as a legacy of the Indo–Soviet partnership during the Cold War. But how will this invasion impact future relations between New Delhi and Moscow? We argue that the war will likely harm this relationship over the long term, although some scenarios might minimize this harm. Western sanctions and Russian material losses in the war will make it difficult for Russia to fulfill Indian arms orders, especially if the sanctions regime remains in place for several years, forcing India to turn to other sources of weapons, including the United States. Its increasing isolation from Europe could also force Russia to move even closer to India’s rival China, making India less secure. There may be opportunities to improve energy ties between India and Russia, but Western sanctions and geographic barriers will limit any energy gains
Open Access, available here: https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2022.1799235
Works In-Progress
Under review: "Deterrence, status, and domestic interests: Understanding Russian nuclear modernization since 1999"
"Technological capabilities, perception, and the impacts of emerging technologies on crisis stability" with Juljan Krause and Kimberly Peh (presented at MPSA, ISA, working paper available upon request)
"Status and strategy in nuclear modernization decisions" (presented at APSA, ISA, ISA-NE, working paper available upon request)
"Technological innovation, nuclear modernization, and strategic shifts" (Presented at MPSA, working paper available upon request)
"Low-yield nuclear options, escalation management, and lowered first-use thresholds: A crisis stability paradox"
"The Pacific dimension of U.S.-Russia competition"
"Atomic Advice: Leaders, Advisers, and Nuclear Decision-Making" with Colleen Larkin
Dissertation: "Security, Prestige, and Power: Understanding the Determinants of Russian Strategic Nuclear Modernization." Open Access via ProQuest