Working Papers
Prosecutor tradeoffs and race: evidence from a circuit split
Abstract: I consider whether changing the costs or benefits to prosecutor charging decisions impacts racial disparities in charges. Prosecutors face a tradeoff between expending resources to gather evidence and building a stronger case. I exploit a circuit split in charging rules to observe variation in the cost of evidence requirements. I compare how prosecutors differentially increase charges for racial minorities across each evidence cost regime by utilizing a bunching point in mandatory minimum charging of federal drug crimes. Using a difference-in-differences design, I find that when evidence costs are lowered, prosecutors disproportionately increase charges for Black defendants compared to White counterparts. I then consider how decreases to the expected sentence length for increased charges affects prosecutor choice and racial disparities using the 2018 First Step Act (FSA). I find that in circuits with high evidence costs, the FSA decreased the race gap in increased charges. But in circuits with low required evidence, the FSA increased this disparity. The results suggest that increasing evidence costs is an effective policy tool for reducing racial disparities in charges.
How much do mandatory minimums matter?
Abstract: I estimate the causal increase to sentence lengths created by mandatory minimum eligibility for federal drug crimes. Estimating sentence effects is complicated by selection bias created by case manipulation near the eligibility cutoff. I decompose the impacts of mandatory minimum eligibility into effects driven by the law and effects driven by this manipulation. This is done by fitting distributions through non-manipulated cases and extrapolating these distributions into manipulated case areas. I find that without manipulation, mandatory minimum eligibility increases sentence length by about 10 months. This effect is consistent across racial groups with small heterogeneity by drug type and by criminal history. However, through case manipulation, I find that Black defendants and Hispanic defendants receive an additional 5-7 months to their sentence lengths, while manipulation has no significant impact on White sentence lengths. Using a unique data set of US Attorneys, I show the race disparity in manipulation effects is tied to prosecutors' decisions to increase charges for minority defendants more than White counterparts.
Prosecutorial discretion and outcome disparities (With Andy Yuan)
Abstract: We examine the causal effects of prosecutors' incentives on racial and gender disparities. Blakely v. Washington 542 U.S. 296 (2004) significantly disincentivized state prosecutors from pursuing sentence enhancements by raising their burdens of proof from "preponderance of evidence'' to "beyond a reasonable doubt.'' Through a regression discontinuity design, we find that a higher burden of proof reduces defendants' likelihood of receiving a sentence enhancement by 47%. Furthermore, we find striking evidence that Blakely eliminated the entire preexisting gender gap of men being 24% more likely to receive sentence enhancements than women. However, we find no evidence suggesting a racial gap of sentence enhancements both pre and post Blakely.
Selected Works in Progress
Do legal actors compensate? - measuring prosecutor and judicial responses to an exogenous change in charging costs (with Andy Yuan)
The efficacy and equity of reducing traffic stops (with Jacob Meyer and Austin Smith)
Physical environment and crime: evidence from streetlight modernization