Research

Publications

Articles

(Forthcoming). 'Responding to Second-Order Reasons', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

A rich literature has discussed what it is to respond to a reason, e.g., to believe or act on the basis of some consideration or another. In comparison, what it would be to respond to a second-order reason has been underexplored. Yet formulating an account of this is vital for maintaining the existence of second-order reasons in both the practical and epistemic domains. And indeed, there are reasons to doubt this is possible. For example, responding to second-order reasons is meant to be different from simply coming to believe or act for a more richly described first-order reason but it's not clear what this would look like. This paper introduces an account of the second-order basing relation which meets these concerns. It therefore both develops our picture of second-order reasons and helps to defend their existence. 

(Forthcoming). 'Inference and Transparency: A Two Explanations Account of Self-Knowledge', forthcoming in a volume edited by C. Wright, G. Melis, and G. Merlo, Oxford University Press

Prima facie, our knowledge of our mental states significantly differs from others’ knowledge of them. This is in some sense correct but fails to provide the whole picture. This paper develops and defends a two explanations account of self-knowledge: that subjects’ capacity for self-knowledge can and should be explained in two ways. Self-knowledge fundamentally differs from other-knowledge, but only at the personal level. This is the level at which we can talk of the subject herself. But the same subpersonal mechanisms underpin self- and other-knowledge alike. In this respect, self-knowledge resembles perception: both are in some way ‘inferential’ at the subpersonal level of explanation but non-inferential at the personal level. 

(Forthcoming). 'Standpoints, Knowledge, and Power: Introducing Standpoint Epistemology', Hypatia

Should citizens have equal say regarding the running of society? Following the principles of democracy, and most of political philosophy: yes (at least at a fundamental level, thus allowing for representatives and the like). Indeed, comparing the main alternative seemingly supports this intuition. Epistocracy would instead give power just to the most epistemically competent. Yet testing citizens’ political and economic knowledge looks apt to disproportionately disempower marginalised groups, making the position seem like a nonstarter and democracy the clear winner. Nevertheless, this paper argues against giving citizens equal say, or at least, it offers the strongest possible motivation for this position. In particular, I introduce the progressive case for epistocracy, and what I term standpoint epistocracy. This account refigures the relevant notion of political competence such that it is not the most privileged classes who would most likely constitute our epistocracy, but rather, the least. The resulting picture considerably improves on traditional versions of epistocracy and also democracy.

(2023). 'Accounting for Doxastic Agency: Mental Action and Self-Awareness', Synthese

Uncontroversially, individuals exercise agency in acting; can we say the same about believing? This paper argues that subjects do indeed exercise agency over their beliefs and provides an account by which this is possible. On my picture, self-awareness is fundamental to the nature of doxastic agency. Drawing on work in the philosophy of action, I argue that subjects exercise agency in performing mental actions that form and sustain their beliefs, where they are aware of these actions as part of reasoning and exercising agency over their beliefs. 

(2023). 'Controlling our Reasons', Nous

Philosophical discussion on control has largely centred around control over our actions and beliefs. Yet this overlooks the question of whether we also have control over the reasons for which we act and believe. To date, the overriding assumption appears to be that we do not, and with seemingly good reason. We cannot choose to act for a reason and acting-for-a-reason is not itself something we do. While some have challenged this in the case of reasons for action, these claims seem especially untenable regarding believing for a reason. And extending the scope of control in this way also faces the threat of regress. In the face of this orthodoxy, the present paper argues that we do in fact have control over both believing and acting for a particular reason. It also starts to develop an account of the way in which this would be possible. Given the broad importance of understanding control and agency, this paper bears on a number of topics in epistemology, the philosophy of mind, and ethics.

(2022). 'Believing for a Reason is (at least) Nearly Self-Intimating', Erkenntnis

This paper concerns a specific epistemic feature of believing for a reason (e.g., believing that it will rain on the basis of the grey clouds outside). It has commonly been assumed that our access to such facts about ourselves is akin in all relevant respects to our access to why other people hold their beliefs. Further, discussion of self-intimation - that we are necessarily in a position to know when we are in certain conditions - has centred largely around mental states. In contrast to both assumptions, this paper argues that believing for a reason is (at least) very nearly self-intimating: necessarily, if a subject believes that q for the reason that p, then, provided relevant conceptual and rational capacities, she is in a position to form a justified true belief that she believes that q for the reason that p. We should think this on the basis of the role that believing for a reason plays from the subjects’ perspective, and in particular, the way in which it intellegises one’s belief.

