The Political Economy of Intellectual Property Rights in Trade
Dissertation Committee: Helen V. Milner (chair), James R. Vreeland, and Kristopher W. Ramsay
Who are winners and losers of intellectual property rights protection?
How do their conflicts of interest shape the trade policies?
How do institutions and economic interdependence shape the outcome?
In my dissertation, I address these fundamentals of international and comparative political economy and examine why the WTO preserves the freedom to use a set of rights and safeguards under the TRIPS agreement, known as TRIPS Flexibilties. Specifically, I study how WTO member states' uses of the trade remedies are bound by their domestic and international political conditions.
Ch 1) TRIPS and International Organization: Reputation as a Binding Constraint - How States Navigate TRIPS Flexibilities
Ch 2) TRIPS and Domestic Political Institutions: The Politics of Compulsory Licensing - Democracy and Regulatory Threat in Public Health
Ch 3) TRIPS and Economic Interdependence: Innovation, Imitation, and Political Cleavages in International Trade and Patent Protection