SINDH'S REJECTlON OF PAKISTAN is total. But the Pakistani establishment, backed by the United States of America has no intention of disappearing from the scene. Here is an irresistible force facing an immovable object. What can be the upshot of such an explosive situation? Allah alone knows, but man may speculate --- in the light of history . . . and common sense.
Right now people in Pakistan --- and particularly in Sindh --- want elections. They want elections because, as former Indians, they have known elections since 1921. They are not like the Arabs or the Iranians who have never known a proper election. After Partition, they have not had seven elections like in India. But they had elections in 1954 and in 1971 --- and again in 1977. After the 1954 elections, Fazlul Haq of East Bengal came to West Bengal and said in Calcutta that ``those who divided the country are traitors'' (``Desher vibhajan jara korechhe, tara deshadrohi''). He was then dismissed for his labours. But the 1971 elections more than vindicated Haq when Mujibur Rehman converted East Pakistan from a colony of Pakistan into the sovereign state of Bangladesh. No wonder the Pakistani establishment does not want elections.
Today military officers are working as Governors, departmental heads, collectors, judges; they do not want to give up what they have, even if it does not belong to them. However, there is another, bigger, reason behind the demand for elections; and the Army is scared stiff of that. Today the conviction in all the provinces in Pakistan is that they must have more powers. The party which asks for the greatest autonomy will get the biggest electoral support. Their core demand is that Pakistan must become a confederation, with the provinces transferring only Defence, Foreign Affairs, Communications and Currency to the Centre. The money for the Army must also come from the provinces --- with their approval. It is the old 6-point formula of Mujibur Rehman again at work. The Army wants no part of such a scheme. It has scared Washington with the assessment that any elections in Pakistan will return ``leftist'' parties. And for the USA, Left --- any Left --- is communism. The fact, however, is that the Pakistan provinces will not go leftist; they will go nationalist. However, the USA is not used to such nice distinctions in the realm of its Third-World diplomacy. Whatever, apparently, goes counter to American interests, is bad, subversive, ``communist''. It i8 not very different from South Africa, where anybody who objects to ``apartheid'', is dubbed ``communist''.
Even otherwise, the USA prefers to deal with dictators --- preferably of the military variety --- than with democrats who have a mind of their own and a constituency to tend.
Pakistan has been an unashamed American client state ever since the New York Times welcomed Liaqat Ali's arrival in the USA with a front-page, greeting in Urdu: ``Khoosh Aamded!'' Ayub Khan's brother Sardar Bahadur himself said that the military coup of 1958 was CIA inspired. As long as Ayub was the strong man of Pakistan, he visited USA every year and met CIA boss Allen Dulles every time. Allen himself certified Pakistan under military dictatorship as ``a bulwark of freedom in Asia''. The then US ambassador not only donned the ``Jinnah cap'', his daughter even married strongman Iskander Mirza's son. Indeed in the words of Air Marshal Asghar Khan, ``Iskander Mirza's pro-Americanism often embarrassed the Americans.'' Ayub opposed Egypt's Nasser to please the USA --- and Zia opposes Iran's Khomeini, again to please the USA. None of this would be possible in a democratic Pakistan.
The USA, therefore, does not want elections any more than does Zia. Indeed the USA would dump Zia, if he gets to be too unpopular, and install another general in his place, who can then hop fully eke out some more years for the Pentagon's comfort. A now broom is expected to sweep better --- for a while.
But not quite. The new dictator will not last even a fraction of that of the old one. And meanwhile the people's demand for democracy will grow too strong to resist. And at that stage the American democratic conscience will no doubt come into play. Elections will be held --- even though Zia says that Allah told him in a dream in 1978 that ``elections are un-lslamic.'' Interestingly enough, Jinnah had pronounced that ``whatever the Muslims do, is Islamic.'' And Muslims in Pakistan do want elections! And these elections may prove as crucial as the 1971 polls.
A pertinent question here is why the demand for elections is much stronger in Sindh than in the other three provinces. The fact is that all the provinces want elections, but some want it more urgently --- for local reasons. The Punjab is ruling all Pakistan today through the Army; so it is not all that keen on elections, which will give it more freedom, but which will also reduce its power.
