Research Interests：

• Epistemic game theory and logic;

• Psychological games;

• Political economy (superpower competition,  propogation of misinformation on networks, governance and social violence under authoritarian regimes);

• Ambiguity and misspecification;

• Self-confirming equilibrium and learning;

• Algorithmic game theory, Kolmogorov complexity and its application in games.

Publications:

• Quantal Response Equilibrium and Rationalizability: Inside the Black Box (with Fabio Maccheroni), forthcoming in Games and Economic Behavior.

•  Characterizing Permissibility, Proper Rationalizability, an Iterated Admissibility by Incomplete Information, International Journal of Game Theory 50 (2021): 119-148.

• Monotonic Core Allocation Paths for Assignment Games (with Takaaki Abe), Social Choice and Welfare 53 (2019): 557-573. 

• Directed Graphical Structure, Nash Equilibrium, and Potential Games, Operations Research Letters 46 (2018): 273-277.

• Elimination of Dominated Strategies and Inessential Players (with Mamoru Kaneko), Operations Research and Decisions 25 (2015): 35-54. 

Working Papers:

• Influence Structure, Nash Equilibrium, and Approximation of a Game.

• A Note on Gale, Kuhn, and Tucker's Reductions of Zero-Sum Games.

• Randomness, Predictability, and Complexity in Repeated Situations (with Zsombor Z. Méder).

• Ordered Kripke Model, Permissibility, and Convergence of Probabilistic Kripke Model.

• The Power of Non-Superpowers(with Tomoo Kikuchi)

• Level-k Reasoning, Cognitive Hierarchy, and Rationalizability 

• Reasoning about Bounded Reasoning (with Gabriel Ziegler)

• When Truth Does Not Take on Its Shoes: How Misinformation Spreads in Chatrooms 

• Information Sufficiency and Stability in Decentralized Decision Making