(2021). 'Knowing Our Reasons: Distinctive Self-Knowledge of Why We Hold Our Attitudes and Perform Actions', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

This paper argues that subjects at least sometimes learn why they hold an attitude or perform an action in a distinctive first-personal way, i.e., they learn of those facts in a manner that mere observers cannot. Subjects have this first-personal self-knowledge in virtue of first-personal self-knowledge of the reasons for which they hold an attitude or perform an action – their motivating reasons. This paper focusses on one’s reasons for holding an attitude. So, it is not just that subjects have distinctive access to the fact that they, say, believe that q; they also have distinctive access to the fact that they believe that p for the reason that p. I argue for this position contra the prevailing orthodoxy. Philosophers and psychologists often deny that subjects have distinctive access to why they hold their attitudes. Indeed, even many of those who claim that subjects can use a special method to learn that they have a given attitude deny that this method provides knowledge of why one holds that attitude. 

(2019). 'The Transparency Method and Knowing our Reasons', Analysis

Subjects can know what their attitudes are and also their motivating reasons for those attitudes. This paper mostly focuses on the attitude of belief for simplicity. One attractive account of self-knowledge of belief and other attitudes appeals to the ‘transparency method’ (TM). According to TM, subjects answer the question of whether they believe that q by answering the world-directed question of whether q is true. Something similar also looks intuitive in the case of self-knowledge of one’s reasons for believing that q, but developing the view requires determining the relevant world-directed question. This paper argues that subjects use what I term the ‘reasons transparency method’ (RTM): subjects learn why they believe that q by answering the world-directed question ‘what are good reasons for believing that q?’. I motivate RTM against a foil that I develop from Boyle (2011a): subjects learn what their reasons are for believing that q by considering whether q is true. 

(2018). 'Confabulation and Rational Obligations for Self-Knowledge', Philosophical Psychology

This paper argues that confabulation is motivated by the desire to have fulfilled a rational obligation to knowledgeably explain our attitudes by reference to motivating reasons. This account better explains confabulation than alternatives. My conclusion impacts two discussions. Primarily, it tells us something about confabulation – how it is brought about, which engenders lively debate in and of itself. A further upshot concerns self-knowledge. Contrary to popular assumption, confabulation cases give us reason to think we have distinctive access to why we have our attitudes.

Handbook articles

(Forthcoming) 'Self-Knowledge', for the Blackwell Companion to Epistemology


Book reviews

(2019). Review of Byrne’s Transparency and Self-Knowledge, The Philosophical Quarterly 


Work in Progress/submitted


Thesis

'Knowing Our Reasons: Distinctive Self-Knowledge of Why we Hold Attitudes and Perform Actions'. Supervisors: Conor McHugh (Southampton) and Richard Gray (Cardiff)

My thesis concerns our self-knowledge of why we have our attitudes and perform actions. For example, as well as knowing that I believe it will rain, I can also know why I believe it – for the reason that the weather forecast says it will. It is often thought we learn of this in a similar way to other people, even if we have a distinctive first-personal access to other facts about ourselves like sensations and beliefs. This is supported by the raft of data concerning the confabulation of reasons and the unconscious influences on our thinking. 
I argue, though, that the main argument for this orthodoxy fails. Rather, we do have a distinctive first-person access to a key explanation of our attitudes and actions – the reasons for which we hold/perform them (i.e. our motivating reasons). In providing an account of this, I use insights from cognitive science and appeal to both the personal level, where we can talk of the subject herself, and that of low-level processing. I argue that at the low level, self-knowledge indeed resembles other-knowledge. Both involve a quasi-inferential process using evidence about the relevant subject. But regarding how the subject herself learns of her motivating reasons, I argue that we use a transparency method. We learn of what our reason is for believing p, say, by considering what justifies believing p. That is, we don’t consider evidence that we have that reason. Rather, we look out into the world, and consider the good reasons in favour of having that belief. This then allows us, the subject, to self-ascribe our motivating reason. This process is underpinned by various low-level mechanisms but constitutes a distinct type of method. 
Then, I argue that my account has a surprising consequence. Our motivating reasons self-intimate – if we have a motivating reason, then necessarily we will be in a position to know that we have it. This is the case even if we doubt, that the same holds for our attitudes. The self-knowledge of motivating reasons, then, bears great significance.
(See my paper of the same name for the central idea in abridged form!)