People in Sindh, Baluchistan, and the NWFP, on the other hand, want much more than elections. They want autonomy --- as a prelude to independence. But as separate nationalities, they have a different psychic clock ticking away inside them. Baluchistan's fight for freedom in the Nineteen Seventies caused Pakistan to post one lakh troops in that province at a daily expense of one crore of rupees --- mostly paid for by the Shah of Iran for five long years. At the end of it, 5,300 Baluchi guerrillas and 3,300 Pakistani troops lay dead. Today the highest office a Baluchi can hold in the police force is that of sub-inspector. In the words of Sardar Mengal, the deposed Baluchi premier: ``There is no Kalati in the Kalat Scouts and no Makrani in the Makran Militia.'' In this situation, the Baluchis do not want just elections; they want a revolution that will bring them freedom. They will strike in their own way and in their own good time.
And so will the NWFP. Here the lakhs of Afghan refugees are already saying, ``We have come home to Pakhtoonistan.'' And one of these years they may have a separate sovereign state of Pakhtoons. It is not for nothing that Wali Khan has said that the Pathans can fabricate any arms ``except atom bomb''. But they are obviously biding their time. And they know that the hotting up of the cold war, particularly on their Afghan border, is not the time to precipitate matters.
Indeed the two super-powers are quite unpopular --- both in India and in Pakistan. Instinctively, people all over the Hindustan peninsula feel that the powers are only using them --- and exploiting their differences --- to advance their own interests in the area. A reunited India would be a Great Power, dealing with the USA and the USSR on terms of equality.
Just now Soviet Russia is sitting in Afghanistan, right across the border. Any mass movement in the NWFP or Baluchistan would only get Zia more American arms --- if not also a few thousand American ``military advisers'', a la Salvador. People in Pakistan would like to get rid of American military presence, and not invite Russian military presence also. The latter course can only precipitate a Russo-American confrontation on Pakistani soil. Pakistanis do not want that. And, mercifully, Russia does not want it either. Its hands are more than full with Afghanistan. It knows that Pakistan is not its cup of tea. Crossing the Khyber will mean war --- maybe even World War III. And so the NWFP and Baluchistan are deliberately hastening slowly. They know that time is on their side.
This, however, is not the compulsion for Sindh. It finds itself at a safe enough distance from the Russians in Kabul Unlike Baluchistan, it has not been overrun and overwhelmed by the Punjabis It has been enundated by the Punjabis and by the refugees from India. It, therefore, does have some maneuverability. Indeed the settlement of a large number of families of education, culture and wealth from India has contributed to the ferment in Sindh. Even otherwise, Sindh is politically more .conscious than NWFP and Baluchistan. On top of this, Sindh finds that it has a long border with a sympathetic India. All these factors have combined to make the anti-Zia MRD stronger in Sindh than in any other province. And then there is the ``Jiye Sindh ` sentiment to draw upon.
A legitimate question would be: If the lndian States can live together, why are the Pakistan provinces not able to live together? After all, they are a pretty homogeneous state, in the same river valley.
There are three good reasons why they cannot. India is a large country with several States, none of which dominates the Union. Even Uttar Pradesh, the biggest State, has less than one-sixth of the seats in the Lok Sabha. By contrast, the Punjab in Pakistan is bigger than all the other provinces put together.
American backing for the Pakistani army, which is basically Punjabi, puts even more premium on the Punjab. And that makes it even more unacceptable to Sindh and other provinces. The third factor is psychological: the Hindus tend to be tolerant even of the non-Hindus; the Muslims tend to be intolerant even of each other.
Such are the wages of monotheistic Islam --- and such, the bonus of polytheistic Hinduism. As Arnold Toynbee put it in his Dialogues with Daisaku Ikeda of Soka Gakkai of Japan: ``The Indian and East Asian attitude is pantheism. The Judaic religions (Judaism, Christianity, Islam) have concentrated the element of divinity into a unique, omnipotent, creator god outside the universe, and this restriction of divinity has deprived nature --- including human nature --- of its divinity. By contrast, in India and Eastern Asia, before the impact of the modern West, the whole universe and everything in it, including non-human nature and man himself, was divine and, therefore, possessed, in human eyes, a sanctity and a dignity that have restrained man's impulse to indulge in greed by doing violence to non-human nature...I believe that mankind needs to revert to pantheism. The present adherents of the Judaic monotheistic religions are, all of them, ex-pantheists. This historical fact suggests that there might be some hope of their reverting to the pantheistic attitude, now that they have become aware of the badness of the consequences of the monotheistic lack of respect for nature.''
