We use a field experiment to identify how differences in preferences and spousal influence result in low willingness to pay (WTP) for technologies that can benefit all household members. We create income-earning opportunities to empower households and conduct an actual stove purchase experiment to elicit their WTP for fuel, time, and indoor air pollution-reducing improved cookstoves. The decision to buy the stove was randomly assigned to either wives, husbands, or couples using either individually or jointly earned income. Experimental results suggest that wives, who often are responsible for cooking and collecting fuelwood, are willing to pay 57% more than husbands and 39% more than couples. Wives who made the stove purchase decision alone using the income they earned alone are willing to pay 67% more than husbands who made the purchase decision alone. We also find that couples’ WTP is similar to that of husbands, implying that husbands dominate joint decisions. A follow-up survey conducted 15 months after the stove purchase shows that the treatments do not affect stove use. Our findings highlight the importance of considering the division of labor, preference difference, and spousal influence within the household when promoting the adoption of new household technologies. Improving access to cash for poor women would likely enable them to make decisions consistent with their preferences.
In this study we conducted a randomized experiment in rural Ethiopia to test on how quickly energy efficient technology (an improved stove) is put in use after the technologies is disseminated. We evaluate two concepts that may affect usage of a product: screening (related to valuation of a product) and sunk cost effects (based on the price the potential user paid for the product). A standard Tobit and IV-Tobit methods of estimations are used for testing sunk cost and screening effects, respectively. Results based on the baseline survey and follow up data shows that there is no difference in the length of waiting time to start using the energy efficient technology between those who got the stove for free and those that paid money for it; in other words, the sunk cost effect is absent. However, we find a difference in the waiting time between those with high valuation for the stove and those with lower valuation for it; in other words, we find an evidence of the screening effect. The result has pricing policy implications for government and non-government organizations involved in dissemination of such technologies that have both public (environmental) and private benefits.
Full list of my research work is available at my Google Scholar Account