Hi! I am a fifth-year PhD candidate in Economics at MIT. I am a microeconomic theorist with research interests in dynamic information design, mechanism design, and market design. I completed my undergraduate studies in Mathematics and Economics at the University of Wisconsin–Madison.
E-mail: sanguanm@mit.edu
Here is my CV
Memory Correlated Equilibrium (with Andrew Koh), 2025 (New!)
How does memory affect equilibria in games? Memory structures can alleviate commitment issues.
Robust Technology Regulation (with Andrew Koh), 2025
How should uncertain technologies be robustly regulated when a learning process is unknown?
Attention Capture (with Andrew Koh), 2024
Revise and Resubmit, Journal of Political Economy
How to optimally extract attention from platform users through dynamic information design?
Persuasion and Optimal Stopping (with Andrew Koh and Weijie Zhong), 2024
Submitted
A unified method for solving dynamic information design with optimal stopping
Informational Puts (with Andrew Koh and Kei Uzui), 2024
Submitted
A dynamic information design using only public signals can guarantee the best equilibrium in a dynamic coordination game with switching frictions.
Multiple Admission Tracks in the College Admissions Problem, 2022
When should colleges transition from a test-only policy to a multi-channel policy?
Screening against Unknown Learning