Nor is that all. Pakistan was a very reluctant, a very much forced, state. Even in the 1946 assembly elections, the majority of the Sindhis did not vote for the pro-partition candidates, though the province had 70 per cent Muslim population. Baluchistan's top leader, Khan Samad Khan, was against partition. The Khan of Kalat actually applied for accession to India. It was the British-controlled tribal jirgas that opted for Pakistan. The NWFP had elected a Congress Government even in 1946. It went to Pakistan only by default --- because West Punjab's plumping for partition had removed the NWFP's land-link with the new India, and the British would not give it the choice of Independence. In disgust, the NWFP Congress boycotted the referendum. Good old Ghaffar Khan justly complained that they had been ``thrown to the wolves''.
It will thus be seen that the democratic pro-lndian urges i Sindh, NWFP, and Baluchistan are nothing new; they were there even in 1947. The Muslim League was not half as popular in the Muslim-majority provinces as it was in the Muslim-minority provinces. lndeed, even Pakistani Punjab has now acquired strong new intimations of its Punjabi identity. These days Punjabi films succeed in Pakistan, while Urdu films flop.
Today Punjab backs the role of Urdu in Pakistan because of the traditional position of Urdu as official language in the province; also because Urdu seals the Punjabi-Refugee alliance against the other three provinces of Pakistan --- and makes it out as a pan-lndo-Muslim language. In a changed situation, even Pakistan Punjab may forget about Urdu. It was not for nothing that Josh Malihabadi said that Urdu might have some future in India but it had none whatsoever in Pakistan.
A few years before Partition, the Muslim students of Punjab University in Lahore had resolved that even as strong animals prey on weak animals, Muslims had the natural right to live off Hindus. But a few years back, the students of the same Punjab University, resolved that the National Day of Punjab is Vaisakhi! Evidently they did not know that Vaisakhi is the Hindu New Year Day. Such is the natural Hindu-ness of even the Punjabi-Muslims. All of them are Muslim-Indians --- to be exact, Muslim-Hindus --- and not Indian Muslims. They are Indians who happen to be Muslim --- not Muslims who happen to be Indian.
One day the then Governor-General of Pakistan, Ghulam Mohammed, was having a boating excursion on the Manchar (corruption of Mansarovar) lake in Sindh. Music was going on in the next boat. At one stage the singer sang:
Chhad jhagda masjid mandir da;
Ghantor tariqa Qalandar da
(Give up this fight over temple and mosque --- and take Saint Qalandar's way of love.)
Ghulam Mohammed, a Punjabi, burst into tears. And the boat with the singing party had to be moved away, to calm down the Governor-General.
No, the Punjabi Muslims are also Punjabis first and Muslims only for an argument with the Hindus or for a cushy job with the Saudis.
Some Sindhis in their desperation say, if they have to choose between Islam and Sindhiat they would rather choose Sindhiat. (This is a new word for ``Sindhi culture'' coined after independence-partition --- the earlier word being the Persianized ``Sindhi Tahzeeb''.) However, such a problem does not exist. The native nationalism of people in Pakistan has asserted itself; Islam is only a thin superimposition on their nationalism. They would all like to come into their own --- and not be a nuisance to one another. Even Punjab would recognize that since the Vedic times Sindh and Punjab have been separate states --- then known as Sindhu and Sauvira, respectively. The one had its centre at Mooanjo-daro, the other at Harappa. The ancient realities are asserting themselves. Verily, the more we change the more we remain the same. The Sindhis remain Sindhis and the Punjabis remain Punjabis and not even Islam can make them all ``Pakistanis''.
In this situation a confederal arragement, with a certain friendly freedom for all the four provinces, should be the right solution for the Pakistani problem.
