• How much do mandatory minimums matter? - Forthcoming at Journal of Law, Economics and Organization (JLEO)

Abstract: Mandatory minimum sentencing is frequently identified as a potential driver of long sentences among drug offenders. I estimate the causal effect of mandatory minimum (MM) eligibility on federal drug sentencing using a regression discontinuity design with extrapolation to disentangle statutory impacts from prosecutorial selection. I find that MM eligibility increases sentence length uniformly across case types by about 10 months (14%). This includes defendants with low criminal history, indicating limited protection for low-level offenders. To assess which types of cases are affected by selection, I compare extrapolated counterfactual sentence lengths against observed sentences. I find evidence that charging manipulation is localized among minority defendants. These results indicate that racial disparities in MM sentencing are driven by prosecutor charging decisions rather than by features of the MM statute.

Working Paper Link

• Unintended consequences of constraining discretion: Evidence from criminal sentencing (with Andy Yuan)

Abstract: We study how institutional decisionmakers respond when procedural reforms constrain their discretion. We exploit a Supreme Court decision that raised the evidentiary burden for sentencing enhancements. The reform reduced enhancement rates by nearly 30 percent. Yet contrary to the mechanical prediction, average sentences rose by two months. We find no evidence of prosecutorial adjustment across thirteen charging and bargaining outcomes. Instead, the increase is driven by judges, whose responses vary systematically with their pre-reform sentencing behavior. Lenient judges increase sentences within the remaining sentencing guideline while strict judges reduce them, compressing the distribution of punishment. This asymmetric response reflects the tighter guideline constraints faced by strict judges, who were already more likely to sentence at the guideline maximum. These results show that constraining discretion can produce unintended consequences as decisionmakers adapt along remaining margins.

PDF Link,  Online Appendix 

• When states restrict traffic stop authority: Evidence on policing and road safety (with Jacob Meyer)

Abstract: We study how changing the legal scope of police authority affects police behavior and public safety. We examine two statewide reforms in Oregon and Virginia that prohibited officers from initiating certain equipment-related traffic stops. Using administrative records and a synthetic difference-in-differences design, we find that both laws reduce traffic stops by 16–17 percent, driven by 45–64 percent declines in equipment-related stops. We find no evidence that officers shift to other stop justifications or that motor vehicle accidents increase. Reductions in traffic stop activity accrue slightly more to non-White drivers in Virginia, and slightly more to White drivers in Oregon. Stop reductions were broad, but slightly higher among agencies that disproportionately utilized equipment-related stops against non-White drivers during the pre-period, especially in Virginia. Our findings show that legislatures can substantially reduce police-civilian interactions by changing the legal scope of stop-initiation authority, with limited evidence of behavioral substitution or roadway-safety costs.

PDF Link 

• Prosecutorial discretion and outcome disparities (With Andy Yuan) - R&R at American Law & Economics Review (ALER)

Abstract: We examine the causal effects of prosecutors' incentives on racial and gender disparities. Blakely v. Washington 542 U.S. 296 (2004) significantly disincentivized state prosecutors from pursuing sentence enhancements by raising their burdens of proof from "preponderance of evidence'' to "beyond a reasonable doubt.'' Through a regression discontinuity design, we find that a higher burden of proof reduces defendants' likelihood of receiving a sentence enhancement by 47%. Furthermore, we find striking evidence that Blakely eliminated the entire preexisting gender gap of men being 24% more likely to receive sentence enhancements than women. However, we find no evidence suggesting a racial gap of sentence enhancements both pre and post Blakely.

PDF Link

• Mandatory minimum repeal and prosecutorial leverage (with Adam Soliman)
  
  

• Untitled community courts paper (with David Mitre Becerril and Mohamad Alkadry)
  
  

• Prosecutor tradeoffs and race: evidence from a circuit split
  
  

• Physical environment and crime: evidence from streetlight modernization (resting)