Sarah McGrath

Book: Moral Knowledge. 2019. Oxford: OUP


“Reply to Arpaly, Kornblith, and Markovits.” To appear in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.

“Please Keep Your Charity out of my Agency: Paternalism and the Participant Stance.” Forthcoming in Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics.

“Epistemology for Realists.” Forthcoming in David Copp and Paul Bloomfield (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Moral Realism.

“Moral Knowledge.” Forthcoming in Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.) The Ethical Life: Fundamental Readings in Ethics and Contemporary Moral Problems. 5th edition. (Oxford University Press).

“Epistemic Autonomy for Social Epistemologists: The Case of Moral Inheritance.” John Matheson and Kirk Lougheed (eds.), Epistemic Autonomy. New York: Routledge. (2022): 271-287.

“Bias: Some Conceptual Geography” (with Thomas Kelly) in Nathan Ballantyne and David Dunning (eds.) Reason, Bias, and Inquiry: New Perspectives from the Crossroads of Epistemology and Psychology (Oxford University Press 2022).

The Metaethics of Gender.” Oxford Studies in Metaethics vol. 16 (2021): 27-53.

“Moral Confirmation vs. Moral Explanation: a Tale of Two Challenges.” Res Philosophica vol. 98 no. 1 (2021): 1-21.

“The Methodological Significance of Levels of Generality for Moral Theorizing.” Philosophical Perspectives vol. 33 no. 1 (2019): 105-125.

“What’s Weird About Moral Deference?” in Gideon Rosen et al (eds.) The Norton Introduction to Philosophy 2nd edition (Norton Publishers 2018): 914-920.

Moral Perception and Its Rivals” in R. Cowan and A. Bergqvist (eds.) Evaluative Perception (Oxford University Press 2018): 161-182.

“Are There Any Successful Philosophical Arguments?” in John Keller (ed.) Being, Freedom and Method: Themes from van Inwagen (Oxford University Press 2017): 324-339 (co-authored with Thomas Kelly).

“Soames and Moore on Method in Ethics and Epistemology” Philosophical Studies 172, 6 (2016): 1661-1670 (co-authored with Thomas Kelly).

“Forgetting the Difference Between Right And Wrong,” in S.G. Chappell (ed.) Intuition, Theory, and Anti-Theory (Oxford University Press 2015): 104-126.

Relax? Don’t Do It! Why Moral Realism Won’t Come Cheap,” Oxford Studies in Metaethics 9 (2014): 186-214.

“On Hastings Rashdall’s ‘The Limits of Casuistry’,” Ethics vol. 125, No.1 (Oct. 2014): 196-199.

“Moral Perception,” in Hugh LaFollete (ed.) International Encyclopedia of Ethics (Wiley-Blackwell, 2013): 3832-3839.

“Moral Realism without Convergence,” Philosophical Topics vol.38, no.2 (2013/2010): 59-90.

“Skepticism about Moral Expertise as a Puzzle for Moral Realism,” The Journal of Philosophy, 108 (2011): 111-137.

Normative Ethics, Conversion, and Pictures as Tools of Moral Persuasion,” Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 1 (2011): 268-294.

Moral Knowledge and Experience,” Oxford Studies in Metaethics 6 (2011): 107127.

“Reply to King,” Journal of Philosophical Research 36 (2011): 235-241.

Is Reflective Equilibrium Enough?” Philosophical Perspectives 24 (2010): 325359 (co-authored with Thomas Kelly).*To be anthologized in a forthcoming OUP collection devoted to contemporary discussions of themes from the work of John Rawls, edited by Sarah Roberts-Cady.

“The Puzzle of Pure Moral Deference,” Philosophical Perspectives, 23 (2009): 321-344.

Moral Disagreement and Moral Expertise,” Oxford Studies in Metaethics 3: (2008): 87-108.

“Organ Procurement, Altruism, and Autonomy,” Journal of Value Inquiry 40 (2006): 297-309.

“Causation by Omission: A Dilemma,” Philosophical Studies, 123 (2005): 125-148.

“Moral Knowledge by Perception,” Philosophical Perspectives, 18 (2004): 209-228.

“Causation and the Making/Allowing Distinction,” Philosophical Studies, 114 (2003): 81-106.