But how would the USA view the matter? It looks upon Pakistan as one of its two policemen in West Asia --- the other one being Israel. Israel keeps the Arab states in line from the out side; Pakistan, being Muslim, is in a position to keep them in line from the inside. This internal police role of Pakistan, in the service of the USA, could be allowed to continue for some time while Pakistan is reorganized internally. After all, if the UK can recruit troops in Kathmandu, the USA may recruit troops in Lahore --- if that is what the two sides want! Hopefully, as oil exhausts itself, the USA will have a diminishing strategic interest in the Pakistani area.
An assurance that the American strategic interests in Pakistan will not be adversely affected, underwritten by lndia, the paramount power in South Asia, could reconcile the USA to a more realistic reorganization of the Pakistani areas.
There is another problem. A confederation tends to become a federation --- and a federation tends to become more unitary than federal; otherwise it tends to break up into so many constituent units. Since the Pakistanis have tried the unitary experiment and rejected it, they could now drift apart into complete independence. If that is their free will, so be it. However, the Indus river system will always bind them together in economic cooperation. Punjab can be guaranteed free access to Karachi harbour. Indeed while politically a part of Sindh, the Karachi port area could be administered jointly by the four provinces. That should satisfy all the provinces.
Nor need the refugees fear for their future in Sindh. A few years ago they had said that India should care for them also, since they too were ``persons of Indian origin''. However, there is no defence like amity. Otherwise the refugee islands in the cities of Sindh could always be overwhelmed by the sea of rural Sindhi humanity. But refugees in Sindh need have no such fear. Nobody will any more call them Makar (locusts) in Sindh, once they make their peace with the Sindhis. G. M. Syed Or Sindh has said that all those who identify themselves with the people and culture of Sindh, will be accepted as Sindhis. After all, this is not the first time that outsiders have settled down in an area; they always adjust to the new land and the new situation, to be at peace with themselves and with the world. The ``New Sindhis'' are also beginning to respond to the ``Old Sindhis'', Maulana Noorani, general secretary of Jamat-i-Islami, and a ranking refugee leader, has come out openly in support of the Sindhi demands.
There are important people in Sindh who say India should liberate them from Pakistan --- and then keep them in lndia or outside. Any such act of mid-wifery on the part of India would be a legitimate act of liberation on the part of one democratic people for a fraternal people aspiring for democracy. Sheikh Ayaz, the most out-standing modern poet of Sindh, has been saying: ``Jai Sindh! Jai Hind!'' It is for the Government of India to decide whether it should help deliver the democratic baby in Pakistan. But, even if it does not, the people there can take care of the situation.
Pakistan took away Karachi from Sindh in 1948: and in 1954 Sindh was forcibly merged into ``One Unit''. But the Sindhis succeeded in undoing the ``One Unit'' and getting back Karachi in 1971. They have the will to acquire all the autonomy they want; and they will no doubt have their way. They have even given themselves the ``axe'' (parashu) as the symbol of the ``Jiye Sindh'' movement, to leave nobody in any doubt that they mean business.
True, the Sindhis do not fight pitched battles; they did not fight any even when Sindh was free. They used to engage the Baluchis to fight for them --- whether the enemy was Nadir Shah or Napier. But even the single tribe of Hurs gave the British enough hell in 1943, to necessitate Martial Law in half of Sindh for a whole year. Of late all Sindh has been up in arms--even though these arms consist mostly of lathis and axes. Rasul Bux Palejo, the Sindh farmers' leader, has been in detention since 1979. Even the Sindh Graduates' Association has been banned. No government can keep down a people, once they are roused. So even if Government of India does not act, the people of Pakistan shall prevail against their rootless government. It will only mean some delay --- and some more suffering. That is all.
Nor need anybody be surprised by the four provinces of Pakistan coming into their own under a benign Indian umbrella. Bharat Mata takes care even of her truant children. After all, even Jinnah had not visualized a permanent Indo-Pak hostility. He had said that against any foreign threat, India and Pakistan would stand together. Khaliquzzaman, a pillar of the Partition movement, said after 1971 that the Partition scheme had failed, and that a new arrangement needed to be worked out. And even Bhutto of `'one-thousand-year-war'' fame had thought aloud that he might not become prime minister in a reunited India, but that he could certainly hope to be its foreign minister. Of course. And even if it is too late for Bhutto, j it may be timely enough for a Jatoi, a Daultana, a Wali Khan or a Mengal.