Working Papers
Direct and Indirect Persuasion, working paper, 2024.
This paper analyzes a Bayesian persuasion model with two senders sequentially transmitting their information to a receiver. We consider two persuasion schemes: the first sender's information is transmitted to a receiver directly ("direct persuasion") and via the second sender ("indirect persuasion"). This paper shows that indirect persuasion benefits the receiver if and only if the second sender is biased toward the action, compared to the receiver, that is selected in the prior belief and (1) the first one has a like bias, and the degrees of biases in both senders are large enough, or (2) the first sender has an opposing bias.
Sponsored Review, working paper, 2024.
Sponsorship, as represented by the advertiser-media relationship, is a prominent example of a bias that distorts information from reviewers. This paper analyzes an information disclosure game with such a reviewer. A receiver must choose an action whose payoff is unknown. The sender can disclose verifiable evidence to influence the decision. In addition, the reviewer observes a signal correlated with the state and publishes a report. The reviewer has two concerns: an unfavorable review for the sender may trigger a suspension of the sponsorship; in contrast, a biased review may hurt the reputation for quality. We find that the presence of sponsorship-induced bias can benefit the receiver because it resolves the distortion of information from reputation concerns.
Publication
Starting Rough, Dynamic Persuasion with Partial Information, Economic Letters, June 2024, volume 138, 111712.
This study builds upon a Bayesian persuasion model Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011), extending it to two stages where the sender observes signals correlated with the persistent state instead of directly observing it. We demonstrate that the uncertainty about the state yields an optimal persuasion policy involving starting rough: the sender maximizes the second stage's payoff by forgoing persuasion in the first stage.
Academic meetings
Japanese Economic Association, 2024 Autumn Meeting, Oral, 2024/10/20 (forthcoming)
Workshop/Seminar
The 15th East Asian Theory Workshop at Hong Kong University, December 2024 (Forthcoming)
Contract Theory Workshop, Summer Conference 2024 at Tohoku University, August 2024
Economics Seminar at Nagoya University, October 2023
Applied Micro Theory Workshop at Osaka University, February 2023
9th Annual Communication Theory Workshop, December 2022